Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Berry and Co. petitioned the tax court for relief from the County's property tax assessment of its property for 2007 and 2008. At trial, Berry and the County each offered expert appraiser testimony as to the estimated market value of the property. Both appraisers used the market sales comparison approach to value the subject property. The tax county determined that the highest and best use for the subject property was redevelopment and agreed with the County's expert on the valuation, which was higher than the original assessment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the tax court's determination that the highest and best use of the subject property was redevelopment was not erroneous, and (2) the tax court's valuation of the subject property was supported in the record and was not clearly erroneous. View "Berry & Co., Inc. v. County of Hennepin" on Justia Law

After suffering a work-related injury, Employee underwent surgery at a hospital owned by HealthEast Care System. The injury required surgical implantation of a spinal cord stimulator. Employer's worker's compensation insurance provider, State Auto Insurance, paid part but not all of the surgical expenses, asserting (1) the withheld portion of the expenses was attributable to a price markup added by HealthEast to the price paid by HealthEast for the implant hardware used in Employee's surgery, and (2) the manufacturer of the implant hardware should be required to charge directly for the implant hardware. The compensation judge found that Employer and State Auto were liable for the unpaid balance. The Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) HealthEast could charge for the implant hardware because when more than one health care provider is responsible for the creation of a service, article, or supply, the provider that provides the service, article, or supply in its final form is entitled to charge for it; and (2) a compensation judge does not have the authority to determine a reasonable value of a treatment, service, or supply that is lower than eighty-five percent of the provider's usual or customary charge. View "Troyer v. Vertlu Mgmt. Co." on Justia Law

Samantha Heiges was arrested and charged with second-degree murder and first-degree manslaughter for allegedly drowning her baby daughter in a bathtub immediately after the baby was born. After a jury trial, the district court convicted Heiges of second-degree murder and sentenced her to 299 months in prison. The court of appeals affirmed Heiges's conviction. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the scope of the term "confession" in Minn. Stat. 634.03 includes statements made to friends and acquaintances after the crime was committed but before the commencement of the police investigation; (2) Heiges's conviction did not violate Section 634.03 when the State established the trustworthiness of Heiges's confessions by presenting sufficient evidence to corroborate the attendant facts and circumstances of those confessions; (3) the facts admitted in Heiges's confession could be used to satisfy Minn. Stat. 634.051, which requires that the evidence that establishes the death of the victim be independent of the evidence that establishes the killing of the victim by the defendant; and (4) the evidence at trial, including Heiges's confessions, was sufficient to sustain Heiges's conviction for second-degree murder. View "State v. Heiges" on Justia Law

Continental Retail sought certiorari review of the market value determinations by the Minnesota Tax Court for a Continental commercial building for the assessment dates of 2006, 2007, and 2008. Continental filed petitions challenging the county assessor's estimated market value for the three years, and at trial, the tax court increased the market value determinations for all three years. On appeal, Continental argued that the tax court's value determinations were excessive and not supported by the record over the assessed value of the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the tax court's value determinations were supported by the record and were not clearly erroneous. View "Continental Retail, L.L.C. v. County of Hennepin" on Justia Law

The Commission of Transportation requested a condemnation order for a portion of appellant Richard Lepak's land for the improvement and widening of a highway. After a condemnation hearing, the district court concluded that improving and widening the highway was a legitimate public purpose and that the state Department of Transportation had established a reasonable necessity. Therefore, the district court rejected the challenged to the proposed taking, and the court of appeals affirmed. At issue on review was whether the State had a valid public purpose for the taking because part of Lepak's land would be used to build a private road to mitigate damages to a neighboring parcel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the purpose of the taking in this case met the definition of "public use" or "public purpose" as set forth in Minn. Stat. 117.025. View "State Comm'r of Transp. v. Kettleson" on Justia Law

Toby Johnson was indicted for intentional murder while committing a kidnapping, murder in the second degree, and kidnapping. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State amended the first count to aiding and abetting first-degree murder. Johnson then pleaded guilty to counts one and two. Johnson was sentenced to life in prison with a possibility of parole after thirty years. The postconviction court denied Johnson's petition for postconviction relief, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Later, Johnson filed a motion to correct or reduce his sentence, alleging that his guilty plea was invalid for several reasons. The district court concluded that the sentencing court had erred during the sentencing hearing by citing to the second-degree murder statute when imposing a sentence for first-degree murder. As to Johnson's other reasons for requested relief, the court concluded that the Supreme Court's rule from State v. Knaffla barred Johnson from raising claims that were not raised in his first petition for postconviction relief. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court's denial of Johnson's motion challenging the validity of his guilty plea, holding that Johnson's petition was untimely and should not be considered on the merits. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

In 2008, Olmsted County changed the property tax classification of farmland owned by Frederick Farms from agricultural-homestead to agricultural-nonhomestead property. The tax court denied Frederick Farms' petition to change the classification of the property back to agricultural homestead for taxes payable in 2009 and later. Frederick Farms appealed, arguing that it was operating a joint family farm venture with its sole shareholder, James Frederick, and that the County must classify the property as agricultural homestead because it was used by the joint family farm venture. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the tax court, concluding (1) that a joint family farm venture must own or lease, and not merely use, the property in order for a participant of the joint family farm venture to claim an agricultural-homestead classification; and (2) because the family farm corporation, not the joint family farm venture, owned the land in question, Frederick Farms was not entitled to claim an agricultural-homestead classification as a participant in a joint family farm venture. View "Frederick Farms, Inc. v. County of Olmsted" on Justia Law

George Frandsen was employed by Ford Motor Company when he was injured in the course and scope of his employment. Ford assumed responsibility for the injury and paid Frandsen temporary total disability (TTD) benefits pursuant to the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act. Later, the parties agreed to reclassify the TTD benefits Ford had previously paid to Frandsen as permanent total disability (PTD) benefit payments. After Frandsen turned sixty-seven years old, Ford petitioned the WCCA to discontinue payment of Frandsen's PTD benefits pursuant to Minn. Stat. 176.101, which states that permanent total disability shall cease at age sixty-seven because the employee is presumed retired from the labor market. The Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) denied Ford's petition, concluding that Ford had waived the retirement presumption by failing to expressly reserve the right to discontinue payment of Frandsen's PTD benefits in the settlement agreement. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the WCCA, holding (1) the retirement presumption applies unless the employee rebuts the presumption or proves knowing and intentional waiver by the employer, and (2) here the record lacked any evidence that Ford intended to continue paying PTD benefits to Frandsen after he turned sixty-seven. Remanded. View "Frandsen v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

This case involved the assault of a pregnant woman, who, after the assault, received a cesarean section. The baby, named Destiny, later died. After a jury trial, Dameon Gatson was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder for aiding the perpetrator in the killing of Destiny and first-degree assault. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err when it upheld the State's strike of a prospective juror; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict; (3) the trial court did not err by not instructing the jury on whether Destiny was a "human being" for purposes of the homicide statutes and on whether the removal of Destiny's life support was a superseding intervening cause of her death; (4) any error in admitting portions of the perpetrator's guilty plea was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and any violation of Gatson's right to confrontation was harmless; (5) Gatson was not entitled to relief on his claim that the admission of the perpetrator's guilty plea violated hearsay rules; and (6) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Gatson's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. View "State v. Gatson" on Justia Law

David Miller purchased a home owned by respondents Linda Lankow and Jim Betz. The home had previously been extensively remediated because of moisture intrusion damage. Respondents Donnelly Brothers and Total Service Company and defendant Diversified Contractors, Inc. did the remediation work. After discovering and notifying respondents and defendants of additional moisture intrusion damage, buyer began to repair the home. Buyer then commenced an action against respondents and defendant to recover damages. The district court excluded buyer's expert witness evidence as a sanction for the spoliation of evidence that resulted from buyer starting to make repairs to his home. The court then granted respondents' summary judgment motion on the basis that buyer could not make a prima facie case without the expert evidence. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the duty of a custodial party to preserve evidence may be discharged when the custodial party has a legitimate need to destroy the evidence and gives the noncustodial party notice sufficient to enable the noncustodial party to protect itself against the loss of the evidence. View "Miller v. Lankow" on Justia Law