Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of first-degree murder and sentencing him to life in prison without the possibility of release, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to present an alternative-perpetrator defense.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that Defendant's proffered evidence in support of his motion to present alternative-perpetrator evidence for lack of sufficient foundation; and (2) the district court committed an error that was plain in instructing the jury on the order in which to consider the charges against Defendant, but there was no reasonable likelihood that the instruction affected the jury's verdict and therefore did not affect Defendant's substantial rights. View "State v. Woodard" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for first-degree murder, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Appellant's right to a fair trial before an impartial tribunal was not violated when the district court stated that it might reconsider its prior Spreigl ruling if the defense presented certain witnesses; (2) the jury instructions on accomplice liability were plainly erroneous, but Appellant failed to establish that there was a reasonable likelihood that the error had a significant effect on the verdict; (3) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct in his closing arguments regarding the law of accomplice liability; (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting the State’s motion to admit evidence of appellant’s past convictions for impeachment purposes, including by allowing the specific convictions to be disclosed to the jury; and (5) Appellant’s pro se arguments were without merit. View "State v. Reek" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission (MPUC) lacks the authority to require Otter Tail Power Company to amend an existing transmission cost-recovery rider (TCRR) approved under Minn. Stat. 216B.16, subd. 7b(b) to include the costs and revenues associated with two high-voltage interstate transmission lines, known as the Big Stone Access Transmission Lines (Big Stone Lines).In 2013, the MPUC approved Otter Tail's request for a TCRR for three transmission projects. In 2016, Otter Tail filed this general rate case with the MPUC seeking an annual-rate increase on its retail electricity sales to help offset company-wide investment costs and asserted that the costs and revenues associated with the Big Stone Lines should not be considered when setting the retail rates. The MPUC directed Otter Tail to amend the TCRR approved in 2013 to include the costs and revenues of the Big Stone Lines. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the MPUC does not have statutory authority to compel Otter Tail to include the Big Stone Lines in the TCRR. View "In re Application of Otter Tail Power Company for Authority to Increase Rates for Electric Service in Minnesota" on Justia Law

In this condemnation action, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court rejecting Landowners' theory of damages supporting their claim for severance damages, holding that the lower courts did not err.The State, acting through the Minnesota Department of Transportation, condemned a portion of Landowners' property for a construction project intended to improve the quality of Highway 61. Court-appointed commissioners awarded Landowners $391,000 in damages, $305,000 of which were severance damages attributable to the presumed loss of access to the property from the abutting highway during construction. Each party appealed the damages award. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Landowners were not entitled to damages for loss of access under a theory that assumes that the taking of a temporary easement for a highway improvement includes the taking of the right of access to abutting property; and (2) Landowners were not entitled to severance damages based on construction-related interferences as an alternative means of compensation. View "State, Commissioner of Transportation v. Elbert" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions for first-degree sale of a controlled substance and second-degree possession of a controlled substance, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting a witness's statements under Minn. R. Evid. 807, the residual hearsay exception.Defendant's convictions were based on a transaction in which Defendant sold methamphetamine to L.P. After she was arrested, L.P. was interviewed by law enforcement and made statements regarding her meeting with Defendant and the drug transaction. During trial, the district court admitted into evidence L.P.'s statements under Rule 807. At issue on appeal was whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting the statements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting L.P.'s statements because admission of the statements satisfied the enumerated requirements of Rule 807. View "State v. Vangrevenhof" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of second-degree driving while impaired, holding that the State properly used Defendant's license revocation as an aggravating factor to enhance his charge of driving while impaired.Defendant was charged with second-degree driving while impaired for refusal to submit to chemical testing in violation of Minn. Stat. 169A.25, subd. 1(b), which requires that the defendant both refuse to submit to chemical testing and the presence of one aggravating factor. Defendant's prior license revocation was the aggravating factor, but the State waited until the license revocation was sustained to charge Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding (1) a license revocation is "present" as an aggravating factor as of its effective date, and it may be used to enhance a charge of driving while impaired once review has occurred or the right to review has been waived; and (2) therefore, the State properly used Defendant's license revocation as an aggravating factor. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's sentences in connection with his conviction for two counts of violating an order of protection (OFP) under Minn. Stat. 518B.01, subd. 14(d)(1), holding that the multiple-victim rule authorized two sentences in this case and that Defendant's consecutive sentences did not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of his behavior.A temporary OFP prohibited Defendant from contacting either his infant son or his son's mother. After Defendant had contact with both his son and the mother at a hotel, the State charged Defendant with two counts of violating an OFP. Defendant pleaded guilty to both counts, and the district court sentenced him to two permissive consecutive sentences. The court of appeals affirmed the sentences, concluding that Minn. Stat. 609.035, subd. 1 did not prohibit the district court from imposing multiple sentences for crimes that were committed during a single behavioral incident. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the multiple-victim rule applied in this case because Defendant made in-person contact with two protected persons, and therefore, there were two victims of the OFP-violation crime; and (2) Defendant's sentences did not exaggerate the criminality of his behavior. View "State v. Alger" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the district court's denial of Defendant's request for non-identifying information about a confidential reliable informant's relationship with police and the informant's information-gathering activities, holding that the State's common law privilege to withhold the identity of an informant does not protect non-identifying information.Defendant was charged with drug possession and sale crimes. Defendant filed discovery and suppression motions seeking information about a confidential reliable informant, on whose observations the State relied to obtain a warrant to search Defendant's home. The district court denied the motions, concluding that Defendant was not entitled to discover the informant's identity or any other information about the informant. Defendant was convicted of fifth-degree sale of a controlled substance. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the State's common law privilege did not protect non-identifying information. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals (1) properly concluded that the State's common law privilege does not apply to non-identifying information; and (2) did not err in concluding that the non-identifying information Defendant requested related to the case, as required by Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01. View "State v. Dexter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the district court denying Appellant's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim raised in his first petition for post conviction relief and the claims raised in his second petition for postconviction relief, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant's claims.After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of first-degree felony murder, attempted first-degree felony murder, and second-degree assault. The Supreme Court affirmed. In his first petition for postconviction relief, Appellant raised some of the same issues addressed in his direct appeal but also claimed that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district court ordered an evidentiary hearing only on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim and, after a hearing, denied the claim. Appellant then filed a second petition for postconviction relief, which the district court summarily denied. The Supreme Court affirmed both of the district court's orders, holding (1) Appellant did not satisfy the first prong of Strickland on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim; and (2) all of Appellant's claims in his second petition were time barred. View "Griffin v. State" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice case, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that the district court abused its discretion by admitting testimony about causation from Dr. John Stark, an orthopedic surgeon, and Dr. Kevin Stephan, an infection-disease specialist, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the doctors' causation testimony.This action arose from right-knee arthroplasty Dr. James Schaffhausen performed on Plaintiff. In her complaint, Plaintiff argued that, as a result of the surgery, she suffered permanent neurologic damage. The jury found for Plaintiff. Dr. Schaffhausen moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, arguing that it was error for Dr. Stark and Dr. Stephan to testify as to causation because they were not neurologists. The district court denied the motions. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the experts were not qualified to testify as to causation because they lacked the requisite occupational experience in neurology. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where the district court carefully weighed the qualifications of Dr. Stark and Dr. Stephan before deciding to admit their testimony, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting their testimony on the issue of causation. View "Marquardt v. Schaffhausen" on Justia Law