Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Commissioner of the Department of Human Services (DHS) determining that Appellant was permanently disqualified from working in a capacity where he may have contact with people who access services from a DHS-licensed program, holding that Appellant's claims on appeal failed.After DHS discovered a 2002 child-protection report that Appellant had sexually abused his son sometime around 1998, Appellant was disqualified from employment as a residence manager at a DHS-licensed substance abuse treatment program. The court of appeals affirmed DHS's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's right to due process was not violated; (2) the Department of Human Services Background Studies Act, Minn. Stat. ch. 245C, does not create a permanent, irrebuttable presumption that DHS's decision was correct; and (3) Appellant was provided constitutionally sufficient notice of his rights under the Act. View "Jackson v. Commissioner of Human Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the district court granting judgment as a matter of law to Lycoming Engines on Mark Kedrowski's claim that a defective fuel pump manufactured by Lycoming caused the airplane he was piloting to lose power and crash, holding that the district court abused its discretion by excluding that opinion of Kedrowski's sole expert on causation.The jury returned a $27.7 million verdict for Kedrowski. Thereafter, the district court granted Lycoming's motion for judgment as a matter of law, concluding that the opinion of Kedrowski's sole causation expert lacked foundational reliability and that, without this opinion, Kedrowski's claims failed. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court's evidentiary exclusion was overbroad and an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial on liability. View "Kedrowskib v. Lycoming Engines" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals vacating as moot the district court's order granting Antwone Ford's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordering the Department of Corrections either to approve housing for Ford or to modify the terms of his conditional release, holding that Ford's claims were justiciable and that Ford was entitled to the writ.In his habeas petition, Ford asserted that the Commissioner of Corrections unlawfully extended his incarceration for sixteen months after his conditional release term began but failing to approve housing in a community in which he could be supervised. The court of appeals vacated the district court's order as moot. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the district court's order, holding that the Department's failure to abide by its internal policies and State ex rel. Marlowe v. Fabian, 755 N.W. 792 (Minn. App. 2008), kept Ford incarcerated for an extended period of time, and this petition for a writ of habeas corpus was an appropriate procedural remedy. View "State, ex rel. Ford v. Schnell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court concluding that a receiver should bring a piercing-the-corporate-veil claim against the shareholders of the corporate entity that the receiver controls, holding that the receiver in this case did not have the power to bring the veil-piercing claims.Aaron Carlson Corporation, one of the creditors of the now-defunct LSI Corporation of America, Inc. (LSI), sought to pierce the LSI corporate veil and recover from Respondents. The district court concluded that the corporation's claims should have been brought by a receiver that had been appointed in a lawsuit that Respondents had filed against LSI. In that suit, the receiver had sold LSI's assets and repaid some of LSI's creditors. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the receiver did not have the power to bring veil-piercing claims; and (2) therefore, the corporation's claims against the shareholders did not represent an impermissible collateral attack on the receivership and were not barred by res judicata. View "Aaron Carlson Corp. v. Cohen" on Justia Law

In this defamation action brought by Nathan McGuire, a public high school basketball head coach, against Julie Bowlin and three other defendants, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to Bowlin solely on the basis of McGuire's status as a public official, holding that McGuire was neither a public official nor a public figure.McGuire filed this complaint alleging that Defendants had engaged in defamation and a civil conspiracy and that Bowlin had filed false maltreatment-of-minor reports. The district court dismissed all claims against all defendants. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, McGuire argued that he was not a public official for the purposes of his defamation claims. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision regarding the three defendants but reversed the decision with respect to the defamation claim against Bowlin, holding (1) McGuire was not a public official and therefore, the district court erred when it granted summary judgment on that basis; and (2) further, McGuire was not a limited-purpose public figure. View "McGuire v. Bowlin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder, holding that Defendant's allegations of error did not warrant reversal of his convictions.Specifically, the Court held (1) the admission of certain evidence did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or the substantive requirements of Minn. Stat. 626A.42; (2) to the extent the challenged evidence violated Minn. R. Evid. 702 the error was harmless; (3) the district court did not clearly err when it determined that Defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of discrimination under step one of the Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), inquiry; and (4) Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct were without merit. View "State v. Harvey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of knowingly failing to register as a predatory offender, holding that to convict a defendant of knowingly failing to register as a predatory offender the State must prove not only that the defendant's living arrangement at the primary address had ended but also that the defendant knew that this living arrangement had ended.A jury found Defendant guilty when he did not register with local law enforcement authorities within twenty-four hours of leaving his registered primary address, a motel room. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that sufficient evidence sustained Defendant's conviction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State tried to prove by circumstantial evidence that Defendant knew that his living arrangement at the motel had ended, but the circumstances were consistent with a reasonable inference to the contrary; and (2) therefore, the evidence at trial was insufficient to support Defendant's conviction. View "State v. Alarcon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and false imprisonment, holding that Defendant was not deprived of a fair trial when a detective testified about photographs that were found on Appellant's cellphone.After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree and one count of false imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, Defendant argued that he was deprived of a fair trial because a detective improperly testified and offered opinions about photographs on Defendant's cellphone. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the detective's opinion testimony concerning the images on Defendant's cellphone should not have been admitted; (2) the State did not bear the burden to prove that an error in admitting the detective's testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) there was no reasonable possibility that the erroneously admitted evidence significantly affected the outcome of the trial. View "State v. Jaros" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction, holding that a body cavity search performed by forcing Defendant to be strapped down and sedated in order to undergo an invasive anoscopy against his will in the presence of nonmedical personnel was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.After Defendant was strapped down and sedated he was forced against his will to undergo an anoscopy. During the procedure, the doctor located a plastic baggie containing cocaine in Defendant's body cavity. The State charged Defendant with one count of fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance. Defendant moved to suppress evidence of the drugs, arguing that the search, even though conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant, was unreasonable. The district court denied the motion, and Defendant was convicted. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the anoscopy was a reasonable search. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the extreme intrusion of Defendant's dignitary rights by the coerced anoscopy outweighed the State's need to retrieve relevant evidence of drug possession, and therefore, the evidence retrieved from the search must be suppressed. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's sentence on the basis that the district court had misapplied Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.7.a, holding that the classification of a prior offense is determined by reference to the statute setting forth the elements of the crime, rather than by reference to Minn. Stat. 609.02 defining "felony" and "gross misdemeanor."Defendant was convicted of first-degree sale of a controlled substance. After the district court sentenced Defendant he appealed, arguing that his criminal-history score was improperly calculated because the district court had misapplied section 2.B.7.a. The court of appeals agreed and remanded to the district court for resentencing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the term "offense definitions" in section 2.B.7.a means the element-based definition of a crime under the statute setting forth a particular offense. View "State v. Strobel" on Justia Law