Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Wapiti Park Campgrounds, Inc. operated a campground on land in the City of Elk River. The City enacted a series of zoning ordinances that first allowed campgrounds as a conditional use and then removed campgrounds as either a conditional or a permitted use. Wapiti Park obtained a conditional-use permit from the City while campgrounds were allowed as a conditional use. The City later revoked the conditional-use permit and asserted that Wapiti Park was no longer authorized to operate the campground. Wapiti Park filed this action against the City. The district court determined that Wapiti Park's operation of the campground was a nonconforming use that could not be terminated by revocation of the conditional-use permit. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the City lacked the statutory authority to terminate Wapiti Park's nonconforming use as a campground by revoking the conditional-use permit; and (2) the City acted within its authority when it required Wapiti Park to obtain an interim-use permit before approving replacement of a destroyed accessory building and resumption of the regulated use. View "White v. City of Elk River" on Justia Law

Appellant was a real estate firm that owned a vacant four-story building (the property) and sought to develop it into an office building. Before the Minneapolis City Council approved Appellant's site plan application, the Minneapolis Heritage Preservation Commission (Commission) nominated the property for designation as a local historic landmark. Appellant subsequently submitted an application for a certificate of appropriateness to the Commission. The City Council denied the application and subsequently designated the property as a local historic landmark. Plaintiff commenced this action against the City, alleging that the City violated Minn. Stat. 15.99(2)(a) by failing to approve or deny the application for a certificate of appropriateness within sixty days. The district court granted summary judgment for the City, concluding that section 15.99(2)(a) did not apply to an application for a certificate of appropriateness. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that an application for a certificate of appropriateness is a "written request relating to zoning" under section 15.99(2)(a), and because the City failed to approve or deny Appellant's application within sixty days, summary judgment for the City was not proper. Remanded. View "500, LLC v. City of Minneapolis" on Justia Law

This case involved a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the City of Red Wing's rental property inspection ordinance. Appellants were landlords and tenants who brought suit seeking a declaratory that the City's ordinance violated the Minnesota Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, concluding that Appellants lacked standing and that the constitutional claim failed on the merits. The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that Appellants lacked standing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellants' facial challenge presented a justiciable controversy. On remand, the court of appeals again affirmed, this time concluding that the City's ordinance did not violate the state constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the law can be applied constitutionally; and (2) because Appellants did not satisfy their burden in a facial challenge to show that the ordinance operated unconstitutionally in all of its applications, Appellants' facial challenge failed. View "McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing" on Justia Law

After the City of Moorhead annexed Americana Estates (Americana), a residential subdivision with sixty-five metered electric service accounts, the City filed a condemnation petition to begin municipal electric service to residents of Americana. After a hearing, a three-member commission of the district court awarded the Red River Valley Cooperative Power Association (RRVC), which previously served Americana, $307,214. Both parties appealed the commission's award of damages. After a jury trial, the district court awarded a total compensation award to RRVC of $385,311. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the City's valuation was inconsistent with the plain language of Minn. Stat. 216B.47 by failing to give meaningful consideration to four statutory factors and thus was properly excluded from consideration by the district court; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding portions of an untimely revised report submitted by the City dealing with facility replacement costs. View "City of Moorhead v. Red River Valley Coop. Power Ass'n" on Justia Law

Central Lakes College (CLC) formally petitioned the City of Brainerd to reconstruct a road. The City validated the petition and resolved to pay for a portion of the project with special assessments. Appellants, who owned property adjacent to the road, challenged the legality of the petition, arguing that because CLC was an instrumentality of the State, and the State cannot be bound by special assessments of its property, CLC was not an "owner" of property permitted to petition for an improvement under Minn. Stat. 429.031(1)(f). The district court granted summary judgment for the City. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) CLC was an "owner" of property under the plain language of the statute; and (2) therefore, CLC's petition was valid. View "City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Invs. P'ship" on Justia Law

In 2008, Stearns County changed the tax classification of property co-owned by Respondent from residential nonhomestead to commercial. Respondent filed a petition under Minn. Stat. 278.01, claiming the property was misclassified, unequally assessed, and undervalued. The tax court dismissed the petition as untimely. Respondent did not appeal from the tax court's dismissal of its petition and instead filed a verified claim under Minn. Stat. 278.14 for a refund of taxes paid in 2009, claiming the property was misclassified for taxes payable in 2009. The County denied the refund claim. The tax court denied the County's motion to dismiss the section 278.14 appeal (Matter A11-1479). In the meantime, Respondent filed a timely petition under Minn. Stat. 278.01 with respect to property taxes assessed in 2009. The tax court ruled the property was properly classified as residential nonhomestead, its original classification (Matter A11-1480). The County petitioned for writ of certiorari in both matters. The Supreme Court dismissed the writs of certiorari, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction in each case. View "Beuning Family LP v. County of Stearns" on Justia Law

The City of Red Wing enacted an ordinance requiring inspections of rental property before landlords could obtain operating licenses and allowing the City to conduct inspections by application for and judicial approval of an administrative warrant in the absence of landlord or tenant consent. Appellants in this case were nine landlords and two tenants who refused to consent to inspections of their properties and successfully challenged three separate applications for administrative warrants. At the same time Appellants opposed the City's application, they filed a separate declaratory judgment action seeking to have the rental inspection ordinance declared unconstitutional. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the declaratory judgment action for lack of standing, concluding that Appellants had not alleged an injury that was actual or imminent. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the challenge to the constitutionality of the rental inspection ordinance presented a justiciable controversy. Remanded. View "McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing" on Justia Law

The Commission of Transportation requested a condemnation order for a portion of appellant Richard Lepak's land for the improvement and widening of a highway. After a condemnation hearing, the district court concluded that improving and widening the highway was a legitimate public purpose and that the state Department of Transportation had established a reasonable necessity. Therefore, the district court rejected the challenged to the proposed taking, and the court of appeals affirmed. At issue on review was whether the State had a valid public purpose for the taking because part of Lepak's land would be used to build a private road to mitigate damages to a neighboring parcel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the purpose of the taking in this case met the definition of "public use" or "public purpose" as set forth in Minn. Stat. 117.025. View "State Comm'r of Transp. v. Kettleson" on Justia Law

In 2008, Marlow Timberland (MT) filed a tax petition challenging the taxes payable in 2008 on the belief that Lake County's property tax assessment of MT's recently purchased land was too high. MT then filed tax petitions challenging the taxes payable in 2009 and 2010, which were dismissed due to MT's failure to pay the taxes. MT moved to reinstate the 2009 and 2010 petitions based on its contention that the properties were overassessed and that it was unable to pay the taxes due. The Minnesota Tax Court issued an order granting Lake County's motion to dismiss the 2008 petition and denying MT's motion to reinstate the 2009 and 2010 petitions. On review, the Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the tax court erred by not allowing MT to amend its 2008 petition because an amendment would not result in any prejudice to Lake County; and (2) the tax court properly denied MT's motion to reinstate its 2009 and 2010 tax petitions, and reinstatement of those petitions was not required on an equitable basis. Remanded. View "Marlow Timberland, L.L.C. v. County of Lake " on Justia Law

Respondents Dr. Rajbir Sarpal and his wife Carol purchased a parcel of property in 2003 on which they built their home. The property was encumbered by two easements reserved by the City of North Oaks for a future trail. The Sarpals wanted a shed on their property, and in 2006, went to the City to obtain the necessary permits. A City employee gave Dr. Sarpal an "as-built" survey in order to obtain the necessary permits, but the survey was dated to a time before the Sarpals' home was built. Dr. Sarpal, acting as his own general contractor, drew up the plans, submitted them to the requisite authorities, and built the shed on his property. He would later find out that the shed encroached on the City's two easements. Dr. Sarpal petitioned the local zoning board for a variance in order to save the shed, but was denied. The City sued to have the shed removed. The court dismissed all of the City's claims, holding that because the Sarpals relied on the survey given to them by the City, the City was equitably estopped from suing for the easements now. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that when a government entity makes a "simple mistake" when providing a document to a party upon which the party relies to obtain building permits and the government approves that permit, the mistake is not wrongful conduct sufficient to support the conclusion that the government is equitably estopped from enforcing its zoning ordinances.