Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondents, on behalf of their six-year-old daughter, Jocelyn, alleged that Appellants, a medical doctor and medical center, negligently failed to diagnose Jocelyn's cancer and that if they had timely diagnosed Jocelyn's cancer, her cancer would have been curable. But, Respondents asserted, because of the delayed diagnosis, it was likely Jocelyn's cancer would be fatal. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants, concluding (1) Minnesota law does not permit a patient to recover damages when a physician's negligence causes the patient to lose only a chance of recovery or survival; and (2) Respondents' proof of causation failed as a matter of law. The court of appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Minnesota law permits recovery for "loss of chance" in a medical malpractice action; and (2) Respondents created a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of causation. View "Dickhoff v. Green" on Justia Law

In 1995, Katelyn Janson was severely injured in an automobile accident. A lawsuit ended with a settlement in which two annuities were established, both of which guaranteed payments to Katelyn starting in 2001 and established that, if Katelyn died before fifteen years expired, annuity payments would be made to her estate. Katelyn's mother and conservator, Candy Bradison, moved Katelyn to Wyoming in 2001 and to Minnesota in 2003. In 2006, Katelyn died. In 2010, Bradison sought, on behalf of Katelyn's estate, a refund of the amount the estate previously paid to the Minnesota Department of Revenue, arguing (1) the annuity payments were not includable in Katelyn's estate because Katelyn did not own the annuities; and (2) Katelyn was a Wyoming domiciliary at the time of her death. The tax court concluded (1) Katelyn was a Minnesota domiciliary at the time of her death; and (2) the annuity payments were includable in Katelyn's estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Katelyn's intangible property had a situs in Minnesota at the time of her death and could be taxed in accordance with Minnesota's estate tax provisions; and (2) Katelyn was the beneficial owner of the annuity payments, and the value of the payments was properly included in her estate. View "Bradison vs. Comm'r of Revenue" on Justia Law

After David McKee, a physician, acted in a manner Dennis Laurion considered rule and insensitive, Laurion posted critical comments about McKee on various "rate-your-doctor" websites and also sent letters to several medically-affiliated institutions complaining about McKee's conduct. McKee commenced this action against Laurion, asserting claims for defamation per se and interference with business. The district court granted summary judgment for Laurion, concluding that the individual statements were either protected opinion, substantially true, or lacked defamatory meaning. The court of appeals reversed with respect to six of the alleged defamatory statements. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that none of the six statements was actionable either because (1) there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the falsity of the statements, or (2) the statements were not capable of conveying a defamatory meaning that would harm McKee's reputation and lower him in the estimation of the community. View "McKee v. Laurion" on Justia Law

Respondent sued Appellants for negligence and resulting injuries sustained in a car accident. The parties entered into a tentative settlement subject to Respondent giving her underinsured motorist (UIM) carrier notice under Schmidt v. Clothier to preserve her potential UIM claim. The UIM carrier elected to substitute its check for the tortfeasor's check pursuant to Schmidt-Clothier. Respondent accepted the substitute check. The negligence claim proceeded to trial, where a jury found Appellants negligent. The district court entered judgment in favor of Respondent and the UIM carrier. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment for Respondent but reversed for the UIM carrier. The Supreme Court affirmed the reversal of the judgment in favor of the UIM carrier but reversed the court of appeals' decision affirming the judgment for Respondent, holding that an injured party may not continue to pursue a negligence claim against the tortfeasor after she has agreed to settle the negligence action under the Schmidt-Clothier procedure and has accepted the substituted check from the UIM carrier. View "Isaac v. Ho" on Justia Law

L.H. Bolduc Company, Inc. (Bolduc) was the subcontractor of Engineering and Construction Innovations, Inc. (ECI). Bolduc damaged a sewer pipe while working on a construction project. ECI repaired the damage and sought reimbursement from Bolduc's insurer, The Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut (Travelers) under an endorsement to Bolduc's policy naming ECI as an additional insured for liability caused by acts or omissions of Bolduc. Travelers denied coverage. ECI subsequently sued Bolduc and Travelers (collectively, Appellants) for negligence and breach of contract. A jury found that Bolduc was not negligent, and the district court granted summary judgment for Appellants on ECI's breach of contract claims, concluding that Appellants had no obligation to reimburse ECI for damages not caused by Bolduc. The court of appeals reversed, determining (1) ECI was entitled to coverage as an additional insured without regard to Bolduc's fault; and (2) Bolduc was required to indemnity ECI. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) ECI did not qualify as an additional insured with respect to the pipe damage; and (2) Bolduc could not be required to indemnify ECI without violating Minn. Stat. 337.02, which prohibits indemnification for the fault of others in construction contracts. View "Eng'g & Constr. Innovations, Inc. v. L.H. Bolduc Co., Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this dispute over a mortgage was whether statutes of limitations apply to actions for declaratory judgment. The court of appeals reversed in part the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendant based on the applicable statute of limitations, holding that to the extent Plaintiff's complaint sought declaratory relief, it was not barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is a procedural device through which parties may vindicate substantive legal rights, an action for declaratory judgment is barred by an applicable statute of limitations to the same extent that the same cause of action would be barred in a nondeclaratory proceeding. Remanded. View "Weavewood, Inc. v. S & P Home Invs., LLC" on Justia Law

Six banks (the Banks) alleged that the negligent misrepresentation of Respondent, James H. Bedard, Inc., caused them to be damaged when the Housing and Redevelopment Authority of the City of Brainerd defaulted on bonds held by the Banks. Specifically, the Banks purchased $3.3 million in bonds from the City, which helped finance a development project in the City. In deciding to purchase the bonds, the Banks relied on an appraisal and feasibility study prepared by Bedard. The Banks filed a negligent misrepresentation claim against Bedard, alleging that Bedard's study overstated the value of the project and the rate at which the land would sell. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that the Banks failed to plead their negligent misrepresentation claim against Bedard with particularity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the Banks specifically pleaded facts underlying each of the elements of their negligent misrepresentation claim, the Banks pleaded the "ultimate facts" of their claim and thus satisfied the particularity requirement under Minn. R. Civ. P. 9.02. Remanded. View "Hardin County Savings Bank v. City of Brainerd Hous. & Redevelopment Auth." on Justia Law

In this subrogation action, appellant Insurer sought to recover payments it made to its Insured for the repair of water damage allegedly caused by the negligence of respondent, the commercial tenant of Insured. The district court dismissed Insurer's subrogation claim as a matter of law, relying on the court of appeals decision in United Fire & Casualty Co. v. Bruggeman. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed after rejecting the rule from Bruggeman, holding that the question of whether an insurer may pursue a subrogation action against the tenant of an insured, when the tenant's negligence caused damage to the insured's property, must be answered by examining the unique facts and circumstances of each case. Remanded. View "RAM Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rusty Rohde" on Justia Law

A compensation judge found Respondent was barred from receiving workers' compensation benefits because his written notice of injury, given nearly two years after his last day of work, was not timely and because Respondent's employer did not have actual knowledge that Respondent's back problems were work-related. The workers' compensation court of appeals (WCCA) reversed, concluding that a reasonable person in Respondent's position would not have known his injury was compensable until Respondent's doctors provided written reports to Respondent's attorney establishing a relationship between Respondent's back problems and his job duties. The Supreme Court reversed the WCCA and affirmed the denial of benefits, holding (1) the WCCA erred in overturning the compensation judge's finding that Respondent failed to give timely notice to his employer of his work-related injury; and (2) the compensation judge did not err in finding that the employer did not have actual knowledge of such an injury. View "Anderson v. Frontier Commc'ns" on Justia Law

Respondent brought a claim against Appellants, the University of Minnesota and Orlando Smith, the University's men's basketball coach, alleging that Smith negligently misrepresented that he had authority to hire Respondent, and that Respondent suffered damage. The jury found in favor of Respondent and awarded damages. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the Supreme Court, as a matter of public policy, should extend the protection against negligent misrepresentation to prospective employees of the University, which is a constitutional corporation and agency of the state. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that when a prospective government employment relationship is negotiated at arm's length between sophisticated business persons who do not have a professional, fiduciary, or other special legal relationship, the prospective employee is not entitled to protection against negligent misrepresentations by the representative for the prospective government employer. View "Williams v. Smith" on Justia Law