Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirming a compensation judge's judgment finding that Alapati Noga, a former defensive lineman for the Minnesota Vikings, who now suffers from dementia, was entitled to permanent and total disability benefits, holding that Noga did not satisfy the statute of limitations under Minn. Stat. 176.151.Noga played as a defensive lineman for the Vikings from 1988 until 1992. While playing for the Vikings, Noga experienced head injuries and headaches. In 2015, Noga filed a claim petition for workers' compensation benefits. A compensation judge found that Noga sustained a Gillette injury of "head trauma, brain injury, and/or dementia" that culminated on or about December 1, 1992 and that the injury was a substantial contributing factor to Noga's permanent and total disability.The WCCA vacated certain findings and remanded several issues. On remand, the compensation judge resolved those issues in Noga's favor, determining, among other things, that the statute of limitations was satisfied under Minn. Stat. 176.151 because the Vikings provided Noga with medical care that constituted a "proceeding." The WCCA affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Vikings' provision of care for Noga's head injuries did not constitute a proceeding that prospectively satisfied the statute of limitations. View "Noga v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the district court's exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Ford Motor Company in this products liability case, holding that the claims in this case arose out of or related to Ford's contacts with Minnesota, and therefore, the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction by the Minnesota court was proper.A Ford vehicle owned by a Minnesota resident was involved in a car crash in which an airbag in the vehicle failed to deploy and a passenger was seriously injured. Ford moved to dismiss the passenger's claims for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that because the car involved in the accident was not designed, manufactured, or originally sold in Minnesota, Ford could not be subject to personal jurisdiction in Minnesota. The district court held that the exercise of jurisdiction over Ford was proper, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Ford's contacts with Minnesota were sufficient to support specific personal jurisdiction and that the reasonableness factors did not detract from the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction over Ford in this case. View "Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Minnesota Tax Court holding that the Minnesota Legislature incorporated the federal "minimum base amount" limitation into Minnesota's research and development (R&D) tax credit statute, Minn. Stat. 290.068, and that for the 2011 tax year, the term "aggregate gross recipes" referred to federal aggregate gross receipts, not Minnesota aggregate gross receipts, holding that the tax court's conclusions were without error.Specifically, the Court held (1) to calculate Minnesota's R&D tax credit, Minnesota incorporates the "minimum base amount" limitation set forth in I.R.C. 41(c)(2); and (2) the plain language of Minn. Stat. 290.068, subd. 2(c) and its incorporation of the term "aggregate gross receipts" through the term "base amount" referred to federal aggregate gross receipts for the 2011 tax year, and therefore, the tax court did not err in concluding that federal aggregate gross receipts must be used in the fixed-base-percentage formula contained with the base amount calculation for General Mills, Inc.'s 2011 Minnesota R&D tax credit. View "General Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court construing Defendant's motion to correct his sentence as a motion for postconviction relief and summarily denying postconviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing, holding that the court did not err in treating Defendant's motion as a petition for postconviction relief and in summarily denying the petition.Defendant was found guilty of first-degree premeditated murder and second-degree murder. Defendant later filed a motion to correct his sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. The district court construed the motion as a petition for postconviction relief under Minn. Stat. 590.01, determining that the motion fell outside the scope of Rule 27.03 because it implicated more than just his sentence. The court then summarily denied the petition because the petition was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in considering Defendant's motion to correct his sentence as a petition for postconviction relief; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in summarily denying Defendant's request for postconviction relief because, even if the facts alleged in the petition were true, they were legally insufficient to entitle him to the requested relief. View "Rossberg v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the tax court holding that the Minnesota Legislature incorporated the federal "minimum base amount" limitation into Minnesota's research and development (R&D) tax credit statute, Minn. Stat. 290.068, and that for the 2011 tax year the term "aggregate gross receipts" referred to federal aggregate gross receipts, not Minnesota aggregate gross receipts, holding that the reasoning from the Court's opinion in General Mills v. Commissioner of Revenue, __ N.W.2d __, filed today, governed this case as well.At issue was whether the Legislature's incorporation of the federal tax code's definition of the term "base amount" in the tax credit statute includes the federal "minimum base amount" limitation and whether the term "aggregate gross receipts" as used in the Internal Revenue Code formula for calculating the R&D credit refers to Minnesota or federal aggregate gross receipts. The Supreme Court affirmed the tax court's decision, holding (1) to calculate the Minnesota R&D tax credit, section 290.068, subd. 2(c) incorporates the "minimum base amount" limitation contained within I.R.C. 41(c)(2); and (2) the plain language of section 290.068, subd. 2(c) and its incorporation of the term "aggregate gross recipes" through the term "base amount" referred to federal aggregate gross receipts for the 2011 tax year. View "International Business Machines Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversing the judgment of the compensation judge dismissing Petitioner's claim petition seeking workers' compensation benefits for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which Petitioner claimed resulted from numerous traumatic incidents that he experienced while working, holding that the WCCA erred.At issue on appeal was the correct interpretation of Minn. Stat. 176.011, subs.15(d), which requires an employee seeking workers' compensation benefits where the alleged injury is PTSD arising out of employment to prove that the employee has been diagnosed with PTSD by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist using the latest version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) in making a diagnosis. The Supreme Court held (1) Minn. Stat. 176.011, subs.15(d) does not require a compensation judge to conduct an independent assessment to verify that the diagnosis of the psychologist or psychiatrist conforms to the PTSD criteria set forth in the DSM before accepting the expert's diagnosis; and (2) the WCCA erred by overriding the compensation judge's choice between two competing medical experts because the expert opinion adopted by the compensation judge had an adequate factual foundation for the diagnosis. View "Smith v. Carver County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the tax court dismissing petitions filed by Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust (the Trust) challenging Anoka County's assessment of the Trust's three parcels of land in the county, holding that the tax court properly found that the properties were "income-producing" and that the Trust's disclosures were inadequate.Each parcel at issue in this case had a Walmart retail store, operated by Walmart, Inc. The Trust was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Walmart. The tax court dismissed the Trust's petitions challenging the Trust's assessment of the parcels because the Trust failed to disclose certain information before the deadline set forth in Minn. Stat. 278.05, subd. 6(a). The Trust appealed, arguing that it was not subject to the mandatory disclosure rule because Walmart stores are not "income-producing" within the meaning of the tax statute's mandatory-disclosure provision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the properties were income-producing and that the Trust's disclosures were inadequate. View "Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust v. County of Anoka" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the tax court affirming the conclusion of the Commissioner of Revenue that the sales tax exemption in Minn. Stat. 297A.68, subd. 5 for the purchase of capital equipment did not apply to items that Kroll Ontrack, LLC purchased.Kroll - a Minnesota LLC that sold technology-driven services to government entities, law firms, and corporate law departments - provided two internet-based programs that allowed its customers to maintain private databases of litigation documents and to sort, search, and produce relevant documents from those databases. From March 1, 2011 to November 30, 2012 Kroll purchased machinery and equipment needed to run its computer system and paid Minnesota sales tax on its purchases. In 2014, Kroll filed two requests for a refund of the sales tax it paid on the machinery and equipment, asserting that these items qualified as exempt capital equipment. The Commissioner of Revenue denied the refund claim. The tax court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Kroll's system did not qualify for the capital equipment exemption in Minn. Stat. 297A.68, subd. 5. View "Kroll Ontrack, LLC v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the district court ordering Defendant to pay restitution for destruction of a cabin after a jury found him guilty of burglary but did not reach a verdict on an arson charge, holding that the court of appeals erred by applying an incorrect standard.Defendant was charged with second-degree burglary and first-degree arson for the destruction of a cabin in Minnesota that was burglarized and then set on fire. The jury found Defendant guilty of burglary but could not reach a verdict on the arson charge. The State declined to retry Defendant for arson, but, after determining that the arson was factually related to the burglary, ordered Defendant to pay restitution for the fire-damaged cabin. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the burglary and the fire were sufficiently "factually intertwined" to allow restitution. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred by applying a factual-relationship standard rather than a direct-causation standard when considering whether fire damage to the cabin was a result of Defendant's offense. View "State v. Boettcher" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court suppressing the results of Defendant's blood test, holding that the limited right to counsel established in Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1991), does not apply when an individual is asked to submit to a blood test pursuant to a warrant.After Defendant was arrested for driving while impaired, the police officer obtained a search warrant to take a sample of her blood for alcohol concentration testing. The officer read Defendant the implied-consent advisory for blood and urine tests, and Defendant allowed her blood to be drawn. Defendant moved to have the results of her blood test suppressed, arguing that, under Friedman, she had a limited constitutional right to consult with counsel before deciding whether to submit to a blood test. The district court agreed. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the limited right to counsel under the Minnesota Constitution recognized in Friedman does not apply when a driver is presented with the choice to submit to a blood test pursuant to a search warrant. View "State v. Rosenbush" on Justia Law