Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirmed the orders of the district court dismissing Appellant's constitutional claims asserting discrimination in the tax assessments of its properties, holding that Appellants' claims were time-barred.Appellant, Walmart, Inc., owned real property in two counties (the Counties). In this action, Walmart claimed that for tax purposes the Counties overvalued the properties or unfairly assessed the properties' value as compared with other similarly situated properties. Appellant asserted that the Counties' international discrimination in their tax assessments violated the Equal Protection Clause and Appellant's right to uniformity in taxation. The district court dismissed the claims as time-barred, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's claims were subject to the limitations period of Minn. Stat. Ann. Chapter 278 and were time-barred. View "Walmart Inc. v. Winona County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court overruling Appellant's objection to the State's peremptory strike of a prospective juror, holding that Appellant did not meet his burden of proving that the State's race-neutral reason for the strike was a pretext for racial discrimination.Appellant was convicted of first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct. On appeal, Defendant challenged the State's peremptory strike of the only nonwhite person from the jury venire. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the prosecutor's explanations for striking the venire-person were race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strike. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying Appellant's Batson challenge to the State's peremptory strike of the juror. View "State v. Lufkins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the orders of the district courts in four cases summarily denying postconviction petitions as untimely, holding that the petitions in this case were untimely.At issue was when the two-year time limit prescribed in Minn. Stat. 590.01, subd. 4(c) begins to run for postconviction petitions asserting a claim for relief based on a new, retroactive interpretation of the law. The Supreme Court held (1) the two-year time limit in subdivision 4(c) begins to run from the date the United States Supreme Court or a Minnesota appellate court announces an interpretation of law that forms the basis for a claim that the interpretation is a new rule of law that applies retroactively to the petitioner's postconviction petition; (2) application of the two-year time limit to bar Petitioners' postconviction petitions neither implicated separation of powers concerns nor violated constitutional due process protections; and (3) the postconviction petitions in this case were untimely. View "Aili v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff's complaint alleging that Defendant failed to pay her wages in accordance with Minnesota law, holding that Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment.Plaintiff worked as an on-site property caretaker at an apartment complex owned by Defendant. Because she also lived in an apartment on the property, Plaintiff was compensated primarily with credits toward her monthly rent. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant's use of rent credits to pay her wages violated Minnesota law and that Defendant failed to pay her for every hour she worked during her on-call shifts. The district court dismissed all three claims, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court erred when it granted summary judgment to Defendant. View "Hagen v. Steven Scott Management, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder for the deaths of an adult and an infant, holding that the district court erred in failing to suppress Defendant's statement to the police, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant's statement to police should have been suppressed because Defendant unambiguously invoked his constitutional right to remain silent during the police interrogation, but the failure to do so by the district court was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the evidence was sufficient to prove that Defendant had an intent to kill when he fired the gunshot that killed the infant; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences. View "State v. McInnis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of first-degree criminal damage to property, holding that reasonable estimates on the cost to repair or replace damaged property are included in the meaning of the statutory phrase "cost of repair and replacement" and that sufficient evidence supported Defendant's conviction.On appeal, Defendant argued (1) allowing the jury to consider only "estimated" costs to repair or replace the damaged property, rather than the actual costs of repair and replacement, would impermissibly add the word "estimated" to the language of Minn. Stat. 609.595, subd. 1(4); and (2) because the property owner did not repair or replace the damaged property, the estimates presented to the jury on the cost to do so were insufficient to support her conviction for first-degree criminal damage to property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute unambiguously includes estimates when calculating the reduction in the value of the property due to the damage caused; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict they did. View "State v. Powers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's pretrial motion to strike down Minn. Stat. 624.714, subd. 1a, the permit-to-carry statute, and convicting Defendant of violating the statute, holding that the permit-to-carry statute does not violate the Second Amendment.Minn. Stat. 624.714, subd. 1a requires individuals to obtain a permit to carry a handgun in public. Defendant was charged with carrying a pistol in a public place without a permit in violation of the statute. Defendant filed a pretrial motion to strike down the permit-to-carry statute, arguing that the requirement that an individual obtain a permit to carry a firearm violates the Second Amendment. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the permit-to-carry statute withstands strict scrutiny and does not violate the Second Amendment. View "State v. Hatch" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court finding that Mother's child was in need of protection or services, holding that the district court properly considered the allegations of the petition in this case and that Rice County proved the allegations by clear and convincing evidence.After Mother failed to appear at a pretrial hearing the County requested to proceed by default pursuant to Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 18. The district court granted the request and found that the child in this case was in need of protection or services. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the juvenile protection rules do not allow for relief in a default proceeding based solely on the pleadings and that the evidence was insufficient to support the adjudication. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court could not simply accept the allegations in the County's petition as true when Mother failed to appear for the pretrial hearing; (2) the unrequited witness testimony presented at the hearing established that the allegations of the petition were true and correct; and (3) the court did not err in finding that the child was in need of protection or services. View "In re H.G.D." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that a Blakely violation committed by the district court at a sentencing hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, holding that the Blakely violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty to two counts of criminal sexual conduct. The complaint alleged that the offenses were committed sometime between 2004 and 2018, but at sentencing, the district court determined that Defendant's offenses were committed after August 1, 2006. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's sentence, concluding (1) the lower court's determination of Defendant's offense dates was a violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 196 (2004), and its progeny; but (2) the error was harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although the district court erred in determining that date of Defendant's offense without receiving a Blakely waiver from Defendant, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Reimer" on Justia Law

In this property dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals determining that Joseph and Jennifer Roach's appeal was not barred by their acceptance of a remittitur on future damages and that the Roaches could seek attorney fees, holding that attorney fees were not authorized under the watershed statute, Minn. Stat. 103D.545, subd. 3.The Roaches, whose home was damaged during the construction of a home on property owned by Thomas and Sandra Alinder, brought nuisance and other claims against the Alinders and the company that built the home. After years of litigation, a jury trial was held to address damages. The jury awarded the Roaches damages. The Roaches moved for attorney fees. The district court denied the motion on the grounds that section 103D.545, subd. 3, did not apply. The district court further conditionally ordered a new trial unless the Roaches accepted a remittitur of the future damages award to zero. The Roaches accepted the remittitur and appealed the denial of attorney fees. The Supreme Court held (1) the Roaches were permitted to appeal issues separate and distinct from the subject of the remittitur order; but (2) attorney fees were not authorized under the statute. View "Roach v. County of Becker" on Justia Law