Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was denied a promotion after based on the results of a civil service test conducted by the Richfield Police and Fire Civil Service Commission. Appellant filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the Commission’s promotional process failed to meet the requirements of Minn. Stat. 419.06(9). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Court of Appeals erred by determining that the term “records” under section 419.06(9) includes a candidate’s interview responses at the time the candidate is applying for a promotion; and (2) the Commission violated section 419.06(9) when it failed to consider records “kept in the regular course of the administration of civil service” as required by statute. View "Peterson v. Richfield Civil Serv. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Employee fractured her ankle on a staircase at her workplace. A workers’ compensation judge awarded benefits to Employee, concluding that the injuries “arose out of” her employment. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirmed, relying on its previous decision in Dykhoff v. Xcel Energy. The Supreme Court stayed Employer’s appeal while it considered Dykhoff. The Supreme Court then reversed the WCCA’s decision in Dykhoff and remanded. On remand, the WCCA again affirmed, this time applying the “increased risk” test, which requires an employee to to show that her workplace exposed her to a risk of injury that was increased over what she would face in her everyday life. The WCCA relied on two factual findings to conclude that Employee’s injury was compensable under the increased risk test. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the WCCA’s decision was manifestly contrary to the evidence. Remanded. View "Arrowhead Senior Living Cmty. v. Kainz" on Justia Law

Appellant brought an action against Respondent, a railroad company, in state court seeking damages under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) and the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA). The jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellant, finding that Respondent had violated LIA. Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion to amend the judgment, requesting interest from the date of the verdict to the date of judgment. The district court denied the motion on the ground that prejudgment interest is not available in a FELA action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that post-verdict, prejudgment interest is not available in a FELA action as a matter of federal substantive law. View "Kinworthy v. Soo Line R.R. Co." on Justia Law

In 2012, the governing board of Avera Marshall Regional Medical Center notified the hospital’s medical staff that it had approved the repeal of the medical staff bylaws and replaced them with revised bylaws. Avera Marshall’s Medical Staff, Chief of Staff, and Chief of Staff-elect commenced an action seeking a declaration that the Medical Staff had standing to sue Avera Marshall and that the former medical staff bylaws constituted a contract between Avera Marshall and the Medical Staff. The district court granted judgment for Avera Marshall and dismissed the case, concluding that the Medical Staff lacked the capacity to sue under Minnesota law and that the medical staff bylaws did not constitute an enforceable contract between Avera Marshall and the Medical Staff. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Medical Staff has the capacity to sue and be sued under Minnesota law; and (2) the medical staff bylaws constitute an enforceable contract between Avera Marshall and the individual members of the Medical Staff. Remanded. View "Medical Staff of Avera Marshall Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Avera Marshall" on Justia Law

Minn. Stat. 176.081(1)(a) requires employers and insurers to pay attorney fees calculated by a statutory formula not subject to judicial review. In this case, Respondent injured his back while working for Employer. Employer and its insurer (together, Relators) settled with Respondent. Respondent’s attorney then sought an award of contingent attorney fees in an amount that was calculated by applying the statutory formula in section 176.081 but which disregarded the upper limit set by the formula. Relators objected, arguing that, in the absence of judicial review to ensure a fee award is not excessive, application of the statutory formula violates separation of powers principles. The compensation judge applied the statutory formula and concluded that $13,000 would adequately compensate Respondent’s attorney but refused to consider whether the statutory fee was reasonable. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals affirmed the compensation judge’s fee award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court will recognize the Legislature’s statutory formula as presumptively reasonable, and, absent exceptional circumstances, further judicial review of an award based on the statutory formula is unnecessary; and (2) Relators failed to present any exceptional circumstances to challenge this presumption. View "David v. Bartel Enters." on Justia Law

After Sining Mao left his employment with Seagate Technology, LLC, Mao joined Seagate’s competitor, Western Digital Corporation. Seagate subsequently commenced a district court action alleging that Mao stole Seagate’s trade secrets and confidential information and provided it to Western Digital. Western Digital invoked an arbitration clause in Mao’s employment agreement with Seagate. Before the arbitration hearing, Seagate brought a motion for sanctions against Western Digital and Mao (Appellants) based on alleged fabrication of evidence. An arbitrator issued an award against Appellants in an amount exceeding $500 million. The district court vacated the award in part, but the court of appeals reinstated the award. On appeal, Appellants argued that the arbitrator’s exceeded his authority by issuing punitive sanctions and prejudiced Appellants by refusing to hear evidence material to the controversy. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ decision reinstating and confirming the arbitration award in full, holding that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority or refuse to hear material evidence as required for vacatur. View "Seagate Tech., LLC v. W. Digital Corp." on Justia Law

Respondent filed a complaint against his former employer, U.S. Steel Corporation, alleging retaliatory-discharge and threat-to-discharge claims under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The district court granted U.S. Steel’s pretrial motion to quash Respondent’s demand for a jury trial on the retaliatory-discharge claim. After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment for Respondent on his threat-to-discharge claim and rejected Respondent’s retaliatory-discharge claim. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding (1) Respondent’s retaliatory-discharge claim, which sought only money damages, was legal rather than equitable in nature, and therefore, Respondent was entitled to a jury trial on that claim; and (2) the district court correctly denied U.S. Steel’s motion seeking to assert a Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense to vicarious liability for Respondent’s threat-to-discharge claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Respondent had the right to a jury trial on his retaliatory-discharge claim; and (2) U.S. Steel may not assert a Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense to Respondent’s threat-to-discharge claim. View "Schmitz v. U.S. Steel Corp." on Justia Law

Relator was injured while working for Employer. Relator began receiving workers’ compensation benefits in 2010. In 2012, Relator began receiving a retirement annuity from the Public Employees Retirement Association (PERA). At some point, Relator began receiving federal social security retirement benefits. While Employer was entitled under Minn. Stat. 176.101(4) to offset Relator’s permanent total disability benefits by the amount of her social security retirement benefits, the parties disagreed as to whether Employer was entitled to apply the offset to Relator’s PERA retirement benefits. A compensation judge granted Employer the offset. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirmed, concluding that Relator’s PERA retirement annuity was an “old age and survivor insurance benefit.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the reasoning in Ekdahl v. Independent School District #213, also decided today, section 176.101(4) does not permit permanent total disability benefits to be offset by public employee pension benefits. Remanded. View "Hartwig v. Traverse Care Ctr." on Justia Law

Relator was injured while working for a School District. Relator eventually sought and was awarded permanent total disability (PTD) benefits. Relying on Minn. Stat. 176.101(4) and claiming that the statute authorizes an offset for “any old age and survivor insurance benefits,” the School District sought to offset its PTD benefit payment by the amount of government-service pension benefits Relator was receiving. A compensation judge concluded that the School District was not entitled to the offset. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversed, concluding that government-service pension benefits are included in the phrase “old age and survivor insurance benefits” and therefore can be offset from the School District’s disability-benefit payment. The Supreme Court reversed the WCCA and reinstated the decision of the compensation judge, holding that the phrase “old age and survivor benefits” refers only to federal social security benefits, and therefore, the WCCA erred when it applied section 176.101(4) to Relator’s retirement annuity. View "Ekdahl v. Indep. Sch. Dist. #213" on Justia Law

Employee was injured in a work-related accident. Employee obtained approval for surgery from a union-sponsored benefit plan (the Fund) and proceeded with the surgery at a Hospital. After a hearing, a workers’ compensation judge concluded that the surgery was not reasonable and necessary and ordered Employer to reimburse the Fund for the medical bills but also concluded that Employer could seek reimbursement of the expenses from the medical providers. The Hospital was not given notice of that hearing. Before a second hearing on Employer’s request for reimbursement, the Hospital intervened. The compensation judge ordered the Hospital to reimburse Employer. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversed, concluding that the automatic-reimbursement rule announced in Brooks v. A.M.F., Inc. should be extended to the Hospital because it was not given notice of the first hearing. The Supreme Court reversed after declining to extend its decision in Brooks and require automatic payment of a medical provider’s treatment expenses when an employer fails to give the medical provider notice of its right to intervene in a workers’ compensation proceeding to determine responsibility for those expenses, holding that the Hospital was not entitled to automatic payment of its medical bills for Employee’s treatment. Remanded. View "Gamble v. Twin Cities Concrete Prods." on Justia Law