Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the court of appeals' decision reversing in part Defendant's convictions, holding that the district court did not violate Minn. Stat. 609.04 when it convicted Defendant of both an electronic solicitation offense and an electronic distribution offense and did not violate Minn. Stat. 609.035 when it sentenced Defendant on both the electronic solicitation conviction and an attempted third-degree sexual assault conviction.Defendant was convicted of attempted third-degree criminal sexual conduct, electronically soliciting a child to engage in sexual conduct, and electronically distributing any material, language, or communication that relates to or describes sexual conduct to a child. The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that the district court violated section 609.04 and section 609.035. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to support the attempt conviction; (2) the offense of electronic solicitation necessarily includes the offense of electronic distribution; and (3) the State proved that the electronic solicitation conviction and the attempted third-degree sexual assault conviction were not part of a single behavioral incident. View "State v. Degroot" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for of first-degree premeditated murder and attempted first-degree premeditated murder but reversed Defendant's 360-month sentence for attempted first-degree premeditated murder, holding that the sentence was error because it exceeded the statutory maximum.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's pretrial motion to suppress his post-Miranda statements; (2) the jury instruction on the elements of premeditated murder was not erroneous, and the district court did not err by failing to give a jury instruction on accomplice testimony; and (3) because the statutory maximum for the offense of attempted first-degree premeditated murder is 240 months, Defendant's sentence on this offense is remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Ezeka" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals defining AIM Development, LLC's nonconforming-use rights on a property containing a facility for nonhazardous, non-toxic industrial waste based on the terms of a state permit in effect at the time that it purchased the property, holding that a property owner's nonconforming-use rights are defined by the uses lawfully existing at the time of the adverse zoning change.In 2013, AIM Development purchased the property containing the waste facility, which had operated as a nonconforming use since 1989. At issue was the scope of AIM Development's nonconforming-use rights and whether the waste facility may accept waste from more than one source. Based on the terms of a state permit in effect when AIM Development purchase the property the court of appeals determined that the facility was limited to accepting waste from a recently demolished paper mill. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in defining the scope of the nonconformity by the state permit; and (2) accepting waste from more than one source does not, standing alone, constitute an impermissible expansion of AIM Development's nonconforming-use rights. View "AIM Development (USA), LLC, Appellant, v. City of Sartell" on Justia Law

In this case brought by two associations against the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR) arising out of alleged mismanagement of the groundwater-appropriation permitting process, the Supreme Court held that the two associations stated a claim under Minn. Stat. 116B.03 and that one of the associations failed to state a claim under the public trust doctrine.Two associations brought this suit against the DNR, alleging violations of the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act under section 116B.03 based on alleged pollution and impairment of White Bear Lake. The associations alleged that the DNR mismanaged the groundwater-appropriations permitting process, resulting in the lake's water levels reaching historic lows. One of the associations added a claim that the DNR had violated the common-law public trust doctrine. The district court found that the DNR had violated by section 116B.03 and the public trust doctrine. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals (1) erred in concluding that the associations did not state a claim under section 116B.03; and (2) did not err in concluding that the one association failed to state a claim under the public trust doctrine. View "White Bear Lake Restoration Ass'n, ex rel. State v. Minnesota Department of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's petition to voluntarily terminate her parental rights to her two young children after Grant County filed a petition for involuntary termination, holding that a parent's voluntary petition does not supplant a county's petition for involuntary termination of parental rights.After the County filed a petition for involuntary termination of Appellant's parental rights to her two children. Three days before trial, Appellant filed a petition for voluntary termination of her parental rights to her children for good cause. The district court denied the voluntary petition, finding that Appellant did not demonstrate good cause for the termination. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plain language Minn. Stat. 260C.301 shows that the Legislature did not contemplate that a parent's petition for voluntary termination would automatically supplement an earlier-filed involuntary petition. View "In re Welfare of Children of J.D.T." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed under the second prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), holding that, even if Appellant had offered to plead guilty to second-degree murder, Appellant made no showing that there was a reasonable probability that the State would have entered into a plea agreement.A jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder while committing child abuse, second-degree felony murder, and second-degree manslaughter. Appellant later filed a postconviction motion, alleging that her counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to recommend that she plead guilty to second-degree murder and by failing adequately to inform her about the power of the State's case. The district court concluded that Appellant had satisfied the first but not the second prong of Strickland. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, even assuming that defense counsel's recommendation could have persuaded Appellant to make a qualifying offer, Appellant failed to show that any such offer would have been accepted by the State and presented to the court. View "Peltier v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of attempted third-degree criminal sexual conduct, holding that the State proved that Defendant committed an act that was "a substantial step forward, and more than preparation for" the commission of third-degree criminal sexual conduct.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) in the statutory phrase "a substantial step toward, and more than preparation for" in the attempt statute, Minn. Stat. 609.17, the substantial step must be strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose, but it need not objectively reveal the nature of the intended crime; and (2) the evidence in this case proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant intended to commit the crime of third-degree criminal sexual conduct and that he committed an act that was a substantial step toward, and more than preparation for, the commission of the intended crime. View "State v. Wilkie" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the district court's denial of Defendant's petition for postconviction relief, holding that, under Minn. Stat. 260B.245, subd. 1(b), delinquency adjudications may be deemed "felony convictions" for the purpose of the statutory definition of a crime of violence.Defendant was charged with possession of a firearm by an ineligible person, which required proof that Defendant had been convicted of a crime of violence. Defendant pled guilty to the offense, admitting that he had been adjudicated delinquent for committing fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance. The district court accepted the plea and placed Defendant on probation. Defendant later filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting that his juvenile delinquency adjudication failed to satisfy the definition of a "crime of violence" because, under section 260B.245, a delinquency adjudication cannot be deemed a "conviction of crime." The district court denied postconviction relief. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the phrase "felony convictions," as used in the statutory definition of crime of violence, includes a juvenile delinquency adjudication for felony-level offenses listed in Minn. Stat. 624.712, subd. 5; and (2) Defendant provided an adequate factual basis for his guilty plea. View "Roberts v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the tax court increasing the assessed unit value of a pipeline system for tax years 2015 and 2016, holding that the tax court did not err in its calculations for the cost indicator of value but erred in assigning equal weight to the cost and income indicators of value.On appeal, the taxpayer (1) challenged the tax court's market value determination, asserting that the court erred in its treatment of construction work in progress and external obsolescence in the computation of the cost indicator of value; and (2) challenged the weight that the court assigned to the cost indicator of value, as opposed to the income indicator, in determining the unit value of the pipeline system. The Supreme Court held that the tax court (1) did not err in its calculations for the cost indicator of value; but (2) erred by concluding that it had no discretion to adjust the default weightings prescribed by Minnesota Rule 8100.0300, subpart 5 for the cost and income indicators of value. View "Enbridge Energy, Limited Partnership v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle during a traffic stop, holding that a driver violates Minn. Stat. 169.30(b) by driving past the stop sign or stop line before coming to a complete stop.Defendant's vehicle was stopped after he failed to stop at a stop sign and stop line. The district court suppressed the evidence seized from Defendant's vehicle, concluding that the traffic stop was unlawful because Minn. Stat. 169.30(b) requires a driver "to stop at the intersection, not at the stop sign or stop line." The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 169.30(b) is violated when the driver a vehicle drives past the stop sign or stop line before coming to a complete stop; and (2) because Defendant failed to bring his vehicle to a complete stop before he drove his vehicle past the stop line and the stop sign, the traffic stop was lawful. View "State v. Gibson" on Justia Law