Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Following a trial, the Minnesota tax court affirmed an order of the Commissioner of Revenue calculating the value of the estate of Ruth Singer and assessing the estate the sum of $69,679 in taxes and interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the tax court had jurisdiction; (2) Minn. Stat. 291.215, which provides that any elections made in valuing the federal gross estate shall be applicable in valuing the Minnesota gross estate, is constitutional, even if it is not uniform or its application results in a regressive tax; (2) the tax court did not err in affirming the Commissioner's assessment; (3) the federal estate tax law does not preempt Minnesota's estate tax law; and (4) the tax court properly determined that the value of Singer's home should be included in her gross estate. View "Singer v. Comm'r of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Johnsons, organic farmers, claimed that while Appellant, a cooperative, was spraying pesticide onto conventionally farmed fields adjacent to the Johnsons' fields, some pesticide contaminated the Johnsons' organic fields. The Johnsons sued Appellant on theories including trespass, nuisance, and negligence per se, seeking damages and injunctive relief. The district court granted summary judgment to Appellant and dismissed all of the Johnsons' claims. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court (1) concluded that the Johnsons' trespass claim and claim for damages based on 7 C.F.R. 205.202(b) failed as a matter of law, and therefore, reversed the court of appeals' reinstatement of those claims; and (2) held that the district court failed to consider whether the Johnsons' non trespass claims that were not based on section 205.202(b) could survive summary judgment, and therefore, affirmed the court of appeals' reinstatement of those claims. Remanded. View "Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Coop. Oil Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder committed for the benefit of a gang and attempted first-degree murder committed for the benefit of a gang. The Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's convictions. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming several violations of his right to counsel. The postconviction court denied Petitioner's petition without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the postconviction court, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to postconviction relief on his claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel when his petition did not identify any prejudice resulting from the failure of Petitioner's counsel to raise specific challenges o the State's evidence and did not identify any federal constitutional claims that counsel unreasonably failed to raise. View "Jackson v. State" on Justia Law

Vernon Stisser, the personal representative of the estate of Pamela Stisser, petitioned the district court for an order directing certain payments and disbursements from Pamela's inter vivos trust (Trust). Among other claims, Vernon sought an order requiring trustee David Andreas (Trustee) to (1) pay all debts at the time of Pamela's death that were secured by Pamela's personal property and by Pamela's and Vernon's real estate; (2) compensate Vernon for his services as the personal representative of Pamela's probate estate; and (3) reimburse Pamela's estate for all probate estate administration expenses. The court granted Trustee's motion for partial summary judgment on Vernon's claim for payment of the secured debts. After a trial on Vernon's remaining claims, the court concluded the Trust did not require Trustee to compensate Vernon for his services as personal representative and required Trustee to pay only a limited amount of Vernon's claim administration expenses. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals incorrectly held that Trustee was required to pay debts secured by Pamela's personal property. View "In re Pamela Andreas Stisser Grantor Trust" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with three counts of fourth-degree controlled substance crime and one count of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person. A public defender was appointed to represent him. Prior to trial, the chief public defender made a motion seeking a discharge of the public defender and an order that Defendant had forfeited his right to counsel by manipulating the court and making threatening statements to his lawyer. After an evidentiary hearing at which Defendant was present but not represented by counsel, the court granted the motion, holding that Defendant had forfeited his right to counsel due to his severe misconduct. Defendant subsequently appeared pro se at his jury trial. The jury found him guilty of all counts. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court denied Defendant his procedural due process rights. The Court remanded the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing, at which Defendant would be entitled to due process protections, to determine whether Defendant engaged in "extremely serious misconduct" warranting forfeiture of his right to counsel. View "State v. Krause" on Justia Law

John Doe 76C (Doe) claimed the Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis and the Diocese of Winona (Dioceses) were liable for his damages resulting from alleged sexual abuse in the early 1980s by a priest under the Dioceses' control. Doe's claims were subject to six-year statutes of limitations. To support his argument that accrual of his claims was delayed and that his action was timely, Doe intended to offer general expert testimony on the theory of repressed and recovered memory. The district court concluded that Doe's expert testimony was inadmissible under the Frye-Mack standard, making his claims untimely, and granted the Dioceses summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Doe's expert testimony might be admissible under Minn. R. Evid. 702. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Doe's expert testimony on the theory of repressed and recovered memory, offered to prove a disability delaying the accrual of a cause of action, was inadmissible under Rule 702 because it lacked foundational reliability and, as a result, Doe's claims were untimely. View "John Doe 76C v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis" on Justia Law

In 2008, Stearns County changed the tax classification of property co-owned by Respondent from residential nonhomestead to commercial. Respondent filed a petition under Minn. Stat. 278.01, claiming the property was misclassified, unequally assessed, and undervalued. The tax court dismissed the petition as untimely. Respondent did not appeal from the tax court's dismissal of its petition and instead filed a verified claim under Minn. Stat. 278.14 for a refund of taxes paid in 2009, claiming the property was misclassified for taxes payable in 2009. The County denied the refund claim. The tax court denied the County's motion to dismiss the section 278.14 appeal (Matter A11-1479). In the meantime, Respondent filed a timely petition under Minn. Stat. 278.01 with respect to property taxes assessed in 2009. The tax court ruled the property was properly classified as residential nonhomestead, its original classification (Matter A11-1480). The County petitioned for writ of certiorari in both matters. The Supreme Court dismissed the writs of certiorari, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction in each case. View "Beuning Family LP v. County of Stearns" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted, after a stipulated facts bench trial, of first-degree possession of a controlled substance. More than five years after his conviction became final, Defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief. The postconviction court denied Defendant's petition as untimely and meritless. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's petition was untimely under Minn. Stat. 590.01, 4(c), which requires that a claim is brought within two years from the time the claimant knew or should have known that the claim existed; and (2) section 590.01, subdivision 4 was not unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine where the legislature did not intrude unto a judicial function when it enacted the time limitations provisions in the postconviction statute. View "Sanchez v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant Alexander Miller pleaded guilty to intentional second-degree murder of Crystal Lindorff by an Alford plea on March 11, 2005. Appellant's conviction was not reviewed on direct appeal. On May 11, 2009, Appellant filed this petition for postconviction relief. The postconviction court denied Appellant's petition, concluding that it was untimely and meritless. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the postconviction court properly dismissed Appellant's postconviction petition, as (1) because Appellant filed the petition over two years after his claim arose, the petition was untimely; and (2) the time limits were constitutionally applied to Appellant's petition. View "Miller v. State" on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to decide whether an airplane manufacturer owed a duty to a noncommercial pilot who, after purchasing an airplane from the manufacturer but failing to receive all of the flight training promised to him as part of that purchase, died when his airplane crashed. The district court found the manufacturer was negligent. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the manufacturer did not have a duty to provide training and that the claims were barred by the educational malpractice doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the manufacturer did not owe a duty to the pilot, and thus the district court erred in its judgment; and (2) accordingly, the Court did not reach, among other things, the issues of educational malpractice or causation. View "Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp." on Justia Law