Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

When Appellant Amanda Tatro was a junior in the mortuary science program at the University of Minnesota, she posted statements on Facebook which she described as "satirical commentary and violent fantasy about her school experience." Following a hearing, the Campus Committee on Student Behavior (CCSB) found Tatro had violated the student conduct code and academic program rules governing the privilege of access to human cadavers, which prohibited "blogging" about cadaver dissection. CCSB imposed sanctions, including a failing grade for an anatomy laboratory course. The University Provost affirmed the sanctions. Tatro appealed, arguing that the University violated her constitutional rights to free speech. The court of appeals upheld the disciplinary sanctions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the University did not violate the free speech rights of Tatro by imposing sanctions for her Facebook posts that violated academic program rules where the academic program rules were narrowly tailored and directly related to established professional conduct standards. View "Tatro v. Univ. of Minn." on Justia Law

In a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Respondent Reyes Campos argued the the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, which held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel included the right to be informed about the deportation consequences of a guilty plea, applied retroactively to his conviction. Based on Padilla, Campos conended that his attorney's failure to warn him of the deportation consequences of his guilty plea constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and rendered his plea invalid. The district court determined that Padilla could not be applied to Campos' collateral attack on his conviction. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Padilla announced a new rule of criminal procedure that does not apply to a collateral review of Campos' conviction. Remanded. View "Campos v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the scope of an appraisal clause in a fire and wind insurance policy, which provided that either party could demand an appraisal if the parties failed to agree on "the amount of loss." Insureds initiated a breach of contract action, arguing that the appraisal clause did not apply to their claim for damages because the parties disputed whether the damage was covered by the policy, not the cost of repairing the damage. The district court ordered the parties to participate in an appraisal process after determining that the amount of loss under the appraisal clause included a "causation element." The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the phrase "amount of loss," as it related to the authority of the appraiser under the policy, unambiguously permitted the appraiser to determine the cause of the loss; and (2) the appraiser must necessarily determine the cause of the loss as well as the amount necessary to repair the loss as an incidental step in the appraisal process in this case. View "Quade v. Secura Ins." on Justia Law

The State charged Brandon Smith with gross misdemeanor possession of a pistol without a permit and misdemeanor illegal transportation of a firearm. The charges resulted from Smith's possession of a pistol retrieved from his car by two state troopers during an otherwise lawful traffic stop. The district court convicted Smith of both charged offenses and sentenced him. The court of appeals vacated the misdemeanor sentence for illegal transportation of a firearm but affirmed the gross misdemeanor sentence of possession of a pistol without a permit. At issue on appeal was whether the district court erred by denying Smith's motion to exclude the pistol from evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the troopers did not unlawfully expand the scope of the traffic stop without reasonable, articulable suspicion of illegal activity, and therefore, the district court did not err when it admitted the pistol into evidence. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

Tammy Pepper suffered injuries in a single-vehicle accident when she was struck by a pickup truck owned by her sister and driven by her stepfather. Pepper subsequently sought insurance benefits under three policies. First, Pepper sought and recovered liability benefits from her sister's insurer. Second, Pepper sought and recovered liability benefits from her stepfather's insurer, State Farm. Third, Pepper sought, but did not recover, underinsured motorist coverage under a separate State Farm policy held by her stepfather. State Farm denied that it owed Pepper underinsured motorist coverage under the stepfather's policy on the ground that the terms of that policy excluded the sister's truck from its definition of vehicles eligible for underinsured motorist coverage. The district court granted summary judgment to State Farm, concluding that the exclusion in the stepfather's policy was valid because the exclusion was designed to prevent coverage conversion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court was correct that Pepper was not entitled to UIM benefits in this case. View "Pepper v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Respondent Robert Half International (RHI) terminated Appellant Kim Hansen's employment shortly after she returned from maternity leave and failed to reinstate her to the same or similar position. Hansen filed an action against RHI, alleging that it violated the Minnesota Parenting Leave Act (MPLA) and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) by failing to reinstate her to her position or a comparable position after maternity leave, for retaliating against her for taking maternity leave, and for terminating her because of her sex. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of RHI. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that judgment was appropriate as a matter of law. View "Hansen v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

Respondents brought this action on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated against Philip Morris, alleging that Philip Morris's marketing of its cigarettes violated Minnesota's consumer protection statutes. Respondents asserted claims under Minn. Stat. 8.31(3a) and for common law fraud and unjust enrichment. The district court granted Respondents' motion to certify the class. Subsequently, the court granted summary judgment to Philip Morris on the consumer protection claims asserted under section 8.31(3a) and then dismissed the case. The court of appeals affirmed the class certification but reversed the grant of summary judgment and reinstated Respondents' section 8.31(3a) consumer protection claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Respondents' consumer protection claims asserted under section 8.31(3a) were previously released; and (2) because all of Respondents' claims had been dismissed, the issue of whether the plaintiff class was properly certified was moot. View "Curtis v. Altria Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Denon Rhoads was initially charged with a single count of second-degree burglary. At a pretrial hearing, Rhoads asserted his right to self-representation and signed a written waiver of counsel. The State later amended the complaint to include a count of first-degree burglary that roughly doubled the maximum possible punishment. On the day of trial, Rhoads renewed his waiver-of-counsel. The district court, however, did not conduct an on-the-record inquiry of Rhoads's understanding of the maximum punishment that might be imposed if he were convicted of first-degree burglary. Rhoads was later convicted of first- and second-degree burglary. The Supreme Court reversed Rhoads's first-degree burglary conviction and remanded, holding that because the record did not support an inference that when Rhoads renewed his waiver-of-counsel he understood the maximum possible punishment he faced had doubled, the renewed waiver-of-counsel was not knowing and intelligent. Remanded. View "State v. Rhoads" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Appellant Marlon Pratt was convicted of seventeen counts of theft by swindle and two counts of racketeering. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing. This appeal followed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support Pratt's theft-by-swindle convictions; but (2) the judge who presided over Pratt's trial was disqualified from doing so under the Code of Judicial Conduct because the judge was retained by the county attorney's office to be an expert witness in an unrelated case, while at the same time presiding over Pratt's trial, which would cause a reasonable examiner to question the judge's impartiality. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Pratt" on Justia Law

Nicole Beecroft was found guilty of first-degree premeditated murder for the stabbing death of her newborn baby. The key factual issue at trial was whether Beecroft's baby was alive or dead when stabbed by Beecroft. Each party presented testimony on this issue from medical examiners and other forensic pathologists, but certain state officials interfered with Beecroft's forensic experts. Beecroft subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, which the postconviction court denied. The Supreme Court reversed Beecroft's conviction, holding (1) the interference by the state officials undermined the integrity of the judicial system in this case; (2) the trial errors alleged by Beecroft did not in and of themselves warrant a reversal and the grant of a new trial; but (3) when the existence of alleged errors is combined with the improper conduct of state officials, a reversal is warranted in the interests of justice. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Beecroft" on Justia Law