Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent suffered a work-related back injury. Respondent and her employer entered into a “full, final, and complete” settlement of Respondent’s claims for workers’ compensation benefits related to that injury. Respondent later filed a claim petition seeking additional benefits for the back injury, alleging a lumbar spine injury with consequential depression and anxiety. The employer moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that Respondent was first required to bring a motion to vacate the existing settlement agreement before bringing a new claim. The workers’ compensation judge denied the motion, concluding that the settlement agreement did not foreclose a later claim for consequential psychological injury. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the settlement agreement did not foreclose claims from the same incident that were not mentioned in the agreement without evidence that those claims were contemplated by the parties at the time they entered into the agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the language of the settlement agreement was sufficient settle conditions and complications that arise out of, and are a consequence of, Respondent’s workers’ compensation injury. View "Ryan v. Potlatch Corp." on Justia Law

When Daniel Berglund refused to file Minnesota income tax returns for tax years 2008, 2009, and 2010, the Minnesota Department of Revenue prepared and filed returns for Berglund and mailed him Notices of Commissioner Filed Returns for the relevant tax years. In total, the Commissioner of Revenue assessed $668,840 in unpaid taxes, penalties, and interest for the three-year period. Berglund appealed, arguing that because the returns did not contain the Commissioner’s signature they were invalid and unenforceable. The tax court granted the Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the lack of a “manual signature” was of no consequence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the relevant statutes do not require that the Commissioner sign commissioner-filed returns in order for those returns to be valid. View "Berglund v. Comm’r of Revenue" on Justia Law

Kelly Dennis was allegedly injured in the course of his employment with The Salvation Army. Dennis filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, but The Salvation Army and its insurer (collectively, Relators) denied liability. The compensation judge awarded Dennis benefits, and the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirmed. Within thirty days, Relators filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the clerk of the appellate courts. Relators, however, failed to serve a cost bond on the WCCA as required by Minn. Stat. 176.471. Relators subsequently served an untimely cost bond on the WCCA. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether timely service of the cost bond was mandatory to have the WCCA order reviewed by the Supreme Court on certiorari. The Supreme Court discharged the writ of certiorari and dismissed the appeal, holding that Relators’ failure to file the cost bond within the thirty-day period to appeal was fatal to their appeal. View "Dennis v. Salvation Army" on Justia Law

Employee was injured while participating in an annual employee-recognition event sponsored by Employer. Employee petitioned for workers’ compensation benefits, but Employer denied liability, arguing that Employee’s injury was excluded from coverage under Minn. Stat. 176.021(9), which exempts from workers’ compensation coverage injuries incurred during “voluntary recreational programs.” A compensation judge concluded that the employee-recognition event was not a “voluntary” program because it occurred during Employee’s shift, and he was required to attend in order to obtain his wage without sacrificing his vacation time. The Workers’ Compensation Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an employer-sponsored recreational program is not “voluntary” when it takes place during work hours and employees must either attend the event or risk forfeiting pay or benefits; and (2) the relevant inquiry when applying section 176.021(9) is whether the program is voluntary, not whether individual recreational activities within the program are voluntary. View "Shire v. Rosemount, Inc." on Justia Law

When Respondents filed their Minnesota tax return for tax year 2007, they claimed they were part-year residents of the state. After an audit, the Commissioner of Revenue determined that Respondents were full-year residents of Minnesota for that year and assessed additional income tax, penalties, and interest. On appeal, the tax court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents, concluding that Respondents were not “residents” under Minn. Stat. 290.01. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statute is ambiguous; and (2) the tax court’s interpretation of the statute was erroneous. Remanded to the tax court for a recalculation of Respondents’ tax debt in accordance with this opinion. View "Curtis G. v. Comm’r of Revenue" on Justia Law

After Employee ended his employment with Employer he applied for and received state unemployment benefits from the Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED) and supplemental unemployment benefits (SUB) through a plan offered by Employer. DEED determined that the SUB plan payments counted as “wages” under Minn. Stat. 268.035(29)(A) and determined that Employee had been overpaid state unemployment benefits. An unemployment law judge affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Employee was entitled to keep the state unemployment benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the SUB plan payments Employee received were not “wages” for purposes of his eligibility for state unemployment benefits, and therefore, Employee was not overpaid state unemployment benefits. View "Engfer v. Gen. Dynamics Advanced Info. Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Relators were sixteen electric cooperatives located in Minnesota. The cooperatives filed amended sales-tax returns for tax periods spanning the years 2004-06 to recover sales taxes they had paid for the portion of the revenues that they later converted into equity. The Commissioner of Revenue initially granted the refunds claimed on the cooperatives’ amended returns. However, the Commissioner later determined that the refund was made in error and assessed the cooperatives to recover the amounts refunded to them. The cooperatives appealed. The tax court concluded that the cooperatives were not legally entitled to sales-tax refunds for any earnings that they later converted into equity and that the challenged assessments were timely. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) electric cooperatives may not reclassify portions of monthly payments by their customers as equity contributions and receive sales-tax refunds based on the reclassification; and (2) when the Commissioner assesses a taxpayer based on a deficiency created by an erroneous refund, the two-year statute of limitations for erroneous refunds generally applies. View "Connexus Energy v. Comm’r of Revenue" on Justia Law

Based on an indirect audit that the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Revenue conducted of the sales and use tax returns for Conga Corporation for the tax periods from January 1, 2007 through March 31, 2010, the Commissioner determined that Conga had unreported revenues for the relevant tax periods and issued an order assessing additional sales, use, and entertainment taxes, plus penalties and interest. The tax court affirmed the Commissioner’s order with respect to the assessment of 2007 taxes but reversed with the penalty assessment for tax years 2008-2010, concluding that the Commissioner’s decision to use an indirect audit was not supported by the record. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commissioner’s decision to use an indirect audit to assess taxes was supported by the record. Remanded. View "Conga Corp. v. Comm’r of Revenue" on Justia Law

Reichmann Land and Cattle, LLP managed a winter feeding facility. In 2011, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) issued an administrative order requiring Reichmann to obtain national-pollutant-discharge-elimination-system (NPDES) and state-disposal-system (SDS) permits or discontinue the winter feeding operation. Reichmann requested a contested case hearing. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Reichmann’s winter feeding fields constituted a “concentrated animal feeding operation” and were not “pastures.” Therefore, Reichmann was required to apply for an NPDES/SDS permit. The Commissioner of the MPCA adopted the findings and conclusions of the ALJ. The court of appeals affirmed the Commissioner’s conclusion that Reichmann must apply for an SDS permit but reversed the Commission’s requirement that Reichmann must apply for an NPDES permit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Reichmann need not obtain an NPDES permit because its winter feeding facility is not an animal feeding operation as required by 40 C.F.R. 122.23(b)(1); and (2) Reichmann is required to obtain an SDS permit because it does not qualify for the pasture exemption. View "In re Reichmann Land & Cattle, LLP" on Justia Law

Respondent sustained injuries while employed by Employer. In 2010, Respondent sought workers’ compensation benefits, claiming that as a result of his injury he developed complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS) and that he was entitled to compensation for certain medical expenses, including expenses incurred for the implantation of a spinal cord neurostimulator. The compensation judge concluded that Respondent had failed to show that the effects of his work-related injury included CRPS and therefore necessitated a neurostimulator. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirmed. In 2013, Respondent filed a second request for medical benefits seeking compensation for the expenses related to the replacement of his neurostimulator. The compensation judge dismissed the claim, concluding that Respondent’s 2013 claim was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. The WCCA reversed. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the WCCA, holding (1) res judicata did not preclude Respondent’s 2013 claim; but (2) in resolving the 2013 claim, the compensation judge did not determine whether Respondent’s medical condition had changed or new material facts had emerged, a determination that was necessary in order to resolve whether collateral estoppel precluded the 2013 claim. Remanded. View "Mach v. Wells Concrete Prods. Co." on Justia Law