Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree murder while committing criminal sexual conduct. Appellant filed a notice of direct appeal, which the Supreme Court stayed pending postconviction proceedings in the district court. Appellant neither filed a petition for postconviction relief nor followed through with his direct appeal, and the Court dismissed his appeal. In this case, Appellant appealed the denial of his first petition for postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the postconviction court properly denied Appellant's petition as untimely under Minn. Stat. 590.01, 4(a); and (2) the time limit in section 590.01, 4(a) was constitutional as applied to Appellant, because even if the Due Process Clause of the Minnesota Constitution provided Appellant a right to one review, the two-year time limitation in subdivision 4(a) was a reasonable limitation on the alleged right. View "Carlton v. State" on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to interpret the Minnesota dog owner's liability statute. Respondent Gordon Anderson was injured during an attack on his dog by another dog named Bruno, owned by Respondent Neil Christopherson. Anderson, along with his wife, sued Christopherson and his father, arguing, among other claims, that the Christophersons were strictly liable for Anderson's injuries under Minn. Stat. 347.22. The district court granted partial summary judgment to the Christophersons, holding (1) the Christophersons were not liable under the statute because Bruno's conduct was not focused on Anderson; and (2) Dennis Christopherson was not liable because he was not an "owner" of Bruno, as that term was defined under the statute. The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) a dog owner may be held strictly liable for injuries caused by a dog's affirmative conduct regardless of the focus of that conduct; and (2) there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Anderson's injury was a direct and immediate result of Bruno's conduct and whether Dennis Christopherson was an owner of Bruno under the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded for a jury trial on both the question of whether Anderson's injuries were caused by Bruno's conduct under section 347.22 and also the question of whether Dennis Christopherson was an "owner" of Bruno under the statute. View "Anderson v. Christopherson" on Justia Law

Respondent Christian Ndikum was charged with possession of a pistol in public after he carried a briefcase containing a gun into a courthouse. At trial, Respondent requested that the district court instruct the jury that knowledge of possession is an element of the crime of possession of a pistol in public that the State must prove. The district court refused to so instruct the jury, and the jury found Respondent guilty as charged. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the State had to prove knowledge of possession of a pistol as an element of the crime of possession of a pistol. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State was required to prove that Respondent knew he possessed the pistol at issue; and (2) the district court abused its discretion by failing to so instruct the jury. View "State v. Ndikum" on Justia Law

After a grand jury indicted Defendant on two counts of first-degree premeditated murder, two counts of first-degree felony murder, and two counts of second-degree murder, the district court convicted Defendant on both counts of first-degree premeditated murder. Defendant challenged his convictions on four grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for dismissal of the indictment; (2) the record contained sufficient evidence to support the district court's verdict that Defendant was guilty of first-degree premeditated murder rather than heat-of-passion manslaughter; (3) the prosecutor's alleged misconduct during witness questioning did not affect Defendant's substantial rights under the plain-error test; and (4) the allegedly erroneous admission of a witness's out-of-court statement did not substantially influence the district court's verdict, and therefore, Defendant was not entitled to a new trial. View "State v. Hohenwald" on Justia Law

Jerrell Brown was convicted of aiding and abetting first-degree murder for the benefit of a gang in connection with a shooting death. On appeal, Brown (1) challenged his conviction, claiming that the trial court violated his right to a public trial and erred in its evidentiary rulings and jury instructions, and (2) claimed the prosecutor violated his right to a fair trial by failing to disclose impeachment evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed Brown's conviction, holding (1) because the facts of this case did not implicate the right to a public trial, the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings or its jury instructions; and (2) the undisclosed impeachment evidence was not material. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

When Appellant Amanda Tatro was a junior in the mortuary science program at the University of Minnesota, she posted statements on Facebook which she described as "satirical commentary and violent fantasy about her school experience." Following a hearing, the Campus Committee on Student Behavior (CCSB) found Tatro had violated the student conduct code and academic program rules governing the privilege of access to human cadavers, which prohibited "blogging" about cadaver dissection. CCSB imposed sanctions, including a failing grade for an anatomy laboratory course. The University Provost affirmed the sanctions. Tatro appealed, arguing that the University violated her constitutional rights to free speech. The court of appeals upheld the disciplinary sanctions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the University did not violate the free speech rights of Tatro by imposing sanctions for her Facebook posts that violated academic program rules where the academic program rules were narrowly tailored and directly related to established professional conduct standards. View "Tatro v. Univ. of Minn." on Justia Law

In a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Respondent Reyes Campos argued the the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, which held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel included the right to be informed about the deportation consequences of a guilty plea, applied retroactively to his conviction. Based on Padilla, Campos conended that his attorney's failure to warn him of the deportation consequences of his guilty plea constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and rendered his plea invalid. The district court determined that Padilla could not be applied to Campos' collateral attack on his conviction. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Padilla announced a new rule of criminal procedure that does not apply to a collateral review of Campos' conviction. Remanded. View "Campos v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the scope of an appraisal clause in a fire and wind insurance policy, which provided that either party could demand an appraisal if the parties failed to agree on "the amount of loss." Insureds initiated a breach of contract action, arguing that the appraisal clause did not apply to their claim for damages because the parties disputed whether the damage was covered by the policy, not the cost of repairing the damage. The district court ordered the parties to participate in an appraisal process after determining that the amount of loss under the appraisal clause included a "causation element." The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the phrase "amount of loss," as it related to the authority of the appraiser under the policy, unambiguously permitted the appraiser to determine the cause of the loss; and (2) the appraiser must necessarily determine the cause of the loss as well as the amount necessary to repair the loss as an incidental step in the appraisal process in this case. View "Quade v. Secura Ins." on Justia Law

The State charged Brandon Smith with gross misdemeanor possession of a pistol without a permit and misdemeanor illegal transportation of a firearm. The charges resulted from Smith's possession of a pistol retrieved from his car by two state troopers during an otherwise lawful traffic stop. The district court convicted Smith of both charged offenses and sentenced him. The court of appeals vacated the misdemeanor sentence for illegal transportation of a firearm but affirmed the gross misdemeanor sentence of possession of a pistol without a permit. At issue on appeal was whether the district court erred by denying Smith's motion to exclude the pistol from evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the troopers did not unlawfully expand the scope of the traffic stop without reasonable, articulable suspicion of illegal activity, and therefore, the district court did not err when it admitted the pistol into evidence. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

Tammy Pepper suffered injuries in a single-vehicle accident when she was struck by a pickup truck owned by her sister and driven by her stepfather. Pepper subsequently sought insurance benefits under three policies. First, Pepper sought and recovered liability benefits from her sister's insurer. Second, Pepper sought and recovered liability benefits from her stepfather's insurer, State Farm. Third, Pepper sought, but did not recover, underinsured motorist coverage under a separate State Farm policy held by her stepfather. State Farm denied that it owed Pepper underinsured motorist coverage under the stepfather's policy on the ground that the terms of that policy excluded the sister's truck from its definition of vehicles eligible for underinsured motorist coverage. The district court granted summary judgment to State Farm, concluding that the exclusion in the stepfather's policy was valid because the exclusion was designed to prevent coverage conversion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court was correct that Pepper was not entitled to UIM benefits in this case. View "Pepper v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law