Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of first-degree felony murder, attempted first-degree felony murder, drive-by shooting (the underlying felony), and other offenses, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the drive-by shooting conviction and that the prosecutor did not engage in prosecutorial misconduct.On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he discharged a firearm "at or toward" a building or vehicle and that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct when she argued in rebuttal that Defendant's closing argument was trying to play on the jury's emotions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Defendant discharged a firearm "toward" a building; (2) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct; and (3) Defendant's remaining pro se arguments were without merit. View "State v. Waiters" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that two Minnesota statutes - Minn. Stat. 609.749, subd. 2(6), the stalking-by-mail provision, and Minn. Stat. 609.795, subd. 1(3), the mail-harassment statute - are constitutional under the First Amendment, holding that both statutes are facially overbroad.A.J.B. was found guilty of gross-misdemeanor stalking by use of the mail, misdemeanor harassment by use of the mail, and felony stalking. The court of appeals affirmed A.J.B.'s adjudications for stalking by mail and mail harassment, thus rejecting his constitutional challenges. On appeal, A.J.B. argued that his adjudications under the stalking-by-mail provision and mail-harassment statute must be vacated as contravening the First Amendment. The Supreme Court held (1) section 609.749, subd. 2(6), is facially overbroad and not subject to either a narrowing construction or severance of unconstitutional provisions; (2) section 609.795, subd. 1(3), is facially overbroad, but the statute can be saved through severance of the constitutionally problematic language; and (3) because it is unclear whether Defendant's adjudication of delinquency for mail-harassment is based on the severed language, Defendant's adjudication under section 609.795, subd. 1(3), is reversed and the case remanded. View "In re A.J.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions for first-degree sexual conduct and domestic assault by strangulation, holding that Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01 subs. 1-1a does not authorize an inspection of a crime scene in the control of a third party and that, even if Defendant had a constitutional right to inspect the crime scene, any error in denying that right was harmless.Before trial, Defendant filed a motion to allow his counsel and investigator to enter his former residence to inspect and photograph the crime scene. The district court denied the motion. The court of appeals held that Defendant had a right under Rule 9.01, subs. 1-1a, to inspect the crime scene but was not entitled to a new trial because the denial of his motion to inspect was harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Rule 9.01, subs. 1-1a, does not allow the State to allow a defendant to inspect a crime scene that is the control of a third party; and (2) even if assuming Defendant had the constitutional inspection rights he asserted here, any error in denying his motions to inspect the property was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Lee" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals upholding the district court's ruling that the admission of statements made by Defendant using a foreign language interpreter did not violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution or hearsay rules, holding that the Confrontation Clause was not violated in this case and that the statements were not subject to the hearsay rules.The district court convicted Defendant of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and sentenced him to 144 months in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that the admission of his translated statements violated the Confrontation Clause and hearsay rules. The court of appeals upheld the district court's ruling that the court's admission of the interpreter's translated statements were proper. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the translated statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the translated statements into evidence over the hearsay objection by Defendant. View "State v. Lopez-Ramos" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held in this eviction action that, under the circumstances of this case, the retaliation defense was not available under Minn. Stat. 504B.441 but that the common law should recognize a defense when a landlord retaliates against a tenant for making a good-faith complaint to the landlord of a material violation of a local or state law, residential covenants, or the lease.By special verdict, a jury found that Tenant materially violated the terms of the lease but that Landlord retaliated against Tenant as a penalty for complaining about the condition of the leased premises. The district court entered judgment for possession of the rental unit in favor of Tenant apparently based on the retaliation defense under Minn. Stat. 504B.285, subd. 2, and Minn. Stat. 504B.441. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the retaliation defense was unavailable to Tenant under either statutory provision. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Tenant could not assert a statutory defense; but (2) the language of the verdict was adequate to satisfy the requirements of the common-law retaliation defense that the Court recognized today. View "Central Housing Associates, LP v. Olson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the decision of an unemployment law judge upholding the determination of the Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development that the wages Appellant paid to workers who hold H-2A and J-1 visas are subject to unemployment insurance taxation, holding that the court of appeals did not err in concluding that Appellant owed the taxes.Appellant, a corporation that grows and sells fruits and vegetables, began hiring H-2A and J-1 nonimmigrant visa holders in 2010. In 2016, the Department of Employment and Economic Development determined that Appellant owed $154,726 in unpaid unemployment insurance taxes, mostly on the wages of the H-2A and J-1 visa workers. An unemployment judge upheld the determination, concluding that the visa workers' wages were subject to unemployment insurance taxation under Minnesota law. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant must pay unemployment insurance taxes on these workers' wages. View "Svihel Vegetable Farm, Inc. v. Department of Employment & Economic Development" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirming in part and reversing in part the workers' compensation judge's determination that the heirs of relator Richard Island were entitled to interest from Auto-Owners Insurance Group on underpaid disability benefits but that neither penalties nor expenses were warranted, holding that the compensation judge's determinations were supported by substantial evidence.On appeal, the WCCA affirmed the compensation judge's denial of penalties and expenses but reversed the award of interest from the date of each underpayment of disability benefits, concluding that the heirs were not entitled to interest. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the underpaid benefits must bear interest from the date of each underpayment, and the interest owed under Minn. Stat. 176.221, subd. 7 accrued at the statutory rate in effect at the time the payment was due; and (2) the compensation judge's determinations regarding penalties and expenses were supported by substantial evidence. View "Oseland v. Crow Wing County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court determining that Appellant was not entitled to custody credit against her Minnesota sentence for time spent in the custody of the Red Lake Nation, holding that Appellant was not entitled to custody credit against her Minnesota sentence for the time she spent in Red Lake custody because her Minnesota conviction was not the sole reason for her Red Lake custody.In 2011, Appellant was convicted of third-degree controlled-substance crime in Beltrami County District Court. The district court stayed imposition of Appellant's sentence and placed her on probation. In 2017, while she was still on probation, Appellant was convicted of two gross misdemeanors in Red Lake Tribal Court. After serving her sentence in the Red Lake Detention Center Appellant was released directly to Beltrami County because the district court had revoked her stay. The district court concluded that Appellant was not entitled to custody credit for her incarceration time in the Red Lake Detention Center. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant was not entitled to custody credit against her Minnesota sentence for the time she spent in Red Lake custody. View "State v. Roy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion to strike for lack of probable cause count 3, domestic assault with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm, which was charged as a felony under Minn. Stat. 609.2242, subd. 4, holding that the unambiguous language of the statute supported the felony charges.In moving to strike count 3, Defendant argued that using his previous convictions to enhance count 3 to a felony was inconsistent with Minn. Stat. 609.035, which prohibits multiple punishments for the same course of conduct. The district court granted the motion. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that section 609.035 did not prohibit enhancement under subdivision 4. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the domestic abuse charges against Defendant qualified for the enhancement provided by subdivision 4. View "State v. Defatte" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Commissioner of Human Services determining that RS Eden, a supervised living facility where J.W. received treatment before voluntarily leaving and dying of a drug overdose five days later, was responsible for maltreatment of J.W. by neglect, holding that the Commission's decision was not supported by substantial evidence.RS Eden appealed the maltreatment determination to the court of appeals, which affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that that Commissioner's finding of maltreatment for neglect for RS Eden's failure to obtain a waiver or to confer with a prescribing physicians was not supported by substantial evidence because RS Eden complied with the rules regarding the disposition of controlled substances and took reasonable steps to protect its client. View "In re Appeal by RS Eden" on Justia Law