Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondents Dr. Rajbir Sarpal and his wife Carol purchased a parcel of property in 2003 on which they built their home. The property was encumbered by two easements reserved by the City of North Oaks for a future trail. The Sarpals wanted a shed on their property, and in 2006, went to the City to obtain the necessary permits. A City employee gave Dr. Sarpal an "as-built" survey in order to obtain the necessary permits, but the survey was dated to a time before the Sarpals' home was built. Dr. Sarpal, acting as his own general contractor, drew up the plans, submitted them to the requisite authorities, and built the shed on his property. He would later find out that the shed encroached on the City's two easements. Dr. Sarpal petitioned the local zoning board for a variance in order to save the shed, but was denied. The City sued to have the shed removed. The court dismissed all of the City's claims, holding that because the Sarpals relied on the survey given to them by the City, the City was equitably estopped from suing for the easements now. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that when a government entity makes a "simple mistake" when providing a document to a party upon which the party relies to obtain building permits and the government approves that permit, the mistake is not wrongful conduct sufficient to support the conclusion that the government is equitably estopped from enforcing its zoning ordinances.

Eden Prairie Mall (EPM) challenged the assessed value determinations of one of its anchor tenants. For the tax years 2005 and 2006, the court concluded that the market values of EPM and the tenant should have been assessed at higher rates than the assessments that were entered into evidence at trial. EPM argued that the tax court's valuations were excessive and not supported by the record. EPM filed for bankruptcy during the tax court proceedings and subsequently argued that the tax court violated the automatic stay provision of the bankruptcy code when the court increased its taxes. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the tax court's reassessment did not violate the automatic stay of the bankruptcy code, but that the record did not support the reassessments. The Court reversed the tax court's holding, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

D.T.R., a minor, was born in 2004 to Lynette Marthe and her then-husband Derek Reiter. At the time, both believed Reiter was D.T.Râs biological father. However, in 2007, genetic testing would prove that Michael Richards was D.T.R.âs biological father. In 2008, Richards sought joint legal custody of D.T.R., and named Marthe and Reiter as parties. Before trial, the parties stipulated paternity, but could not agree who should be deemed D.T.R.âs âlegalâ father. The case proceeded to trial in 2009. While the paternity suit was pending, Marthe and Reiter had filed for divorce. In 2010, the district court filed detailed and thorough findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issued an order that concluded that a parent-child relationship existed between Reiter and D.T.R., and adjudicated Reiter as the childâs âlegalâ father. Marthe appealed the courtâs determination of paternity, but Richards did not. The appellate court questioned Martheâs standing to appeal the dismissal of Richardsâ petition. After additional briefing on the issue, the appellate court dismissed Martheâs appeal. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Marthe argued that she had standing to appeal as an aggrieved party pursuant to the applicable state case law and the Minnesota Parentage Act. Reiter asserted that Marthe did not have standing because her rights were not affected by the judgment adjudicating paternity. According to Reiter, Martheâs rights would be affected when her individual interests were at stake, such as a decision determining custody, parenting time or child support. The Supreme Court concluded that Marthe had standing to appeal as an aggrieved party the district courtâs determination of D.T.R.âs paternity. The Court reasoned that the determination of paternity directly impacted her responsibility for child support and her rights related to child support. The Court reversed the appellate courtâs holding, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The issue for the Supreme Court to resolve in this case stems from the arrest of Appellant Brian Hester. Appellant was arrested by a Lower Sioux Indian Community Police officer on DWI charges. The temperature was between 10 and 15 degrees below zero at the time the Lower Sioux officer stopped Appellant. Appellant was transferred to a local jail for further tests to determine the level of Appellantâs impairment. After completing the field sobriety tests at the jail, the officer placed Appellant under arrest. Appellant was advised that refusing to submit to further testing would constitute a crime. Appellant refused and was charged with first-degree driving while impaired, and first-degree test refusal. A jury found Appellant guilty of only the test-refusal charge. Appellant sought to vacate the judgment, claiming that the arresting officer was not a âpeace officerâ as defined by state law. Appellate courts found that the officer was indeed a police officer, and had the authority to require Appellant to take the subsequent tests. On further review, the Supreme Court found that the Lower Sioux were not in compliance with state law requiring them to carry the correct liability insurance limits at the time Appellant was arrested. The lack of liability insurance undermined the officerâs authority to request that Appellant take the subsequent chemical tests. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated Appellantâs conviction for criminal test refusal.

In 1988, Respondent Linda Dahlin obtained a judgment for unpaid spousal support against Appellant Randall Kroening. In 1998, the judgment was extended for an additional ten years pursuant to state law. In 2008, Respondent filed suit with the district court to renew the judgment for another ten years. The court denied the request holding that the judgment could only be renewed once. A divided appellate court reversed the district court, holding that the judgment could be renewed. The Supreme Court settled the split in the lower courts by holding that Respondent could renew her judgment, and that the state law did not limit action on a judgment to one renewal. The Court affirmed the appellate courtâs decision.

A Hennepin County grand jury indicted Appellant Gary Vue with several gang-related felonies. A jury found Appellant guilty, and the district court convicted him and imposed a life sentence with the possibility of parole after 31 years. Appellant appealed his conviction, claiming that the district court erroneously admitted his statement to the police, and that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict him. In December, 2005, police received a tip on the whereabouts of Appellant and his brother who were both suspects in the shooting death of Za Xiong. The tip lead police to Appellant then living in Sacramento, California. The police went to Sacramento to interview him. Within eight minutes, Appellant confessed to the shooting. Police did not believe they had the authority to arrest Appellant outside their jurisdiction. They returned to Hennepin County and got an arrest warrant for the brother. Three years later, in March, 2009, police were able to apprehend Appellant in St. Paul. Appellant pled not guilty, and sought to exclude his statements made to police while in Sacramento. The district court denied Appellantâs motion to suppress, concluding that Appellant was not in custody and, therefore, the police were not required legally to advise him of his Miranda rights. The Supreme Court held that the lower court was correct to deny Appellantâs motion to suppress his statement to the police in Sacramento. Furthermore, it found that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to convict him of the gang-related felonies. The Court accordingly affirmed Appellantâs conviction.

Respondent Ronald Stagg was discharged from employment by Respondent Vintage Place, Inc. for excessive absenteeism and tardiness. Stagg applied for unemployment benefits. An unemployment law judge (ULJ) determined that Stagg was ineligible for benefits because he was discharged for employment misconduct as defined by state law. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the ULJ, holding that Vintage Place failed to follow its own disciplinary policies when it terminated Stagg. Stagg argued that he relied on the employee manual, which defined Vintage Place's formal discipline procedures. Because he had not received a ten-day suspension--the last disciplinary step short of termination under Vintage Place's policy--Stagg did not understand his job was at risk for termination. The appellate court held that Stagg could have reasonably expected Vintage Place to follow its own disciplinary policy, and that Stagg's absenteeism did not amount to denial of unemployment benefits. Given the record presented, the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court's ruling, reversing it and reinstating the ULJ's decision.