Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law
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Plaintiff brought an action against Defendant for copyright infringement and obtained a money judgment in California. The judgment against Defendant was filed and docketed in a Minnesota district court. Plaintiff subsequently served a garnishment summons on Defendant and sought to attach Defendant’s domain name and the content of its related website. The district court concluded that neither the domain name nor its associated website constituted property subject to garnishment under Minn. Stat. 571.73(3). The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an Internet domain name constitutes intangible personal property subject to attachment by garnishment under section 571.73(3)(3). View "Sprinkler Warehouse, Inc. v. Systematic Rain, Inc." on Justia Law

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The State acquired three parcels of land for use during construction of Interstate 394. Because the State no longer needed the parcels, it planned to convey the land to the Golden Valley Housing and Redevelopment Authority (HRA). Webb Golden Valley owned nearby land and argued that the conveyance violated Minn. Stat. 161.44(1). The district court (1) granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to two of the parcels for lack of standing, and (2) dismissed the complaint in its entirety when Webb failed to post a surety bond. The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) Webb’s interest in purchasing the two parcels was sufficient to confer standing to challenge the State’s proposed transfer; and (2) the HRA’s allegations of public harm were not supported by evidence in the record, and therefore the district court erred in granting the HRA’s motion for an order directing Webb to post a surety bond. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Webb had standing to bring this suit; but (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Webb to post a surety bond, and because Webb did not post the surety bond, the district court did not err in dismissing Webb’s lawsuit with prejudice. View "Webb Golden Valley, LLC v. State" on Justia Law

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After Appellants, several public utilities, sought to condemn a permanent easement across the property of Landowners for a high-voltage transmission line, Landowners elected to compel Appellants to purchase their entire parcel of land pursuant to the Buy-the-Farm statute, Minn. Stat. 216E.12(4). Appellants challenged Landowners’ election, arguing that it was not reasonable because the land subject to the election was much larger than the land needed for the easement and that the district court must consider several factors in addition to the statute’s requirements, including the size of the election. The district court approved the election, concluding that it was not required to analyze factors outside the provisions of the Buy-the-Farm statute. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the language of the statute forecloses Appellants’ assertion that the district court must engage in a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis of the reasonableness of Landowners’ election; (2) case law does not require an extra-statutory analysis; and (3) because Landowners’ election meets the statutory requires, the district court did not err in approving the compelled purchase of the parcel. View "Great River Energy v. Swedzinski" on Justia Law

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When Amos Graves was anticipating losing his home to foreclosure, Michael Wayman persuaded him to enter into a transaction that would purportedly save his home. Graves executed a quitclaim deed in favor of a corporate entity under Wayman’s control, but, the next day, sent a cancellation notice to Wayman, as was his statutory right. Wayman refused to cancel the transaction. When Wayman ceased making mortgage payments, First Minnesota Bank, the eventual mortgagee of the property, foreclosed on and purchased the home. Graves sued Wayman, Wayman’s companies, and First Minnesota, alleging that First Minnesota’s mortgage was invalid because Graves did not lawfully sell his home to Wayman. The district court awarded the property to First Minnesota, concluding that the bank was a bona fide purchaser. The court of appeals reversed and awarded the property to Graves, concluding that First Minnesota did not qualify as a bona fide purchaser. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) First Minnesota was not entitled to rights in the property as a bona fide purchaser; but (2) the court of appeals erred in concluding that Graves should be awarded title to the property free of any interest of First Minnesota. Remanded. View "Graves v. Wayman" on Justia Law

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During a hail storm, all twenty of the townhome buildings managed by Cedar Bluff Townhome Condominium Association (Cedar Bluff) were damaged, with at least one siding panel on each building sustaining damage. Cedar Bluff submitted a claim to American Family Mutual Insurance Company (American Family) under its businessowners’ policy, which provided for the replacement of “damaged property with other property…[o]f comparable material and quality.” A dispute arose as to whether the policy required the replacement of all siding, including undamaged siding, in order to provide a color match. Because the parties were unable to agree on the amount of the loss, Cedar Bluff demanded an appraisal. The appraisal panel concluded that siding of comparable material and quality required a reasonable color match between the damaged and undamaged siding. American Family refused to pay the appraisal award. The court of appeals agreed with the appraisal panel, concluding that “a reasonable person could understand that ‘comparable material’ means material that is the same color as the damaged property.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the terms of its policy with American Family, Cedar Bluff was entitled to have all of the siding panels on each of its twenty buildings replaced. View "Cedar Bluff Townhome Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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Appellant entered into a mortgage with Aegis Lending Corporation. The mortgage was later assigned to Pacifica L. Ninteen, and the servicing rights were eventually transferred to Vantium Capital, Inc. (“Acqura”). After foreclosure proceedings were commenced against Appellant, Appellant filed suit against Acqura, alleging numerous state law claims. Specifically, Appellant claimed that Acqura’s violated its Servicer Participation Agreement with Fannie Mae by failing to follow guidelines applicable under the federal Home Affordable Modification Program. The district court dismissed the lawsuit, holding that Minn. Stat. 58.18(1) did not provide a private cause of action for Appellant to pursue damages for Acqura’s alleged violation of its agreement with Fannie Mae and that Appellant therefore lacked standing. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 58.18(1) provides for a private right of action and therefore gave Appellant standing to pursue her claim. View "Gretsch v. Vantium Capital, Inc." on Justia Law

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Mark Hilde hired Big Lake Lumber (Big Lake), Wruck Excavating (Wruck), and J. DesMarais Construction (DesMarais) to help him build a "spec home." 21st Century Bank (Bank) recorded a mortgage against the property to finance the purchase of the property and the home construction. After the Bank foreclosed on its mortgage, Big Lake commenced this mechanic's lien foreclosure action. The district court found that the mechanic's liens of Big Lake and DesMarais related back to the date Wruck commenced work on the improvement project, and thus, the mechanic's liens of Big Lake and DesMarais had priority over the mortgage of the Bank. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred by adopting and then applying a new "integrated analysis" to find the Bank's mortgage superior to the liens; and (2) the district court did not clearly err when it found that Wruck, Big Lake, and DesMarais contributed to the same project of improvement, and accordingly, under the relation-back doctrine, the mechanic's liens of Big Lake and DesMarais had priority over the Bank's mortgage.View "Big Lake Lumber, Inc. v. Sec. Prop. Invs., Inc." on Justia Law

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In 1986, the City of Duluth and the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa (the Band) entered into several agreements establishing a joint venture to operate gaming activities in Duluth. The agreements required that the Band seek approval before creating any additional Indian Country. In 1994, the Band and the City created a series of new agreements and amendments to the 1986 agreements. In 2010, the Band acquired a plot of land. The Band sought to have the plot placed in trust but did not seek the City’s approval to do so, as required by the 1986 agreements. The City commenced this action in state district court seeking a court order requiring the Band to withdraw its trust application. The district court dismissed the lawsuit, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Band had only consented to suit in federal court in the 1994 agreements. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision and reinstated the district court’s judgment for the Band, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction to decide the issue of whether the Band breached the 1986 agreements because it required interpretation of the 1994 agreements, which was a matter vested in the federal courts. View "City of Duluth v. Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa" on Justia Law

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After Washington County assessed the value of one of properties owned by Kohl's Department Stores for the years 2007-2009, Kohl's challenged the valuation. The tax court adjusted the County's assessment by increasing the valuations for 2007 and 2008 and decreasing the valuation for 2009. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the tax court not err (1) by failing to adjust its capitalization rate to account for the property taxes paid by the owner on vacant space and for the neighborhood's excessive vacancy; and (2) when it calculated the property's fair market rent using comparable leases rather than a percentage of retail sales method. View "Kohl's Dep't Stores, Inc. v. County of Washington" on Justia Law

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Through the exercise of its eminent-domain power, the County of Dakota acquired a commercial property owned by Appellant. Following an administrative hearing, three condemnation commissioners awarded Appellant $655,000 in damages. Appellant appealed, arguing that under Minnesota's minimum-compensation statute, he was entitled to an award of damages that would allow him "to purchase a comparable property in the community." The trial court concluded Appellant was entitled to $997,056 in damages after finding that certain property, which was located within the same city as the condemned property, qualified as a comparable property in the community under the statute. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was what qualified as a "comparable property" located in the same "community" as the condemned property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the phrase "comparable property" in the minimum-compensation statute refers to an existing property that has enough like characteristics or qualities to another property that the value of one can be used to determine the value of the other; and (2) the district court did not err when it determined that the disputed property qualified as a "comparable property in the community" of the condemned property. View "County of Dakota v. Cameron " on Justia Law