Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Nicole LaPoint applied for a job with Family Orthodontics, the company’s owner, Dr. Angela Ross, offered LaPoint a job as an orthodontic assistant. When LaPoint told Dr. Ross that she was pregnant, Family Orthodontics rescinded its job offer. LaPoint sued the company for sex discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. The district court entered judgment in favor of Family Orthodontics. The court of appeals reversed, ruling, as a matter of law, that Family Orthodontics had discriminated against LaPoint because of her pregnancy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) to the extent the court of appeals applied an incorrect legal standard to evaluate LaPoint’s claim, it erred; and (2) the district court’s findings were reasonably supported by the evidence, but it was unclear whether the district court would have made the same findings had it applied the correct law regarding animus. Remanded. View "LaPoint v. Family Orthodontics, P.A." on Justia Law

Respondent received a head injury during the course of her employment. Respondent filed a request with the workers’ compensation division seeking coverage for various treatments she was receiving for her injuries, including treatment for emotional and psychological conditions that allegedly developed from her injury. The compensation judge denied Respondent’s request for coverage of emotional and psychological conditions, finding that Respondent had not suffered a concussion and post-concussive syndrome. The compensation judge relied heavily on the opinion of a certain psychologist. The WCCA reversed and vacated the denial of coverage of the emotional and psychological conditions, concluding that there was not an adequate factual foundation for the psychologist’s opinion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the WCCA erred when it raised and ruled on the forfeited issue of whether a psychologist was competent to provide an expert opinion; (2) the WCCA erred when it reversed the compensation judge’s decision based primarily on the psychologist’s report; and (3) the WCCA erred when it reversed the compensation judge’s finding that Respondent did not suffer a concussion and post-concussive syndrome. View "Gianotti v. Independent School District 152" on Justia Law

Employee’s employment was terminated after Employer discovered that the representation Employee made in her employment application was not accurate. Employee applied for unemployment benefits with the Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED). DEED concluded that Employee was eligible to receive unemployment benefits. Employer appealed. An unemployment law judge determined that Employee was ineligible for unemployment benefits because she was discharged for “employment misconduct” under Minn. Stat. 268.095. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Employee’s conduct did not constitute employment misconduct. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that (1) the court of appeals applied an improper definition of “employment misconduct”; and (2) under the facts and circumstances of this case, Employee was terminated for “employment misconduct” as defined in section 268.095. View "Wilson v. Condon" on Justia Law

Mark Juelich and Steven Thoemke, former employees of Toyota-Lift of Minnesota, Inc. (TLM), claimed that TLM failed to pay them commissions they earned under their employment agreements with TLM. Juelich and Thoemke sought penalties under Minn. Stat. 181.14. The district court determined that TLM owed additional commissions to Juelich and Thoemke totaling $104,000 and that TLM was entitled to recover $815,000 from American Warehouse Systems, LLC (AWS) due to AWS’s breach of an asset purchase agreement entered into by AWS and TLM and its unjust retention of customer payments owed to TLM. The district court denied the request of Juelich and Thoemke for penalties under section 181.14, reasoning that the $814,000 judgment owed to TLM from AWS offset the unpaid commissions owed to Juelich and Thoemke. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that TLM was liable for statutory penalties under section 181.14. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when a court determines whether an employer is liable to an employee for the statutory penalty for nonpayment of wages under section 181.14, the court may not consider offsetting liabilities owed by the employee to the employer. View "Toyota-Lift of Minnesota, Inc. v. American Warehouse Sys., LLC" on Justia Law

Respondent suffered a work-related back injury. Respondent and her employer entered into a “full, final, and complete” settlement of Respondent’s claims for workers’ compensation benefits related to that injury. Respondent later filed a claim petition seeking additional benefits for the back injury, alleging a lumbar spine injury with consequential depression and anxiety. The employer moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that Respondent was first required to bring a motion to vacate the existing settlement agreement before bringing a new claim. The workers’ compensation judge denied the motion, concluding that the settlement agreement did not foreclose a later claim for consequential psychological injury. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the settlement agreement did not foreclose claims from the same incident that were not mentioned in the agreement without evidence that those claims were contemplated by the parties at the time they entered into the agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the language of the settlement agreement was sufficient settle conditions and complications that arise out of, and are a consequence of, Respondent’s workers’ compensation injury. View "Ryan v. Potlatch Corp." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether truck drivers hauling asphalt cement from a commercial oil refinery to a contractor’s facility are performing “work under a contract” under Minn. Stat. 177.44(1) and, therefore, must be paid prevailing wages. The Minnesota Department of Transportation (MDOT) determined that the construction companies that were awarded contracts to work on state highway projects violated the project contracts by failing to ensure that drivers that assisted in the acquisition and transport of asphalt cement for the projects were paid prevailing wages. Appellants argued that the hauling activities of these drivers did not constitute “work under a contract” under Minn. Stat. 177.44(1) and, alternatively, that the hauling activities were exempt from the prevailing wage requirements under the “commercial establishment exception” in the Prevailing Wage Act. The district courts granted summary judgment to MDOT. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that hauling activities must be to, from, or on the site of a public works project to qualify as “work under a contract,” and therefore, the hauling activities in this case did not constitute “work under the contract” subject to the prevailing wage requirements. View "J.D. Donovan, Inc. v. Minn. Dep’t of Transp." on Justia Law

Kelly Dennis was allegedly injured in the course of his employment with The Salvation Army. Dennis filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, but The Salvation Army and its insurer (collectively, Relators) denied liability. The compensation judge awarded Dennis benefits, and the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirmed. Within thirty days, Relators filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the clerk of the appellate courts. Relators, however, failed to serve a cost bond on the WCCA as required by Minn. Stat. 176.471. Relators subsequently served an untimely cost bond on the WCCA. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether timely service of the cost bond was mandatory to have the WCCA order reviewed by the Supreme Court on certiorari. The Supreme Court discharged the writ of certiorari and dismissed the appeal, holding that Relators’ failure to file the cost bond within the thirty-day period to appeal was fatal to their appeal. View "Dennis v. Salvation Army" on Justia Law

Employee was injured while participating in an annual employee-recognition event sponsored by Employer. Employee petitioned for workers’ compensation benefits, but Employer denied liability, arguing that Employee’s injury was excluded from coverage under Minn. Stat. 176.021(9), which exempts from workers’ compensation coverage injuries incurred during “voluntary recreational programs.” A compensation judge concluded that the employee-recognition event was not a “voluntary” program because it occurred during Employee’s shift, and he was required to attend in order to obtain his wage without sacrificing his vacation time. The Workers’ Compensation Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an employer-sponsored recreational program is not “voluntary” when it takes place during work hours and employees must either attend the event or risk forfeiting pay or benefits; and (2) the relevant inquiry when applying section 176.021(9) is whether the program is voluntary, not whether individual recreational activities within the program are voluntary. View "Shire v. Rosemount, Inc." on Justia Law

Respondent fell and was injured during the course of his employment with The Salvation Army. A workers compensation judge awarded Defendant benefits, and the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirmed the findings and order of the compensation judge. Relators subsequently filed a timely petition for a writ of certiorari with the clerk of the appellate courts. Relators’ filing, however, did not include a cost bond. The clerk provided Relators with a conformed writ, which Relators served on Respondent and the WCCA. The WCCA notified the clerk of court that Relators had not served a cost bond on the WCCA as required by Minn. Stat. 176.471(3). Relators then served a cost bond on the WCCA. Respondent argued that the plain and unambiguous language of section 176.471 required timely service of a cost bond to effect the Supreme Court’s review. The Supreme Court held that because Relators did not timely serve a cost bond upon the WCCA as required by section 176.471(3) the writ of certiorari must be discharged and the appeal dismissed. View "Dennis v. The Salvation Army" on Justia Law

Terry Boyd filed this lawsuit against BNSF Railway Company, his former employer, under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) after being injured in the course of his employment. Boyd later made a settlement offer, which BNSF rejected. The jury returned a verdict and award against BNSF. The district court ordered BNSF to pay double costs to Boyd pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 68.03(b)(2), which provides for additional costs and disbursement incurred after an offer is rejected by a defendant and the relief awarded is less favorable to the defendant than the rejected offer. BNSF sought review, arguing that an award of double costs under Rule 68.03(b)(2) is preempted by FELA. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because double costs are substantive, rather than procedural, and are not authorized by federal law, FELA preempts the application of Rule 68.03(b)(2) in a state court FELA action. View "Boyd v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law