Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this family dispute over real estate ownership resulting in a land partition action the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the district court's order finding Appellant in contempt for failure to pay sand and gravel royalties, holding that a party who acquired a royalty interest through a stipulated judgment may not enforce that interest by post judgment discovery and a contempt motion.The land partition action was settled and judgment was issued based on a stipulated settlement by the parties. As part of the settlement, Respondent agreed to convey a gravel pit to Appellant, reserving a one-seventh interest in sand and gravel royalties. Under the settlement and resulting judgment, Appellant was required to pay for these royalties and sign releases allowing Respondent to contact gravel purchasers for verification purposes. The district court later found Appellant in contempt for failure to pay royalties but allowed Appellant to purge the contempt finding by, inter alia, paying Respondent's attorney fees. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the parties' stipulated judgment created an interest in land and not a judgment debt, postjudgment discovery was not permitted; and (2) the district court erred in holding Appellant in contempt and ordering payment of attorney fees. View "Sehlstrom v. Sehlstrom" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant’s first-degree burglary conviction, holding that the victim must be physically present during the burglary for a conviction under Minn. Stat. 609.582(1)(b).Section 609.582(1)(b) elevates burglary to a first-degree offense if “the burglar possesses, when entering or at any time while in the building,….any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon.” On appeal, Defendant argued that because the victim was not physically present during the burglary, the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 609.582(1)(b) requires the victim to be physically present during the burglary. View "State v. Rogers" on Justia Law

In this first-degree murder case the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court summarily denying Appellant’s second and third petitions for postconviction relief, holding that Appellant was conclusively entitled to no relief.In his petitions, Appellant alleged, among other things, that two of the State’s witnesses recanted, that he was denied his right to confront the witnesses against him, and that he was denied his right to self-representation. The postconviction court denied the petitions without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in summarily denying postconviction relief because five of Appellant’s claims were filed after the statute of limitations expired and the sixth was legally insufficient to entitle Appellant to a new trial. View "Reed v. State" on Justia Law

In this condemnation case, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the district court’s award of $168,009 in attorney fees to the landowner under the condemnation fee-shifting statute, Minn. stat. 117.031(a), holding that the district court misinterpreted and misapplied the Court’s lodestar precedent.Using the lodestar method, the district court awarded the landowner the amount that he requested. The court of appeals reversed the award because the district court failed to begin its calculation with the presumptive lodestar amount of $34,133 and because the district court did not sufficiently explain why enhancing the presumptive lodestar amount by more than $130,000 would represent a reasonable fee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under current Supreme Court law, an enhancement based on a contingent fee agreement is improper; and (2) the district court incorrectly applied the law and did not make adequate factual findings to support its enhanced attorney-fee award. View "State v. Krause" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals ruling that Minnesota’s vehicle forfeiture statute, Minn. Stat. 169A.63, is unconstitutional as applied to Helen and Megan Olson, holding that the statute is constitutional on its face and constitutional as applied to Megan but unconstitutional as applied to Helen.Megan was arrested for driving while impaired (DWI) and was subject to being charged with a first-degree DWI offense. Because a first-degree DWI offense is a “designated” offense under the DWI vehicle forfeiture statute, the vehicle Megan was driving when she was arrested - a 1999 Lexus owned by Megan’s mother Helen - was subject to forfeiture. The police seized the vehicle incident to Megan’s lawful arrest. The Olsons filed a demand for judicial determination of the forfeiture, arguing that section 169A.63(9)(d), which sets forth the procedural requirements for judicial hearings related to vehicle forfeiture for a DWI offense, violated their due process rights. The district court determined that the statute was unconstitutional on its face. The court of appeals affirmed on different grounds. The Supreme Court held that the statute was constitutional as applied to Megan, who did not own the vehicle, but unconstitutional as applied to Helen, the purportedly innocent owner. View "Olson v. One 1999 Lexus" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court determining that the physician-patient privilege covered a blood sample and granting Defendant’s motion to suppress the results of a blood-alcohol concentration test derived from the blood sample, holding that a blood sample is not covered by the physician-patient privilege.The blood sample in this case was drawn by a medical professional during the course of emergency medical treatment after Defendant was injured in an ATV accident. In reversing the district court’s decision to suppress the evidence, the court of appeals concluded that a blood sample does not fall within the plain meaning of the word “information” as used in Minnesota’s statutory physician-patient privilege, codified at Minn. Stat. 595.02(1)(d). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding holding that the word “information” as used in the statute does not include a blood samples, and therefore, the physician-patient privilege did not apply to Defendant’s blood sample and the results of the blood-alcohol concentration test derived from the blood sample. View "State v. Atwood" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the district court finding for Tenant in the underlying eviction proceedings brought by Landlord and concluding that Landlord had breached the covenants of habitability, holding that a tenant asserting a common-law habitability defense in an eviction proceeding is not required to follow the procedures for an action under the rent-escrow statute, Minn. Stat. 504B.385.In response to Landlord’s action, Tenant raised the common-law habitability defense. The district court agreed with Tenant and ordered retroactive and prospective rent abatement until Landlord’s habitability violations were fixed. On appeal, Landlord argued that a tenant must follow the statutory procedures, including written notice, for a rent-escrow action under section 504B.385. The court of appeals held that Tenant was not required to do so. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that written notice is not required before a tenant raises a common-law habitability defense to an eviction proceeding. View "Ellis v. Doe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the workers’ compensation court of appeals (WCCA) reversing the workers’ compensation judge’s dismissal of Respondent’s petition for temporary total disability (TTD) benefits under the Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Act, holding that there is no statutory authority for an offset of workers’ compensation benefits by the amount of benefits paid under an employer’s self-funded, self-administered short-term disability (STD) plan.After awarded TTD benefits to Respondent, the compensation judge determined that Respondent’s employer (Employer) was entitled to offset those benefits by the amount of STD benefits already paid. Because Employer had already paid STD benefits in essentially the same amount that would be owed as TTD benefits, the compensation judge then dismissed Respondent’s petition. The WCCA reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCCA did not err in determining the Employer was not entitled to offset its workers’ compensation liability to Respondent by the amount of STD benefits it paid to Respondent. View "Bruton v. Smithfield Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court denying the motion for summary judgment filed by the City of Minneapolis as to Plaintiff’s claims under the Human Rights Act that the City discriminated against him by failing to accommodate his disability and retaliated against him for seeking an accommodation, holding that Plaintiff’s claims under the Human Rights Act were not barred by the exclusive-remedy provision of the Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Act.In moving for summary judgment, the City argued that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the exclusivity provision in the Workers’ Compensation Act. The district court denied summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court overruled its decision in Karst v. F.C. Hayer Co., 447 N.W.2d 180 (Minn. 1989) and reversed, holding that an employee can pursue claims under both the Workers’ Compensation Act and the Human Rights Act because each act provides a distinct cause of action that redresses a discrete type of injury to an employee. View "Daniel v. City of Minneapolis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the district court’s denial of Appellant’s request for a jury instruction on the defense of voluntary intoxication, holding that Minn. State. 617.23(2), the indecent-exposure statute, does not require the State to prove that the defendant had a specific intent to be lewd.Defendant was charged with indecent exposure in the presence of a minor under the age of sixteen. After concluding that the indecent-exposure statute creates a general-intent crime, the district court denied Defendant’s request that the jury be instructed on the defense of voluntary intoxication because that defense only applies to specific-intent crimes. The jury found Defendant guilty. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the offense of indecent exposure is a general-intent crime, and therefore, the court of appeals did not err when it affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s request for a jury instruction on the defense of voluntary intoxication. View "State v. Jama" on Justia Law