Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Relator was injured while attending a required training session at the general office of her employer. A workers’ compensation judge denied Relator’s claim for benefits, finding that Relator’s injury did not arise out of and in the course of her employment. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversed, concluding that Relator’s injury arose out of the course of her employment, and therefore, her injury was compensable. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the decision of the compensation judge, holding that Relator did not meet her burden to prove her injury arose out of her employment, as required by statute. View "Dykhoff v. Xcel Energy" on Justia Law

Appellant was discharged after testing positive to a drug test. Nearly three years after being discharged, Appellant filed an action against Respondents, his former employers, alleging that Respondents violated various provisions of the Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Workplace Act, namely Minn. Stat. 181.953. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that Appellant's claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations in Minn. Stat. 451.07(1) for, inter alia, libel, slander, "or other tort resulting in personal injury." The district court granted the motion, concluding that a claim under section 181.953(10) was a "tort resulting in personal injury." The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Appellant's claim was subject to the six-year statute of limitations under Minn. Stat. 541.05(1)(2) as a cause of action "upon liability created by statute"; and (2) therefore, Appellant's complaint was not time-barred. Remanded. View "Sipe v. STS Mfg., Inc." on Justia Law

Employees filed a complaint against two employers (Employers), alleging that Employers violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) based on sexual harassment perpetrated by the sole owner of both entities (Owner). Employees also alleged that Owner was individually liable under MHRA's aiding and abetting provision. The district court dismissed Employees' claims. The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) the district court's determination that the harassment was not actionable was clearly erroneous, (2) Employees were entitled to judgment on their claims as a matter of law, and (3) Owner could not be individually liable for aiding and abetting Employers' MHRA violations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in concluding that Owner could not be liable on an aiding and abetting theory; but (2) two separate errors of law infected the district court's determination that Employees did not prove their sexual harassment claims, and therefore, the Court was unable to ascertain exactly how the errors impacted the court's decision to dismiss Employees' claims. Remanded to the district court to reevaluate the evidence using the correct legal standard. View "Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co." on Justia Law

In 2002, Employee suffered injuries in a work-related accident and was rendered a paraplegic. Employer and its insurer accepted liability for Employee's injuries and paid various workers' compensation benefits. In 2010, Employee filed a medical request seeing payment for the installation of a ceiling-mounted motorized lift system. A compensation judge (1) determined that the cost of making the structural changes was compensable under Minn. Stat. 176.135 because those changes were necessary to provide Employee with reasonable and necessary medical treatment, and (2) ordered Employer and its insurer to pay for the modifications in their entirety. The workers' compensation court of appeals reversed, concluding that the changes to Employee's home necessary to permit installation of the lift system constituted "alteration or remodeling" of Employee's home and that Employer's liability was therefore limited by Minn. Stat. 176.137. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the cost of the structural modifications to Employee's residence that were necessary to permit the ceiling-mounted track system to be installed were "alteration or remodeling" costs subject to section 176.137 and were not costs of medical treatment. View "Washek v. New Dimensions Home Health & State Fund Mut. Ins. Co. " on Justia Law

At the time of his divorce from Wife, Husband was a participant in a pension fund (Fund). To enforce the interest awarded to her under the decree, Wife needed to serve a domestic relations order (DRO) on the Fund and its administrators (collectively, the Plan) for qualification. Before Wife served any DRO on the Plan, Husband remarried. At the time of Husband's retirement, he made a survivor annuity payable to his current spouse upon his death. Wife eventually served a DRO on the Plan in 2005, but the Plan refused to qualify the DRO. After Husband died, Wife brought a motion to enforce the 2005 DRO. The district court ruled in favor of Wife, concluding (1) surviving spouse benefits do not vest in a plan participant's current spouse at the time of the plan participant's retirement; and (2) therefore, the 2005 DRO served on the Plan was a qualified domestic relations order. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under ERISA, surviving spouse benefits vest in a plan participant's current spouse at the time of the plan participant's retirement; and (2) accordingly, the 2005 DRO in this case could not be qualified. View "Langston v. Wilson McShane Corp." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether Appellants, who were employees of a contractor that performed work pursuant to a municipal contract with the City of Minneapolis, may recover for the contractor's alleged breach of a prevailing wage provision in the contract. Appellants brought this action against the contractor, alleging that the contractor failed to pay them the prevailing wage in breach of the contract with the City, that the breach of the contract by the contractor violated state wage statutes, and that the contractor was unjustly enriched as a result. The district court granted the contractor's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Appellants were not intended third-party beneficiaries and that without a viable claim for breach of contract, Appellants' other claims failed. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that Appellants were not intended third-party beneficiaries of the contract and that Appellants' other claims lacked merit. View "Caldas v. Affordable Granite & Stone, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the workers' compensation courts had the authority to hear a petition filed by Insured to determine whether Insurer had a duty to defend and indemnify Insured under a policy for workers' compensation insurance. Insurer moved to dismiss Insured's petition, arguing that the compensation judge did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the petition because it asserted a breach of contract claim rather than one arising under the workers' compensation laws. The compensation judge disagreed and denied Insurer's motion to dismiss. The workers' compensation court of appeals (WCCA) affirmed, concluding that Insured was seeking a declaration that its insurance coverage with Insurer was still "in effect," a question within the compensation judge's authority to decide. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the workers' compensation courts had jurisdiction to decide the issues presented in Insured's petition for declaration of insurance coverage, as the real nature of the claim was whether Insured's insurance coverage was in effect, a question that was within the authority of the compensation judge to answer. View "Giersdorf v. A & M Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

A compensation judge found Respondent was barred from receiving workers' compensation benefits because his written notice of injury, given nearly two years after his last day of work, was not timely and because Respondent's employer did not have actual knowledge that Respondent's back problems were work-related. The workers' compensation court of appeals (WCCA) reversed, concluding that a reasonable person in Respondent's position would not have known his injury was compensable until Respondent's doctors provided written reports to Respondent's attorney establishing a relationship between Respondent's back problems and his job duties. The Supreme Court reversed the WCCA and affirmed the denial of benefits, holding (1) the WCCA erred in overturning the compensation judge's finding that Respondent failed to give timely notice to his employer of his work-related injury; and (2) the compensation judge did not err in finding that the employer did not have actual knowledge of such an injury. View "Anderson v. Frontier Commc'ns" on Justia Law

Respondent brought a claim against Appellants, the University of Minnesota and Orlando Smith, the University's men's basketball coach, alleging that Smith negligently misrepresented that he had authority to hire Respondent, and that Respondent suffered damage. The jury found in favor of Respondent and awarded damages. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the Supreme Court, as a matter of public policy, should extend the protection against negligent misrepresentation to prospective employees of the University, which is a constitutional corporation and agency of the state. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that when a prospective government employment relationship is negotiated at arm's length between sophisticated business persons who do not have a professional, fiduciary, or other special legal relationship, the prospective employee is not entitled to protection against negligent misrepresentations by the representative for the prospective government employer. View "Williams v. Smith" on Justia Law

Respondent Robert Half International (RHI) terminated Appellant Kim Hansen's employment shortly after she returned from maternity leave and failed to reinstate her to the same or similar position. Hansen filed an action against RHI, alleging that it violated the Minnesota Parenting Leave Act (MPLA) and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) by failing to reinstate her to her position or a comparable position after maternity leave, for retaliating against her for taking maternity leave, and for terminating her because of her sex. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of RHI. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that judgment was appropriate as a matter of law. View "Hansen v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law