Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant used Respondent as the general contractor for the construction of a building. When the building began having problems with water intrusion, Appellant brought suit claiming that Respondent acted negligently in its duties as general contractor. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent, concluding that the action was untimely under the two-year statute of limitations for improvements to real property in Minn. Stat. 541.051(1)(a). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the court of appeals correctly found that the plain language of section 541.051(1) does not require that construction be substantially complete to start the running of the statute of limitations; but (2) there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to when Appellant discovered its injury, and therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment. Remanded. View "328 Barry Avenue v. Nolan Props. Group, LLC" on Justia Law

An insurance company (Insurer) issued a policy of insurance on a building. A bank (Bank) was named in the policy as mortgagee. The policy contained a standard mortgage clause and a vacancy clause. The building was later vandalized, and Bank made a claim on the property. Insurer denied the claim under the vacancy clause. Bank sued for breach of the insurance contract. The district court summary judgment in favor of Insurer, concluding that Insurer was not liable to Bank because there was never any coverage offered for a vacant building. The court of appeals reversed, concluded that, under the standard mortgage clause, Bank was entitled to recover. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, when a property insurance policy contains both a vacancy clause and a standard mortgage clause, a mortgagee has coverage for vandalism damage to a vacant building only if the building was vacant because of the acts of the owner or if the owner failed to comply with the terms of the policy and the mortgagee was unaware of the acts or failure. Remanded. View "Commerce Bank v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellant represented a client pursuant to a contingent-fee agreement but voluntarily withdrew from the representation of the client when efforts to settle the case failed. The client subsequently retained substitute counsel, and substitute counsel successfully negotiated a settlement. Appellant filed suit seeking to recover in quantum meruit the value of the services provided prior to withdrawal. The district court entered judgment against Appellant, concluding that Appellant was not entitled to recover in quantum meruit because he failed to establish good cause for withdrawal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an attorney may withdraw from a contingent-fee agreement with or without cause, provided that the withdrawal satisfies the rule of professional responsibility; (2) the attorney may recover in quantum meruit the reasonable value of the services rendered prior to withdrawal if the attorney establishes that the withdrawal is for good cause; and (3) Appellant in this case failed to establish good cause. View "In re Petition for Distribution of Attorney’s Fees between Stowman Law Firm, P.A., and Lori Peterson Law Firm" on Justia Law

After a jury trial in 2003, Appellant was found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release. In 2014, Appellant filed his sixth postconviction petition, alleging newly discovered evidence, juror misconduct, and that cumulative errors required a new trial in the interests of justice. The postconviction court denied Appellant’s petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition, as the record conclusively showed that Appellant’s claims were either harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, procedurally barred, or meritless. View "Colbert v. State" on Justia Law

In 1987, after a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder while committing criminal sexual conduct. Appellant was sentenced to life in prison. In 2014, Appellant brought a motion to correct his sentence. The postconviction court treated Appellant’s motion as a petition for postconviction relief and denied it because of Appellant’s failure to file it until after the two-year postconviction statute of limitations had expired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion when it denied relief to Appellant on the grounds that the statute of limitations had expired. View "Wayne v. State" on Justia Law

The Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards brought a formal complaint against Hon. Alan F. Pendleton, Judge of the District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, alleging that Pendleton violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Minnesota Constitution. A panel appointed by the Supreme Court concluded that Judge Pendleton violated several sections of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Minn. Const. art. VI, 4 and recommended that the judge be censured and suspended from judicial office without pay for at least six months. Judge Pendleton appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board proved by clear and convincing evidence that Judge Pendleton failed to reside within his judicial district during his continuation in office and that he made a knowingly false statement regarding his residency in his affidavit of candidacy; (2) Judge Pendleton was not denied due process of law by irregularities in the proceedings before the Board and the panel; and (3) the appropriate judicial discipline is removal from office. View "Inquiry into the Conduct of Hon. Alan F. Pendleton" on Justia Law

Appellant, a Delaware limited liability company, made short-term, high-interest payday loans to Minnesota residents over the Internet. Integrity conceded that its payday loans did not comply with several provisions of Minnesota’s payday-lending law. In 2011, the Minnesota Attorney General sued Integrity, alleging that it had violated Minnesota’s payday-lending law. Integrity counterclaimed by requesting a declaratory judgment that Minnesota’s payday-lending law was unconstitutional under the extraterritoriality principle of the Commerce Clause, which prohibits a state from regulating commerce that occurs wholly outside the state. The district court granted summary judgment to the State. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Minnesota’s payday-lending law does not violate the Commerce Clause. View "State v. Integrity Advance, LLC" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree assault. The jury found that certain facts existed to support a sentencing departure under the repeat offender aggravating factor. After a sentencing hearing, the district court departed upward from the presumptive sentence range of 135-189 months and sentenced Defendant to the statutory maximum sentence of 240 months. The court of appeals affirmed the sentence, concluding that the repeat offender aggravating factor provided a valid ground for departure and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a 240-month sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly applied the repeat offender aggravating factor to Defendant’s first-degree assault conviction; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 240-month sentence. View "State v. Meyers" on Justia Law

In 1997, Appellant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and attempted first-degree murder. In 2003, Appellant filed his first postconviction petition. The postconviction court denied the petition after holding an evidentiary hearing. In 2013, Appellant filed his second postconviction petition, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The postconviction court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing, concluding that the petition was both untimely under the two-year statute of limitations for filing a postconviction petition and procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant’s claims were procedurally barred. View "Williams v. State" on Justia Law

After Employee ended his employment with Employer he applied for and received state unemployment benefits from the Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED) and supplemental unemployment benefits (SUB) through a plan offered by Employer. DEED determined that the SUB plan payments counted as “wages” under Minn. Stat. 268.035(29)(A) and determined that Employee had been overpaid state unemployment benefits. An unemployment law judge affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Employee was entitled to keep the state unemployment benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the SUB plan payments Employee received were not “wages” for purposes of his eligibility for state unemployment benefits, and therefore, Employee was not overpaid state unemployment benefits. View "Engfer v. Gen. Dynamics Advanced Info. Sys., Inc." on Justia Law