Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Gregory Latterell, on behalf of his stepson Jared Boom's estate, sued Progressive Northern Insurance and AIG Insurance to recover underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits following Boom's death from a motor vehicle accident. Progressive, the insurer of Boom's vehicle, denied Latterell's claim for UIM benefits because of a business-use exclusion in Boom's insurance policy. AIG, Lattrell's insurer, also denied Latterell's claim. Latterell sued, and the district court granted summary judgment to Progressive and AIG. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) the business-use exclusion in the Progressive policy was enforceable under the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act and unambiguously excluded UIM coverage under the specific circumstances of this case, and (2) Latterell could not recover UIM benefits under the AIG policy. The Supreme Court reversed the denial of Latterell's summary judgment as to Progressive, holding that Progressive's business-use exclusion was unenforceable under the No-Fault Act. Remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Latterell against Progressive. View "Latterell v. Progressive N. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, the district court convicted Ronald Hill of first-degree premeditated murder. The Supreme Court affirmed Hill's conviction, holding (1) because the district court properly and carefully balanced the potential probative value and prejudicial effects of the proffered impeachment evidence, the court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of Hill's prior, unspecified felony conviction for impeachment purposes; (2) Hill was not entitled to a new trial because allegedly improper testimony that the State obtained Hill's DNA sample through a search warrant was harmless because it did not affect Hill's substantial rights; (3) any alleged error in admitting evidence that Hill shot the victim with a gun stolen during a home invasion was harmless because there was not a reasonable possibility that the alleged error significantly affected the verdict; and (4) the cumulative effect of any errors resulting from the admission of disputed testimony did not affect Hill's substantial rights, and therefore, Hill was not deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial. View "State v. Hill" on Justia Law

Elizabeth Hawes was convicted of aiding and abetting her brother, Andrew Hawes, in the first-degree murder of their brother, Edwin Hawes. The district court sentenced Hawes to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed Hawes' conviction, holding (1) the circumstantial evidence was legally sufficient to support Hawes' conviction of aiding and abetting first-degree premeditated murder; (2) any error the the district court made when it ruled that out-of-court statements made by Andrew were not admissible as declarations against penal interest was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Hawes' motion for a new trial on the grounds of newly available evidence. View "State v. Hawes" on Justia Law

Berry and Co. petitioned the tax court for relief from the County's property tax assessment of its property for 2007 and 2008. At trial, Berry and the County each offered expert appraiser testimony as to the estimated market value of the property. Both appraisers used the market sales comparison approach to value the subject property. The tax county determined that the highest and best use for the subject property was redevelopment and agreed with the County's expert on the valuation, which was higher than the original assessment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the tax court's determination that the highest and best use of the subject property was redevelopment was not erroneous, and (2) the tax court's valuation of the subject property was supported in the record and was not clearly erroneous. View "Berry & Co., Inc. v. County of Hennepin" on Justia Law

After suffering a work-related injury, Employee underwent surgery at a hospital owned by HealthEast Care System. The injury required surgical implantation of a spinal cord stimulator. Employer's worker's compensation insurance provider, State Auto Insurance, paid part but not all of the surgical expenses, asserting (1) the withheld portion of the expenses was attributable to a price markup added by HealthEast to the price paid by HealthEast for the implant hardware used in Employee's surgery, and (2) the manufacturer of the implant hardware should be required to charge directly for the implant hardware. The compensation judge found that Employer and State Auto were liable for the unpaid balance. The Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) HealthEast could charge for the implant hardware because when more than one health care provider is responsible for the creation of a service, article, or supply, the provider that provides the service, article, or supply in its final form is entitled to charge for it; and (2) a compensation judge does not have the authority to determine a reasonable value of a treatment, service, or supply that is lower than eighty-five percent of the provider's usual or customary charge. View "Troyer v. Vertlu Mgmt. Co." on Justia Law

Samantha Heiges was arrested and charged with second-degree murder and first-degree manslaughter for allegedly drowning her baby daughter in a bathtub immediately after the baby was born. After a jury trial, the district court convicted Heiges of second-degree murder and sentenced her to 299 months in prison. The court of appeals affirmed Heiges's conviction. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the scope of the term "confession" in Minn. Stat. 634.03 includes statements made to friends and acquaintances after the crime was committed but before the commencement of the police investigation; (2) Heiges's conviction did not violate Section 634.03 when the State established the trustworthiness of Heiges's confessions by presenting sufficient evidence to corroborate the attendant facts and circumstances of those confessions; (3) the facts admitted in Heiges's confession could be used to satisfy Minn. Stat. 634.051, which requires that the evidence that establishes the death of the victim be independent of the evidence that establishes the killing of the victim by the defendant; and (4) the evidence at trial, including Heiges's confessions, was sufficient to sustain Heiges's conviction for second-degree murder. View "State v. Heiges" on Justia Law

Continental Retail sought certiorari review of the market value determinations by the Minnesota Tax Court for a Continental commercial building for the assessment dates of 2006, 2007, and 2008. Continental filed petitions challenging the county assessor's estimated market value for the three years, and at trial, the tax court increased the market value determinations for all three years. On appeal, Continental argued that the tax court's value determinations were excessive and not supported by the record over the assessed value of the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the tax court's value determinations were supported by the record and were not clearly erroneous. View "Continental Retail, L.L.C. v. County of Hennepin" on Justia Law

The Commission of Transportation requested a condemnation order for a portion of appellant Richard Lepak's land for the improvement and widening of a highway. After a condemnation hearing, the district court concluded that improving and widening the highway was a legitimate public purpose and that the state Department of Transportation had established a reasonable necessity. Therefore, the district court rejected the challenged to the proposed taking, and the court of appeals affirmed. At issue on review was whether the State had a valid public purpose for the taking because part of Lepak's land would be used to build a private road to mitigate damages to a neighboring parcel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the purpose of the taking in this case met the definition of "public use" or "public purpose" as set forth in Minn. Stat. 117.025. View "State Comm'r of Transp. v. Kettleson" on Justia Law

Toby Johnson was indicted for intentional murder while committing a kidnapping, murder in the second degree, and kidnapping. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State amended the first count to aiding and abetting first-degree murder. Johnson then pleaded guilty to counts one and two. Johnson was sentenced to life in prison with a possibility of parole after thirty years. The postconviction court denied Johnson's petition for postconviction relief, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Later, Johnson filed a motion to correct or reduce his sentence, alleging that his guilty plea was invalid for several reasons. The district court concluded that the sentencing court had erred during the sentencing hearing by citing to the second-degree murder statute when imposing a sentence for first-degree murder. As to Johnson's other reasons for requested relief, the court concluded that the Supreme Court's rule from State v. Knaffla barred Johnson from raising claims that were not raised in his first petition for postconviction relief. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court's denial of Johnson's motion challenging the validity of his guilty plea, holding that Johnson's petition was untimely and should not be considered on the merits. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

In 2008, Olmsted County changed the property tax classification of farmland owned by Frederick Farms from agricultural-homestead to agricultural-nonhomestead property. The tax court denied Frederick Farms' petition to change the classification of the property back to agricultural homestead for taxes payable in 2009 and later. Frederick Farms appealed, arguing that it was operating a joint family farm venture with its sole shareholder, James Frederick, and that the County must classify the property as agricultural homestead because it was used by the joint family farm venture. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the tax court, concluding (1) that a joint family farm venture must own or lease, and not merely use, the property in order for a participant of the joint family farm venture to claim an agricultural-homestead classification; and (2) because the family farm corporation, not the joint family farm venture, owned the land in question, Frederick Farms was not entitled to claim an agricultural-homestead classification as a participant in a joint family farm venture. View "Frederick Farms, Inc. v. County of Olmsted" on Justia Law