Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Commissioner of Human Services determining that RS Eden, a supervised living facility where J.W. received treatment before voluntarily leaving and dying of a drug overdose five days later, was responsible for maltreatment of J.W. by neglect, holding that the Commission's decision was not supported by substantial evidence.RS Eden appealed the maltreatment determination to the court of appeals, which affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that that Commissioner's finding of maltreatment for neglect for RS Eden's failure to obtain a waiver or to confer with a prescribing physicians was not supported by substantial evidence because RS Eden complied with the rules regarding the disposition of controlled substances and took reasonable steps to protect its client. View "In re Appeal by RS Eden" on Justia Law

Appellant BCBSM, Inc. (“Blue Cross”) denied respondent James Linn’s insurance claim because the requested treatment was not considered medically necessary under the parties’ health-plan contract. After Blue Cross denied the claim, an external-review entity determined that the treatment was, in fact, medically necessary for Linn’s condition. Blue Cross paid the claim, but Linn and his wife sued Blue Cross for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment for Blue Cross, concluding that the treatment was not medically necessary under the contract’s plain terms and that Blue Cross fulfilled its contractual obligations when it paid for the treatment following the external review. The court of appeals reversed. Because the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded: (1) external-review decisions were independent determinations of medical necessity that did not supersede contractual definitions of medical necessity; and (2) the health-plan contract plainly excluded coverage for Linn’s claim for treatment, the Court reversed. View "Linn v. BCBSM, Inc." on Justia Law

The Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) assessed surcharges against seven hospitals and hospital systems (collectively, the Hospitals) on their net patient revenue under Minn. Stat. 256.957(2). The Hospitals appealed their surcharge assessments for various months, alleging that federal law preempted the surcharge to the extent it required them to pay a surcharge on revenues obtained from insurance carriers that participated in the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program and the TRICARE program. The Commissioner of DHS denied the claim. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the surcharge was not preempted by federal law. View "In re Consolidated Hosp. Surcharge Appeals of Gillette Children’s Specialty Healthcare" on Justia Law

Kirk Lloyd sought to be admitted at United Hospital to stop his pattern of self-harm. United informed Lloyd and his mother, Melinda Binkley, that Lloyd would not be admitted to United’s inpatient mental-health program and released Lloyd. The next night, Lloyd committed suicide. Binkley, acting as trustee, filed a medical-malpractice action against Allina Health System and its staff (collectively, Respondents) alleging that Respondents’ negligent failure to properly examine, evaluate, and provide services to Lloyd caused his death. Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to immunity for their good-faith actions under the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act. The district court denied summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Respondents’ good-faith decision to deny Lloyd admission to the inpatient mental health unit is entitled to immunity; but (2) it is not clear that Respondents are entitled to summary judgment on all of Binkley’s claims. Remanded. View "Binkley v. Allina Health System" on Justia Law

Kirk Lloyd sought to be admitted at United Hospital to stop his pattern of self-harm. United informed Lloyd and his mother, Melinda Binkley, that Lloyd would not be admitted to United’s inpatient mental-health program and released Lloyd. The next night, Lloyd committed suicide. Binkley, acting as trustee, filed a medical-malpractice action against Allina Health System and its staff (collectively, Respondents) alleging that Respondents’ negligent failure to properly examine, evaluate, and provide services to Lloyd caused his death. Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to immunity for their good-faith actions under the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act. The district court denied summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Respondents’ good-faith decision to deny Lloyd admission to the inpatient mental health unit is entitled to immunity; but (2) it is not clear that Respondents are entitled to summary judgment on all of Binkley’s claims. Remanded. View "Binkley v. Allina Health System" on Justia Law

A court-appointed guardian had the power to consent to necessary medical treatment for a ward under Minn. Stat. 524.5-313(c)(4)(k). Although all parties agreed that it was in the ward’s best interests to remove him from life-sustaining treatment, the guardian argued that court approval was not required before he could consent to remove the ward from life support systems. The district court concluded that guardians do not have the power to direct the removal of life support without prior court approval. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the medical-consent power granted to a guardian under section 524.5-313(c)(4) includes the power to authorize disconnection of a ward’s life-support systems without authorization from the district court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the power of a guardian to consent to necessary medical treatment for a ward under the statute includes the power to consent to the removal of a ward from life support systems, without court approval, when all interested parties agree that removal is in the ward’s best interest. View "In re Guardianship of Tschumy" on Justia Law

Employee was injured in a work-related accident. Employee obtained approval for surgery from a union-sponsored benefit plan (the Fund) and proceeded with the surgery at a Hospital. After a hearing, a workers’ compensation judge concluded that the surgery was not reasonable and necessary and ordered Employer to reimburse the Fund for the medical bills but also concluded that Employer could seek reimbursement of the expenses from the medical providers. The Hospital was not given notice of that hearing. Before a second hearing on Employer’s request for reimbursement, the Hospital intervened. The compensation judge ordered the Hospital to reimburse Employer. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversed, concluding that the automatic-reimbursement rule announced in Brooks v. A.M.F., Inc. should be extended to the Hospital because it was not given notice of the first hearing. The Supreme Court reversed after declining to extend its decision in Brooks and require automatic payment of a medical provider’s treatment expenses when an employer fails to give the medical provider notice of its right to intervene in a workers’ compensation proceeding to determine responsibility for those expenses, holding that the Hospital was not entitled to automatic payment of its medical bills for Employee’s treatment. Remanded. View "Gamble v. Twin Cities Concrete Prods." on Justia Law

Appellant in this case was a nine-year-old boy with severe autism, epilepsy, and chronic seizures. The Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) found that Appellant was not dependent in "mobility" and therefore reduced his authorized personal care assistant (PCA) services covered through the Minnesota Medical Assistance program. The district court reversed the Commissioner's decision, concluding that Minn. Stat. 256B.0659 did not require Appellant to be physically incapable of mobility to be eligible for covered services. The court of appeals reversed because Appellant was physically able to begin and complete moving from place to place without assistance. At issue was whether a person who is physically able to move without assistance but lacks the ability to direct his movement to a specific location has a dependency in mobility under the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commissioner's interpretation of the statute was supported by the plain and ordinary meaning of "mobility." View "A.A.A. v. Dep't of Human Servs." on Justia Law

In 2000, Appellant was indeterminately committed as a sexual dangerous person as a result of a series of sex offenses involving teenage girls. Appellant later petitioned for provisional discharge from civil commitment. After weighing the evidence presented by Appellant and the Commissioner of Human Services at a first-phase hearing, the Supreme Court Judicial Appeal Panel dismissed Appellant's petition under Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(b). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Appeal Panel committed reversible error in applying Rule 41.02(b) by failing to view the evidence produced at the first-phase hearing in a light most favorable to Appellant and by weighing the evidence produced during the first phase of the hearing. Remanded. View "Coker v. Jesson" on Justia Law

In 2004, Doctor informed Employer, a medical clinic, that he planned to exercise his rights under Employer's policy that rewarded length of service by giving benefits to physicians who were sixty years old or older and had at least fifteen years of taking night calls. Doctor agreed to postpone exercising his rights under the policy until the next year. In 2005, Employer told Doctor that the policy no longer existed. Doctor later withdrew from taking night call. As a result, Employer reduced Doctor's salary. In 2009, sued Employer for breach of contract and promissory estoppel, claiming Employer breached the policy by refusing to allow him to be exempt from night call without salary reduction. The district court granted Employer's motion to dismiss, holding that the two-year statute of limitations began to run in 2005 when Employer informed Doctor it would not honor its obligations under the policy. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that a new cause of action accrued each time a payment was due but not paid. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Doctor's cause of action accrued, and the statute of limitations began to run, in 2005, and therefore, Doctor's claim was barred by the statute of limitations. View "Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann" on Justia Law