Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Craig Reichel, a businessperson from Rochester, Minnesota, and his companies, including Reichel Foods, Inc., filed a legal malpractice lawsuit against the law firm Wendland Utz, LTD, and its former lawyer, Jerrie Hayes. Reichel alleged that despite an ultimately favorable outcome in prior litigation, the law firm’s negligence caused him to incur substantial attorney fees and costs. The underlying litigation involved a lawsuit filed by Craig’s brother, Bryan Reichel, claiming an equity interest in one of Craig’s companies. The district court issued several adverse rulings against Craig and his companies, leading to significant legal expenses. Eventually, the bankruptcy court confirmed Craig’s sole ownership of the companies, and the district court granted summary judgment in Craig’s favor.The Olmsted County District Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Wendland Utz, dismissing Reichel Foods’ professional negligence claim on the grounds that Reichel Foods could not demonstrate that, but for the law firm’s conduct, it would have been successful in the underlying litigation. The district court did not address Reichel Foods’ other claims for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, nor did it resolve the claims brought by Craig Reichel and his other companies.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to decide claims still pending in the district court. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ rulings on those claims. Regarding the professional negligence claim of Reichel Foods, the Supreme Court held that a successful outcome in the underlying litigation does not categorically bar a legal malpractice claim. The court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming summary judgment on Reichel Foods’ professional negligence claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Reichel vs. Wendland Utz, LTD" on Justia Law

In Minnesota, a district court removed Brian Lipschultz as a trustee from the Otto Bremer Trust. This decision was based on his violation of Minnesota Statutes section 501C.0706(b)(1), which allows for the removal of a trustee for a “serious breach of trust.” The breaches included Lipschultz's misuse of trust resources for personal purposes, offensive behavior during a stock dispute, manipulation of a grantee, and failure to disclose his successor. Lipschultz appealed this decision, arguing that the district court and court of appeals applied an incorrect legal standard for removal and that they abused their discretion in removing him under section 501C.0706(b)(1). However, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, stating that the district court did not abuse its broad discretion when it determined that Lipschultz committed “a serious breach of trust” under section 501C.0706(b)(1). The court concluded that Lipschultz breached the duty of loyalty and the duty of information, demonstrating a pattern of placing his personal priorities over the duties he owed to the Trust. View "In the Matter of the Otto Bremer Trust" on Justia Law

The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed a decision by the Court of Appeals, ruling that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying an order as a final partial judgment under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. The case arose from a dispute between the City of Elk River and Bolton & Menk, Inc. over a large construction contract for a wastewater treatment plant improvement project. The City sued Bolton for alleged breach of contract and professional negligence. Bolton responded by filing a third-party complaint against three other parties involved in the contract. The district court dismissed Bolton's third-party complaint and Bolton sought to have the dismissal order certified as a final judgment for immediate appeal. The district court granted this certification, but the Court of Appeals dismissed Bolton's appeal, determining that the district court had abused its discretion in certifying the order as a final judgment. The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the district court had offered valid reasons for its certification, including that the third-party claims presented distinct issues from the principal claims and that the case was in its early stages at the time of certification. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "City of Elk River vs. Bolton & Menk, Inc." on Justia Law

In a case heard by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, the defendant, Christian Portillo, was charged with two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. During the trial, the prosecutor elicited testimony from the State’s witnesses regarding evidence that the district court had previously ruled as inadmissible. The defendant's motion for a mistrial was denied by the district court. During the closing-argument rebuttal, the prosecutor told the jury that the defendant no longer held the presumption of innocence based on the evidence presented during the trial. The defendant did not object to this statement. The jury found the defendant guilty of one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct.The defendant appealed, arguing that he was denied a fair trial due to prosecutorial errors committed by the State. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the prosecutor's misstatement of the law did not affect the defendant's substantial rights.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed the decision of the court of appeals. The Supreme Court found that the prosecutor’s misstatement of the law during the closing-argument rebuttal was a plain error that affected the defendant’s substantial rights. The court held that the defendant is entitled to a new trial as the error must be addressed to ensure the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings. View "State of Minnesota vs. Portillo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the district court's dismissing of Plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claim against Defendant, an attorney, holding that the court of appeals erred in its analysis for determining whether experts were required in this case.Plaintiff brought a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Defendant, alleging that Defendant took unfair of the parties' professional relationship and that their business dealings were unfair to Plaintiff. The district court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed on the grounds that Plaintiff did not provide the expert-disclosure affidavits as required by Minn. Stat. 544.42. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 544.42 applies to breach of fiduciary duty claims; but (2) the court of appeals erred in its analysis for determining whether experts were required in this case. View "Mittelstaedt v. Henney" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the district court's dismissal of a medical malpractice action brought against a hospital system based on the alleged negligence of independent contractors involved in providing care for a patient in the emergency rooms of two different hospitals owned by the hospital system, holding that a hospital can be held vicariously liable for the negligence of an independent contractor based on the doctrine of apparent authority.In granting the hospital system's motion to dismiss, the district court ruled that a hospital is not vicariously liable for the acts of non-employees. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a plaintiff states a vicarious liability claim against a hospital for the professional negligence of independent contractors in the hospital's emergency room based on a theory of apparent authority if the hospital held itself out as a provider of emergency medical care and the patient looked to the hospital, rather than a specific doctor, for care and relied on the hospital to select the physical and other medical professionals to provide the necessary services. View "Popovich v. Allina Health System" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts that, as a matter of law, a hospitalist owed no duty of care to a patient seeking to be admitted because no physician-patient relationship had been established, holding that there was sufficient evidence in the record to survive a summary judgment motion.A hospitalist denied a patient admission, and, three days later, the patient died. Plaintiff filed a professional negligence suit against the hospitalist and the hospital. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on the issue of duty, concluding that the relationship between the patient and the hospitalist did not create a doctor-patient relationship. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed after noting that a physician-patient relationship is not a necessary element of a claim for professional negligence, holding (1) a physician owes a duty of care to a third party when the physician acts in a professional capacity and it is reasonably foreseeable that the third party will rely on the physician's acts and be harmed by a breach of the standard of care; and (2) it was reasonably foreseeable that the patient in this case would rely on the hospitalist's acts and be harmed by a breach of the standard of care. View "Warren v. Dinter" on Justia Law

Security Bank & Trust Company (Security Bank) lacked standing both in its capacity as personal representative of Gordon P. Savoie’s estate and in its capacity as trustee of the Gordon P. Savoie Revocable Trust to bring this legal malpractice action related to estate planning services for its deceased client.In its complaint, Security Bank alleged that Larkin, Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren, Ltd. (Larkin) failed to advise Savoie that his estate would be subject to a substantial generation-skipping transfer tax upon a distribution to a beneficiary who was more than thirty-seven years younger than him. The district court granted Larkin’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, determining that Savoie lacked standing either as personal representative or as trustee. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Security Bank had standing as personal representative because a cause of action for legal malpractice accrued to Savoie during his lifetime, and therefore, survived to Security Bank. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a cause of action for malpractice did not accrue during Savoie’s lifetime and therefore did not survive to Security Bank; and (2) Security Bank could not state a claim for legal malpractice against Larkin in its capacity as trustee. View "Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Larkin, Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren, Ltd." on Justia Law

Contrary to the holding of the district court, Appellant filed a timely legal-malpractice claim under Minn. Stat. 541.05(1)(5).Respondent, Appellant’s attorney, prepared an antenuptial agreement for Appellant and his then-fiancee, Cynthia Gatliff, but the agreement did not include statutorily required witness signatures, making it unenforceable. One year after Appellant married Gatliff, Respondent drafted a will for Appellant that incorporated the antenuptial agreement by reference. When Gatliff later filed for divorce, she alleged that the antenuptial agreement was invalid due to its lack of witness signatures. Appellant subsequently sued Respondent for legal malpractice. While the invalid execution of the antenuptial agreement fell outside the six-year limitations period for malpractice claims, Appellant argued that subsequent representations by Respondent that the anteuptial agreement was valid were separate legal-malpractice claims that each triggered their own statute of limitations periods. The district court granted Respondent’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant sufficiently alleged that Respondent’s will drafting formed the basis for a separate malpractice claims within the limitations period. View "Frederick v. Wallerich" on Justia Law

Contrary to the holding of the district court, Appellant filed a timely legal-malpractice claim under Minn. Stat. 541.05(1)(5).Respondent, Appellant’s attorney, prepared an antenuptial agreement for Appellant and his then-fiancee, Cynthia Gatliff, but the agreement did not include statutorily required witness signatures, making it unenforceable. One year after Appellant married Gatliff, Respondent drafted a will for Appellant that incorporated the antenuptial agreement by reference. When Gatliff later filed for divorce, she alleged that the antenuptial agreement was invalid due to its lack of witness signatures. Appellant subsequently sued Respondent for legal malpractice. While the invalid execution of the antenuptial agreement fell outside the six-year limitations period for malpractice claims, Appellant argued that subsequent representations by Respondent that the anteuptial agreement was valid were separate legal-malpractice claims that each triggered their own statute of limitations periods. The district court granted Respondent’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant sufficiently alleged that Respondent’s will drafting formed the basis for a separate malpractice claims within the limitations period. View "Frederick v. Wallerich" on Justia Law