Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting the petition for a writ of prohibition filed by the State prohibiting the district court from enforcing a "taint team" order, holding that the district court erred in concluding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was implicated in this case.Appellant, a juvenile at the time of his offense, was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced to two consecutive sentences of life without the possibility of release. After Miller v. Alabama, 467 U.S. 460 (2012), was decided, Appellant was granted resentencing. At issue during the hearing was copies of recorded calls made by Appellant while he was incarcerated. The district court ordered the State to use a taint team to review the recorded calls for attorney-client communications on the ground that Appellant's the constitutional right to counsel was implicated. The court of appeals granted the State's petition for a writ prohibiting the court from enforcing the taint team order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that relief was not warranted because (1) the Sixth Amendment was not implicated here; and (2) the State would be injured and without any adequate remedy to correct the unauthorized action of the court. View "State v. Flowers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's convictions for driving after cancellation-inimical to public safety (DAC-IPS) based on the conclusion that Minn. Stat. 171.24, subd. 5 is unenforceable on private property, holding that the statute is enforceable on private property.Defendant, whose license was cancelled as inimical to public safety, was charged with DAC-IPS after a law enforcement officer observed him drive a motor vehicle down a private driveway. Defendant filed a motion to suppress and to dismiss the complaint for lack of probable cause. The district court denied the motions. The district court subsequently found Defendant guilty. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the DAC-IPS requires a license only when a vehicle is operated on a street or highway. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the DAC-IPS statute is enforceable in private property; and (2) the district court properly denied Defendant's motions to suppress and dismiss, resulting in restatement of Defendant's convictions. View "State v. Velisek" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Claimant was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits after the date on which he no longer had a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) by a licensed professional using the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5).From 2007 to 2020 Claimant was employed as a Mower County Deputy Sheriff. From September 25, 2019 to March 30, 2021, Claimant had a diagnosis of PTSD by a licensed professional, making him eligible for workers' compensation benefits. In this action, Claimant argued that he was entitled to benefits after March 30, 2021, the date that he no longer had a diagnosis of PTSD, because he remained disabled from a mental illness. The compensation court awarded benefits from April 1, 2020 into the present. The court of appeals reversed in part, concluding that Claimant was not entitled to benefits after March 30, 2021. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Claimant was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits after March 30, 2021. View "Chrz v. Mower County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part Defendant's convictions for first-degree premeditated murder and second-degree assault-fear, holding that the district court committed reversible error when it relied on the doctrine of transferred intent.The Supreme Court remanded the matter, holding that the district court (1) did not violate the accomplice-corroboration statute, Minn. Stat. 634.04, when it found that Defendant committed the murder with premeditation; (2) did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence Defendant proffered to impeach one of the State's witnesses; but (3) committed reversible error by relying on the doctrine of transferred intent to find Defendant guilty of second-degree assault-fear. View "State v. Spann" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing this lawsuit brought by Appellants seeking a declaration "that individuals are restored to civil rights and possess the fundamental right to vote guaranteed by [Minn. Const. art. VII] by virtue of being released or excused from incarceration following a felony," holding that there was no error.At issue before the Supreme Court was (1) whether Minn. Const. art. VII, 1 requires that a person convicted of a felony be restored to the right to vote upon being released or excused from incarceration; and (2) whether Minn. Stat. 609.165 is contrary to the fundamental right to vote or to equal protection protections under the state Constitution. The Supreme Court held (1) under article VII, section 1, a person convicted of a felony cannot vote in Minnesota unless his or her right to vote is restored in accordance with an affirmative act or governmental mechanism restoring the person's right to vote; and (2) section 609.165 does not violate the fundamental right to vote, and there was insufficient evidence to prove that the statute violates the Minnesota Constitution's equal protection principle. View "Schroeder v. Simon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the district court to allow a witness to testify using live, two-way remote view technology during a jury trial in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, holding that Defendant's right to confrontation was not violated in the proceedings below.During Defendant's jury trial on a third-degree sale of a controlled substance charge, the district court allowed one of the State's witness to testify via Zoom because she had been exposed to COVID-19 and was forced to quarantine. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the two-part test set forth in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), is the appropriate test to assess whether a Confrontation Clause violation under the federal or state constitutions; and (2) Defendant's right to confrontation under the federal and state constitutions when the district court permitted the witness to testify using remote view technology under the circumstances of this case. View "State v. Tate" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals reversing in part and affirming in part the district court's grant of summary judgment for Defendant, a school district, in this employment dispute, holding that summary judgment was properly granted on all of Plaintiff's claims.Plaintiff brought this action alleging that the suffered a hostile work environment and disparate treatment culminating in constructive discharge during her employment with Defendant. The district court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment on both claims. The court of appeals reversed in part, concluding that Plaintiff had "presented sufficient evidence of disparate-treatment age discrimination to withstand summary judgment[.]" The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Plaintiff established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she suffered an adverse employment action in the form of constructive discharge. View "Henry v. Independent School District #625" on Justia Law

In this dispute over Governor Walz's declaration of a peacetime emergency under the Emergency Management Act, Minn. Stat. 12.01-.61, and the executive order the Governor issued requiring that Minnesotans wear face coverings, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing the appeal as moot, holding that one issue on appeal met a mootness exception.Plaintiffs brought the underlying petition for a writ of quo warranto challenging the face-covering mandate, arguing that the Governor overstepped his powers under the Emergency Management Act and that the mask mandate violated several of their constitutional rights. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss. While Plaintiffs' appeal was pending, the peacetime emergency and mask mandate ended. Consequently, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal as moot. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the legal question of whether the Act authorizes a peacetime emergency for a public health emergency is functionally justiciable and an important issue of statewide significance that should be decided immediately; and (2) Plaintiffs' remaining challenges to the mask mandate did not meet any of the mootness exceptions. View "Snell v. Walz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court dismissing this complaint brought by patients (collectively, Patients) in the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP), holding that the district court erred.Patients were ordered by the Minnesota Commitment Appeals Panel (CAP) to be transferred to Community Preparation Services (CPS), which would have been a reduction in custody. CAP issued Patients' transfers orders, but the orders did not provide a specific date by which the transfers to CPS should occur. State officials did not transfer Patients, and about two years after the transfer orders were issued Patients filed petitions for a writ of mandamus demanding that the transfers be effectuated. The state officials filed motions to dismiss, arguing that qualified immunity shielded them from liability. The district court granted the motions to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the state officials had a clear obligation to execute the CAP transfer orders within a reasonable period of time; and (2) remand was required. View "McDeid v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court summarily denying Defendant's second petition for postconviction relief, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing.After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree felony murder and attempted first-degree premeditated murder, among other crimes. Defendant later filed the postconviction petition at issue, asserting that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a trial before an impartial jury and that his trial counsel and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance. The district court summarily denied the petition as time barred and procedurally barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it summarily denied Defendant's second postconviction petition as untimely. View "White v. State" on Justia Law