Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

County filed a claim for reimbursement with City, alleging that City had overcharged County for sewer and water services. Following consideration at a city council meeting, City denied County's claim. County subsequently sued City in district court. City moved for summary judgment, asserting that review of its decision was limited to certiorari review under Minn. Stat. 606 and that County's failure to bring a timely certiorari petition deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) City's decision to deny the refund was a quasi-judicial decision, and therefore, the exclusive method for reviewing City's decision was through a writ of certiorari under chapter 606; and (2) accordingly, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear County's claim. View "County of Washington v. City of Oak Park Heights" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a statutory amendment to Minn. Stat. 253B.19, 2(d) effective in August 2010, applied to Appellant's November 2008 petition for provisional or full discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous offender. Appellant argued that retroactive application of the amended statute to his petition was improper because the amendment introduced a new, higher burden for a petitioner seeking provisional or full discharge than the version of the statute that was operative when he filed his petition. The court of appeals affirmed the supreme court judicial appeal panel's decision to deny Appellant's petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals properly evaluated Appellant's petition under the amended version of Minn. Stat. 253B.19, 2(d). View "Braylock v. Jesson" on Justia Law

A jury found Appellant, Betsy Marie Hanks, guilty of first- and second-degree murder for the shooting death of her romantic partner. In preparation for trial, Hanks sought and received funding from the district court to hire an expert witness on battered woman syndrome. At trial, the district court granted the State's motion to prohibit the expert from testifying. After the guilty verdicts were returned, the district court convicted Hanks on both counts of murder. On appeal, Hanks asserted that the district court erred by excluding the battered woman syndrome expert testimony and by entering convictions on both first- and second-degree murder for a single act. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not err in excluding the expert testimony, as the evidence of a troubled relationship between Hanks her partner was insufficient to establish the type of relationship that would give rise to battered woman syndrome; and (2) the district court erred in convicting Hanks of both murder offenses. Remanded to the district court to vacate Hanks's conviction for second-degree murder. View "State v. Hanks" on Justia Law

The State filed a delinquency petition against Appellant, alleging that Appellant committed second-degree intentional murder. The juvenile court certified the proceeding to adult court. Appellant was charged in district court with second-degree intentional murder. The complaint was amended to include second-degree felony murder. The jury found Appellant guilty of second-degree felony murder and second-degree manslaughter. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the amended charge of second-degree felony murder and the lesser-included offense of second-degree manslaughter. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction over the charge specified in the certification order and other charges arising out of the same behavioral incident; and (2) the certification process did not violate Appellant's right to procedural due process. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a "proceeding" permitted by statute includes non-enumerated offenses arising out of the same behavioral incident as the offense enumerated in the certification order; and (2) following a valid certification order, a child no longer has a liberty interest in a juvenile adjudication for offenses arising out of the behavioral incident certified to adult court, and therefore the district court is not required to conduct another hearing on the certification issue. View "State v. Grigsby" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of felony harassment/stalking following a plea agreement. Defendant sought to apply jail credit to his harassment/stalking conviction sentence even though the jail credit claim was based on time Defendant spent in custody on an unrelated parole violation. When the district court sentenced Defendant, the court implicitly denied Defendant any credit for time spent in custody on the parole violation. The postconviction court held that Defendant was not entitled to any jail credit because the police did not have probable cause to arrest Defendant on the harassment/stalking charge until after he was released from prison on the parole violation. The court of appeals affirmed on different grounds. The Supreme Court also affirmed but on different grounds, holding that Defendant was not entitled to apply to his felony harassment/stalking sentence the jail credit he claimed for time spent in custody on the unrelated parole violation because, while in custody, the State had not completed its investigation into the harassment/stalking offenses, and it was not after Defendant was released from custody that the State had both probable cause and sufficient evidence to charge him with the harassment/stalking offenses with a reasonable likelihood of convicting him of those offenses. View "State v. Clarkin " on Justia Law

Following a trial, the Minnesota tax court affirmed an order of the Commissioner of Revenue calculating the value of the estate of Ruth Singer and assessing the estate the sum of $69,679 in taxes and interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the tax court had jurisdiction; (2) Minn. Stat. 291.215, which provides that any elections made in valuing the federal gross estate shall be applicable in valuing the Minnesota gross estate, is constitutional, even if it is not uniform or its application results in a regressive tax; (2) the tax court did not err in affirming the Commissioner's assessment; (3) the federal estate tax law does not preempt Minnesota's estate tax law; and (4) the tax court properly determined that the value of Singer's home should be included in her gross estate. View "Singer v. Comm'r of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Johnsons, organic farmers, claimed that while Appellant, a cooperative, was spraying pesticide onto conventionally farmed fields adjacent to the Johnsons' fields, some pesticide contaminated the Johnsons' organic fields. The Johnsons sued Appellant on theories including trespass, nuisance, and negligence per se, seeking damages and injunctive relief. The district court granted summary judgment to Appellant and dismissed all of the Johnsons' claims. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court (1) concluded that the Johnsons' trespass claim and claim for damages based on 7 C.F.R. 205.202(b) failed as a matter of law, and therefore, reversed the court of appeals' reinstatement of those claims; and (2) held that the district court failed to consider whether the Johnsons' non trespass claims that were not based on section 205.202(b) could survive summary judgment, and therefore, affirmed the court of appeals' reinstatement of those claims. Remanded. View "Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Coop. Oil Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder committed for the benefit of a gang and attempted first-degree murder committed for the benefit of a gang. The Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's convictions. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming several violations of his right to counsel. The postconviction court denied Petitioner's petition without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the postconviction court, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to postconviction relief on his claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel when his petition did not identify any prejudice resulting from the failure of Petitioner's counsel to raise specific challenges o the State's evidence and did not identify any federal constitutional claims that counsel unreasonably failed to raise. View "Jackson v. State" on Justia Law

Vernon Stisser, the personal representative of the estate of Pamela Stisser, petitioned the district court for an order directing certain payments and disbursements from Pamela's inter vivos trust (Trust). Among other claims, Vernon sought an order requiring trustee David Andreas (Trustee) to (1) pay all debts at the time of Pamela's death that were secured by Pamela's personal property and by Pamela's and Vernon's real estate; (2) compensate Vernon for his services as the personal representative of Pamela's probate estate; and (3) reimburse Pamela's estate for all probate estate administration expenses. The court granted Trustee's motion for partial summary judgment on Vernon's claim for payment of the secured debts. After a trial on Vernon's remaining claims, the court concluded the Trust did not require Trustee to compensate Vernon for his services as personal representative and required Trustee to pay only a limited amount of Vernon's claim administration expenses. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals incorrectly held that Trustee was required to pay debts secured by Pamela's personal property. View "In re Pamela Andreas Stisser Grantor Trust" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with three counts of fourth-degree controlled substance crime and one count of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person. A public defender was appointed to represent him. Prior to trial, the chief public defender made a motion seeking a discharge of the public defender and an order that Defendant had forfeited his right to counsel by manipulating the court and making threatening statements to his lawyer. After an evidentiary hearing at which Defendant was present but not represented by counsel, the court granted the motion, holding that Defendant had forfeited his right to counsel due to his severe misconduct. Defendant subsequently appeared pro se at his jury trial. The jury found him guilty of all counts. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court denied Defendant his procedural due process rights. The Court remanded the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing, at which Defendant would be entitled to due process protections, to determine whether Defendant engaged in "extremely serious misconduct" warranting forfeiture of his right to counsel. View "State v. Krause" on Justia Law