Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant brought an action against Respondent, a railroad company, in state court seeking damages under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) and the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA). The jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellant, finding that Respondent had violated LIA. Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion to amend the judgment, requesting interest from the date of the verdict to the date of judgment. The district court denied the motion on the ground that prejudgment interest is not available in a FELA action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that post-verdict, prejudgment interest is not available in a FELA action as a matter of federal substantive law. View "Kinworthy v. Soo Line R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Sysdyne Corporation and Xigent Solutions, LLC provide staff augmentation services to companies in the engineering and information industries. When Brian Rousslang, a former employee of Sysdyne Corporation who was subject to a noncompete agreement, obtained employment with Xigent Solutions, LLC, Sysdyne sued Xigent for tortious interference with contract and sued Rousslang for breach of contract. The trial court (1) awarded damages to Sysdyne on its breach of contract claim with respect to certain preexisting customers Rousslang brought with him from Sysdyne to Xigent; but (2) ruled in favor of Xigent on the tortious interference claim, concluding that Xigent was justified in interfering with the contract because Xigent conducted a reasonable inquiry into the enforceability of the noncompete agreement and, based on advice of outside counsel, honestly believed that the agreement was unenforceable. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the justification defense to a claim of tortious interference with a contract may be satisfied by a defendant’s reliance on incorrect advice of outside counsel; and (2) under the facts of this case, the trial court did not err in concluding that Xigent met its burden of proving the justification defense. View "Sysdyne Corp. v. Rousslang" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of a violation of Minn. Stat. 97B.301, which states that a person may not “take” deer without a license, after he was discovered sitting in a camouflaged blind in an open field, wearing blaze orange, and possessing a loaded gun. At issue on appeal was whether Defendant’s actions constituted a “take” under the applicable definition. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding (1) the statutory definition of “taking” applies to “take”; and (2) under that definition, a jury could reasonably conclude that Defendant took deer by “pursuing” or “attempting to take” deer in violation of section 97B.301. View "State v. Schmid" on Justia Law

When Amos Graves was anticipating losing his home to foreclosure, Michael Wayman persuaded him to enter into a transaction that would purportedly save his home. Graves executed a quitclaim deed in favor of a corporate entity under Wayman’s control, but, the next day, sent a cancellation notice to Wayman, as was his statutory right. Wayman refused to cancel the transaction. When Wayman ceased making mortgage payments, First Minnesota Bank, the eventual mortgagee of the property, foreclosed on and purchased the home. Graves sued Wayman, Wayman’s companies, and First Minnesota, alleging that First Minnesota’s mortgage was invalid because Graves did not lawfully sell his home to Wayman. The district court awarded the property to First Minnesota, concluding that the bank was a bona fide purchaser. The court of appeals reversed and awarded the property to Graves, concluding that First Minnesota did not qualify as a bona fide purchaser. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) First Minnesota was not entitled to rights in the property as a bona fide purchaser; but (2) the court of appeals erred in concluding that Graves should be awarded title to the property free of any interest of First Minnesota. Remanded. View "Graves v. Wayman" on Justia Law

William Krebes died in 2009, survived by his wife, Helen Durand. The next year, two of Durand’s children petitioned the district court for the appointment of a conservator for Durand because she lacked clarity of mind to make informed decisions regarding her late husband’s estate. The district court agreed and appointed a conservator. The conservator then filed an elective share petition on Durand’s behalf in the probate court. The personal representative of Krebes’s estate opposed the petition, arguing that the elective share statute, Minn. Stat. 524.2-212, required the conservator, before filing for Durand’s elective share in the probate proceeding, to obtain a court order authorizing the filing, and the conservator in this case did not do so. The district court granted summary judgment for the conservator, concluding that section 524.2-212 violated Durand’s equal protection rights because protected surviving spouses are treated differently than non-protected surviving spouses. The court of appeals reversed on the grounds that protected and non-protected surviving spouses are not similarly situated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the distinction between protected and non-protected spouses in the section 524.2-212 does not violate equal protection under the Minnesota Constitution. View "In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Durand" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the largely fraudulent lending operations of First United Funding, LLC (First United). After First United collapsed, a court-appointed Receiver commenced this action under Minnesota’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (MUFTA) against several financial institutions, including Alliance Bank and certain Respondent Banks, that had participated in First United’s loan-participation scheme. The district court (1) dismissed the claims against the Respondent Banks for failure to bring the action in a timely fashion, and (2) allowed the claim against Alliance Bank, concluding that that the Receiver had pleaded legally sufficient claims based on a “Ponzi-scheme presumption.” The district court then entered judgment against Alliance Bank. The Receiver and Alliance Bank appealed. The court of appeals (1) divided the Ponzi-scheme presumption into three separate components and concluded that the third component was unfounded in the case of Alliance Bank; and (2) concluded that the district court erred when it dismissed the Receiver’s actual-fraud claims against the Respondent Banks. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) all three components of the Ponzi-scheme presumption lack support in MUFTA; and (2) the Receiver failed to adequately plead constructive fraud, but the district court erred when it dismissed the Receiver’s actual fraud claims. Remanded. View "Finn v. Alliance Bank" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of a crime and was sentenced to a stayed sentence of ninety-eight months together with a conditional-release term of five years. Appellant violated his probation, served a portion of his executed sentence, and was then placed on supervised release. After Appellant violated the terms of his supervised release, the Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC) revoked his release and ordered him to serve the remaining portion of his executed sentence in custody. Appellant filed a motion to correct his sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03(9), alleging that the DOC had illegally extended his conditional-release term. The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the matter and denied Appellant’s motion to correct his sentence on the merits. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) the district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a motion to correct a sentence under Rule 27.03(9), but such a motion is not the proper procedure to obtain judicial review of the Commissioner of Correction’s administrative decision implementing the sentence imposed by the district court; and (2) because Appellant used the wrong procedure, a denial of his motion to correct his sentence was warranted. View "State v. Schnagl" on Justia Law

Minn. Stat. 169A.20(2) (“the test refusal statute”) makes it a crime for a driver to refuse to request to take a chemical test to detect the presence of alcohol if certain conditions are met. One of those conditions is that the driver has been validly arrested for driving while impaired. Appellant argued that the test refusal statute violated due process because it criminalizes refusal to consent to an unreasonable, warrantless search of a driver’s breath. The district court dismissed the charges, concluding that the police lacked a lawful basis to search Appellant without a warrant, and therefore, the test refusal statute was unconstitutional as applied. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the breath test the police asked Defendant to take would have been constitutional under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, charging Defendant with criminal test refusal did not implicate a fundamental right; and (2) the test refusal statute is a reasonable means to a permissive object and passes rational basis review. View "State v. Bernard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Defendant, a former employee of the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS), alleging that Defendant accessed Driver and Vehicle Services records without authorization in violation of the federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA). DHS denied Defendant’s request for defense and indemnification, concluding that Defendant’s actions were outside the scope of his employment. Defendant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the court of appeals seeking judicial review of DHS’s decision. The court of appeals remanded the matter to DHS with instructions to grant Defendant’s request, concluding that DHS’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, holding that the court of appeals did not have jurisdiction over Defendant’s petition for a writ of certiorari and therefore did not have authority to hear this appeal. View "Nelson v. Schlener" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder. In a postconviction motion, Appellant argued that he was entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence and the recantation of two witnesses. The postconviction court denied the petition after granting multiple continuances for Appellant to attempt to secure the appearance of favorable witnesses and then holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed on the merits but remanded for resentencing, holding (1) the postconviction court did not err when it refused to compel the attendance of certain witnesses at an evidentiary hearing; (2) Appellant forfeited his argument that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance; and (3) the sentence imposed after a remand from Appellant’s direct appeal was improper. Remanded for resentencing. View "Burrell v. State" on Justia Law