Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of first-degree premeditated murder. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging seven separate grounds he contended warranted a new trial. The postconviction court summarily denied Appellant's petition, explaining that Appellant's claims were either meritless on their face or barred by State v. Knaffla. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the postconviction court properly determined that the petition and files and records of the trial conclusively showed Appellant was not entitled to postconviction relief because his claims were either meritless on their face or barred by the Knaffla rule. View "Anderson v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted for first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder. After Defendant's convictions were affirmed on appeal, Defendant filed four separate petitions for postconviction relief, each of which was denied by the postconviction court. Defendant filed a fifth petition for postconviction relief, arguing that (1) he was entitled to relief based on newly discovered evidence of false testimony, and (2) the statute under which he was convicted was unconstitutional. The postconviction court denied Defendant's petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) based on the postconviction court's findings, the court did not abuse its discretion when it summarily denied Defendant's claim of newly discovered evidence; and (2) Defendant's claim that the statute under which he was convicted was unconstitutional was time-barred. View "McDonough v. State" on Justia Law

Central Lakes College (CLC) formally petitioned the City of Brainerd to reconstruct a road. The City validated the petition and resolved to pay for a portion of the project with special assessments. Appellants, who owned property adjacent to the road, challenged the legality of the petition, arguing that because CLC was an instrumentality of the State, and the State cannot be bound by special assessments of its property, CLC was not an "owner" of property permitted to petition for an improvement under Minn. Stat. 429.031(1)(f). The district court granted summary judgment for the City. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) CLC was an "owner" of property under the plain language of the statute; and (2) therefore, CLC's petition was valid. View "City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Invs. P'ship" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree felony murder while committing a drive-by shooting and second-degree intentional murder. The district court convicted Defendant of first-degree felony murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment with the possibility of release. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of first-degree felony murder while committing a drive-by shooting, holding (1) the State did not present sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction because Defendant's conduct in this case did not meet the definition of a drive-by shooting; and (2) the district court did not err when it admitted testimony at trial that a witness was threatened and attacked for being a "snitch." Remanded with instructions to enter a judgment of conviction on the second-degree intentional murder count. View "State v. Hayes" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of possessing a firearm as an ineligible person in violation of Minn. Stat. 624.713(1)(2), which prohibits a person previously convicted of a crime of violence from possessing a firearm. After trial, Appellant unsuccessfully moved to vacate his conviction on the basis that the statute, as applied to him, violated the Second Amendment. The court of appeals upheld the statute as constitutional and affirmed Appellant's conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on different grounds, holding that application of section 624.713(1)(2) to Appellant did not violate the Second Amendment as historically understood, because the Second Amendment as understood at the time of its ratification excluded those convicted of crimes of violence from exercising the right to possess a firearm. View "State v. Craig" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of aiding and abetting the first-degree murder of his brother as well as obstructing an investigation. Appellant was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility for parole. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, which the postconviction court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim failed because Appellant failed to show that, but for his attorneys' alleged errors, there was a reasonable probability the outcome of his trial would have been different; and (2) any error in the admission of statements made by Appellant's sister and girlfriend was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Hawes v. State" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and attempted first-degree premeditated murder. After Appellant's first petition for postconviction relief was denied, Appellant filed a second postconviction petition. After a hearing, the postconviction court denied Appellant's petition. Appellant appealed, contending (1) the postconviction court erred in concluding that an affidavit from a recanting witness is inadmissible hearsay, and (2) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during the postconviction proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the affidavit, as Appellant failed to establish corroborating circumstances clearly indicating the trustworthiness of Appellant's affidavit; and (2) Appellant did not have a constitutional right to effective assistance of postconviction counsel, and therefore, his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim failed as a matter of law. View "Ferguson v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff leased a vehicle from BMW. Plaintiff claimed the leased vehicle was defective and brought suit against BMW. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded Plaintiff $25,157 in damages based on Minnesota's lemon law. The district court then granted Plaintiff's motion for an award of attorney fees and litigation costs, awarding Plaintiff a total of $229,064 in fees and costs. In reaching its conclusion on attorney fees, the court determined that it was "improper to compare the amount of reasonable legal fees to the amount of recovery in determining the proper fee award." The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the amount involved in the litigation and the results obtained are relevant factors that the district court is to consider in awarding attorney fees under Minnesota's lemon law; and (2) the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider these factors in awarding attorney fees under the lemon law. Remanded. View "Green v. BMW of N. Am., LLC" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and attempted first-degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions on direct appeal. Defendant filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in federal district court, which was denied, and a petition for postconviction relief in state court, which was also denied. Defendant subsequently filed a second petition for postconviction relief, which the postconviction court denied after concluding that the petition was filed after the expiration of the two-year limitations period in Minn. Stat. 590.01, subd. 4(a)(2). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition as untimely, as the petition satisfied neither exception to the limitations period. View "Berkovitz v. State" on Justia Law

In 1995, Katelyn Janson was severely injured in an automobile accident. A lawsuit ended with a settlement in which two annuities were established, both of which guaranteed payments to Katelyn starting in 2001 and established that, if Katelyn died before fifteen years expired, annuity payments would be made to her estate. Katelyn's mother and conservator, Candy Bradison, moved Katelyn to Wyoming in 2001 and to Minnesota in 2003. In 2006, Katelyn died. In 2010, Bradison sought, on behalf of Katelyn's estate, a refund of the amount the estate previously paid to the Minnesota Department of Revenue, arguing (1) the annuity payments were not includable in Katelyn's estate because Katelyn did not own the annuities; and (2) Katelyn was a Wyoming domiciliary at the time of her death. The tax court concluded (1) Katelyn was a Minnesota domiciliary at the time of her death; and (2) the annuity payments were includable in Katelyn's estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Katelyn's intangible property had a situs in Minnesota at the time of her death and could be taxed in accordance with Minnesota's estate tax provisions; and (2) Katelyn was the beneficial owner of the annuity payments, and the value of the payments was properly included in her estate. View "Bradison vs. Comm'r of Revenue" on Justia Law