Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Melissa Zielinski was convicted of first-degree intentional murder and second-degree intentional murder under aiding-and-abetting theories. The case arose from the robbery and fatal shooting of Karl Henderson. Zielinski and her brother, Nicholas, planned to rob Henderson, who was known to keep large sums of money in a safe. During the robbery, Nicholas shot Henderson. Evidence included DNA on the stolen safe, phone location data, and witness testimony.The district court denied Zielinski’s pretrial motion to suppress evidence obtained from her cell phone and her statements to police, finding the search warrants valid and the police questioning lawful. Zielinski was convicted by a jury and sentenced to life without parole for first-degree murder. Her postconviction petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for not challenging the search warrants on particularity grounds, was summarily denied.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that any potential Fourth Amendment violation from police questioning was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Similarly, any Sixth Amendment violation from limiting cross-examination of Nicholas was also deemed harmless. The court agreed that the district court erred in entering convictions for both first-degree and second-degree murder, as the latter is a lesser-included offense of the former. The court affirmed the first-degree murder conviction, reversed the second-degree murder conviction, and remanded to vacate the latter. The court also upheld the denial of Zielinski’s postconviction relief petition, finding no reasonable probability that the trial outcome would have been different even if the challenged evidence had been excluded. View "State of Minnesota vs. Zielinski" on Justia Law

The case involves the valuation of two commercial properties in a Woodbury shopping center for tax purposes. The taxpayer, Tamarack Village Shopping Center, LP, challenged Washington County’s initial assessments of the properties, arguing that the tax court should have used an effective rent calculation to account for tenant improvement allowances and deducted lease-up costs due to an above-market vacancy rate.The tax court heard testimony from the taxpayer’s real property asset manager, the taxpayer’s expert appraiser, and the County’s expert appraiser. The tax court largely accepted the County’s appraiser’s opinions and rejected the taxpayer’s appraiser’s opinions. The tax court’s final value conclusions increased the properties’ assessed market values over the county assessor’s initial valuations. The taxpayer appealed, contending that the tax court erred in its analysis by not using an effective rent calculation and by not deducting lease-up costs.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the tax court did not err in declining to use an effective rent calculation because the taxpayer’s tenant improvement allowances were typical of the market. The court also found that the tax court did not clearly err in declining to deduct lease-up costs from the property’s indicated value to account for its above-market vacancy rate, as the taxpayer failed to show that such a deduction was required. The court affirmed the tax court’s decision, upholding the increased assessed market values of the properties. View "Tamarack Village Shopping Center, LP vs. County of Washington" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant, Deshawn Woolridge Carter, was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. At the time of the offense, he was under court-ordered conditions following a guilty plea to a felony theft offense, with adjudication stayed. During sentencing, the district court included a custody status point in his criminal history score, which increased the presumptive sentencing range. The appellant argued that because no conviction had been entered for his felony theft offense, he was not on "probation," and the district court had not "entered" his guilty plea.The district court concluded that the appellant was on probation when he committed the current offense, satisfying the requirements of Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines 2.B.2.a. The court included one custody status point in his criminal history score, resulting in a higher presumptive sentencing range. The court of appeals affirmed this decision, holding that the guidelines unambiguously authorized the assignment of a custody status point for an offense committed while on probation under a stay of adjudication.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the term "probation" in the guidelines includes court-ordered conditions under a stay of adjudication following a guilty plea. Additionally, the phrase "entry of a guilty plea" refers to the act of pleading guilty on the record, not the court's acceptance and recording of the plea. Therefore, the district court did not err in assigning a custody status point to the appellant's criminal history score. View "State of Minnesota vs. Carter" on Justia Law

The case involves Frank James Bigbear, who was charged with third-degree criminal sexual conduct for sexually assaulting a 14-year-old victim, I.M. The State of Minnesota presented multiple witnesses, including the victim, and introduced over 10 exhibits at trial. Among the evidence was a video recording of I.M.'s interview with an investigator and a social worker, which was admitted over Bigbear's hearsay objection. The jury found Bigbear guilty after a three-day trial.Bigbear appealed the conviction, arguing that the admission of the recorded interview was reversible error. The Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed that the video recording did not meet the requirements of Rules 801(d)(1)(B) and 807 of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence. However, the court concluded that the error was harmless, reasoning that the jury could have reached the same verdict based on other evidence presented.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed whether the Court of Appeals conducted an incorrect harmless-error analysis. The Supreme Court agreed that the lower court used an improper standard by focusing solely on whether other evidence was sufficient to support the verdict, rather than whether the erroneously admitted evidence substantially influenced the jury's decision. After applying the correct harmless-error standard, the Supreme Court concluded that the erroneous admission of the video was harmless. The court noted that the evidence against Bigbear was overwhelming, including consistent testimonies from the victim and eyewitnesses. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals to uphold Bigbear's conviction. View "State of Minnesota vs. Bigbear" on Justia Law

Blair Benedict Oberton was found in direct criminal contempt of court for a profanity-laced outburst during a judicial proceeding, partially directed at the district court judge. The district court summarily imposed a 180-day sentence, the maximum allowed under its inherent authority. Oberton appealed, arguing that the district court was required to make a finding of extraordinary conduct before imposing such a sentence.The district court's decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which concluded that findings were not required to support a 180-day sentence summarily imposed under the court’s inherent authority. By the time the Supreme Court of Minnesota granted Oberton’s petition for review, he had already served his sentence. The Supreme Court determined that the appeal was not moot due to the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine, as the 180-day sentence could impact future sentencing should Oberton be convicted of another offense.The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed its holding in State v. Tatum, clarifying that while 180 days is the maximum sentence allowed for direct contempt summarily sentenced for punitive purposes, a district court should limit its sentence to 90 days and a $1,000 fine unless the conduct is extraordinary. The court announced a new rule requiring district courts to make oral or written findings describing the extraordinary conduct within 7 days of the direct contempt order to ensure effective appellate review. The court applied this rule prospectively but concluded that under the unique circumstances of this case, Oberton’s 180-day sentence should be vacated and a 90-day sentence imposed on remand. The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "State of Minnesota vs. Oberton" on Justia Law

Kay “KT” Jacobs, a member of the Columbia Heights City Council, was the subject of a recall petition. The petition alleged that Jacobs used a fake name and made derogatory comments about a city council candidate's heritage during a phone call, lied during a city investigation, and was subsequently censured and stripped of her ability to serve on boards and commissions. Jacobs filed a petition to cancel the recall election, arguing that the recall petition did not meet the legal requirements for recall petitions and failed to allege malfeasance or nonfeasance, which are constitutional prerequisites for recalling an elected municipal official.The district court denied Jacobs' petition, finding that the recall petition met the procedural requirements of the city charter and that the allegations constituted malfeasance. Jacobs appealed, and the Minnesota Supreme Court granted her petition for accelerated review.The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision, concluding that the recall petition did not meet the legal definitions of malfeasance or nonfeasance. The court held that Jacobs' conduct, while inappropriate, did not violate a substantive legal standard established by law, rule, or case law, and that she was not acting in her official capacity during the phone call. Therefore, the recall petition failed to allege the necessary grounds for a recall election under the Minnesota Constitution. The court canceled the recall election scheduled for February 13, 2024. View "Jacobs v. City of Columbia Heights" on Justia Law

Fitness International, LLC ("Fitness") entered into a lease agreement with City Center Ventures, LLC ("City Center") for a property in Hopkins, Minnesota, where Fitness operated a health club. Due to executive orders during the COVID-19 pandemic, Fitness was mandated to close its business for approximately 3.5 months in 2020. Fitness sought to recover the rent paid during these closure periods, arguing that the doctrine of frustration of purpose excused its obligation to pay rent during the mandatory closure.The Hennepin County District Court granted summary judgment in favor of City Center, concluding that Fitness's obligation to pay rent was not excused. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that Fitness cited no binding authority allowing the doctrine of frustration of purpose to establish a breach-of-contract claim. The court of appeals also determined that the mandatory COVID-19 closures did not prohibit all permitted uses of the property, thus not substantially frustrating the lease's purpose.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case to consider the doctrine of frustration of purpose. The court recognized that the Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 265 and 269 provide appropriate frameworks for analyzing claims of permanent and temporary frustration of purpose, respectively. However, the court did not decide whether the doctrine could be used affirmatively for a breach-of-contract claim. Instead, it concluded that even if Fitness could pursue such a claim, the obligation to pay rent was only suspended, not discharged, during the temporary frustration. Since Fitness did not establish that paying rent after the closure would be materially more burdensome, the court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, denying Fitness's claim for rent recovery.The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that Fitness's obligation to pay rent was merely suspended during the temporary frustration and not discharged. View "Fitness International, LLC v. City Center Ventures, LLC" on Justia Law

Jamal L. Smith was convicted of first-degree intentional murder while committing a drive-by shooting, among other charges, for the fatal shooting of Jay Boughton during a road rage incident. Smith was driving a rented Chevrolet Suburban with two passengers from Chicago to Minnesota. During the trip, Smith brandished a pistol in a video, and later, the Suburban was involved in a road rage incident where Smith allegedly pointed a gun at another driver. On the night of the murder, Smith's Suburban paced Boughton's truck on the highway before a single .45-caliber bullet was fired from the Suburban, striking Boughton in the neck and causing his death.The Hennepin County District Court denied Smith's motion to dismiss the indictment based on the racial composition of the grand jury and admitted evidence of Smith's prior bad acts under the immediate episode exception. A jury found Smith guilty, and he was sentenced to life with the possibility of release for the murder charge and a concurrent sentence for possession of ammunition or a firearm after being convicted of a crime of violence. Smith appealed, arguing judicial bias, ineffective assistance of counsel, improper jury pool composition, erroneous admission of prior bad acts, and insufficient evidence to prove he fired the fatal shot.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that Smith failed to demonstrate judicial bias or ineffective assistance of counsel. The court also held that Smith did not show that Black persons were underrepresented in the jury pool or that any underrepresentation resulted from systematic exclusion. The court ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Smith's prior bad acts, as it was admissible under the Spreigl exception or as direct or corroborative evidence of a charged crime. Finally, the court concluded that the only reasonable inference from the circumstances proved was that Smith fired the fatal shot. The court affirmed the judgment of convictions. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

David Hepfl and Jodine Meadowcroft had a complex romantic history, including two marriages and divorces. After their second divorce, they reconciled in 2016 and decided to build a cabin on Meadowcroft's property, which she had retained as nonmarital property. Hepfl paid for the construction and furnishing of the cabin, as well as additional structures like a dock and outhouse. Their relationship ended again in October 2020, and Meadowcroft obtained an Order for Protection (OFP) against Hepfl. Hepfl then filed a civil action alleging unjust enrichment to recover the cabin and its associated fixtures and furnishings or reasonable payment.The district court ruled in favor of Hepfl, concluding that Meadowcroft would be unjustly enriched if she retained the cabin and its associated items without compensating Hepfl. The court found that Hepfl had no intention of gifting the cabin to Meadowcroft and that his contributions were made with the expectation of shared use. Meadowcroft's motion for amended findings was denied, and she was ordered to pay Hepfl for the construction costs and return or compensate for the additional items.The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that Meadowcroft's retention of the cabin would result in unjust enrichment. The court noted that Hepfl's contributions were made with the expectation of shared use and that Meadowcroft's actions induced him to make these expenditures.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that Hepfl did not need to show that Meadowcroft engaged in morally wrongful conduct to succeed in his unjust enrichment claim. Instead, it was sufficient that Meadowcroft's retention of the cabin and its associated items would be inequitable under the circumstances. The court emphasized that unjust enrichment claims between former partners in a cohabitating, marriage-like relationship should focus on the equities of the situation rather than the conduct of the parties. View "Hepfl v. Meadowcroft" on Justia Law

A state trooper brought his patrol vehicle to a car dealership for service, accompanied by his canine, Diesel. During the visit, Diesel attacked and injured an employee, Cristina Berrier, without provocation. Berrier suffered serious injuries and subsequently sued the Minnesota State Patrol, alleging negligence and later indicating her intention to pursue a claim under Minnesota’s strict liability dog-bite statute, Minn. Stat. § 347.22.The district court denied the State Patrol’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Berrier’s complaint sufficiently pleaded her statutory claim and that the dog-bite statute waived sovereign immunity. The State Patrol appealed, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the State Patrol was immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The appellate court did not address whether Berrier adequately pleaded her statutory dog-bite claim.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine if the dog-bite statute waived sovereign immunity. The court concluded that the language of Minn. Stat. § 347.22, which imposes liability on the "owner" of a dog, was sufficiently plain, clear, and unmistakable to waive sovereign immunity. The court emphasized that the statute’s broad application to any dog owner, including state entities, served the public policy interest of protecting individuals from dog attacks and ensuring their full recovery. Consequently, the court reversed the appellate court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hennesy vs. Minnesota State Patrol" on Justia Law