Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Employee was injured while working in Minnesota for Wisconsin-based Employer. Employee applied for Wisconsin and Minnesota workers' compensation benefits. Employer's insurance company, Travelers Insurance, covered the Wisconsin benefits but denied the claim for Minnesota benefits based on an exclusion of Minnesota coverage in Employee's policy. Employee then filed a claim for Minnesota benefits with the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry. After settling the claim, the Department pursued a petition for reimbursement it had filed against Employer. A compensation judge found that Employer was not insured for Minnesota workers' compensation liability and ordered Employer to reimburse the Department. The Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversed, concluding that Employer was entitled to coverage from Travelers under the reasonable expectations doctrine. On review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for reconsideration in light of a recent Court decision clarifying that the doctrine should not be used to provide coverage in contravention of unambiguous policy terms. On remand, the WCCA again reversed the compensation judge. On review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the WCCA had no authority to declare unambiguous language of an insurance contract to be invalid and unenforceable because the exclusion conflicted with Wisconsin statutory provisions and public policy. View "Martin v. Morrison Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2008, Marlow Timberland (MT) filed a tax petition challenging the taxes payable in 2008 on the belief that Lake County's property tax assessment of MT's recently purchased land was too high. MT then filed tax petitions challenging the taxes payable in 2009 and 2010, which were dismissed due to MT's failure to pay the taxes. MT moved to reinstate the 2009 and 2010 petitions based on its contention that the properties were overassessed and that it was unable to pay the taxes due. The Minnesota Tax Court issued an order granting Lake County's motion to dismiss the 2008 petition and denying MT's motion to reinstate the 2009 and 2010 petitions. On review, the Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the tax court erred by not allowing MT to amend its 2008 petition because an amendment would not result in any prejudice to Lake County; and (2) the tax court properly denied MT's motion to reinstate its 2009 and 2010 tax petitions, and reinstatement of those petitions was not required on an equitable basis. Remanded. View "Marlow Timberland, L.L.C. v. County of Lake " on Justia Law

William Eldredge, an honorably discharged veteran and a firefighter employed by the City of Saint Paul, was notified by the City that it intended to terminate his employment. Eldredge challenged the termination under the Veterans Preference Act (VPA), which provided that Eldredge may not be removed from his job except for incompetency or misconduct shown after a hearing. The Saint Paul Civil Service Commission granted summary disposition in Eldredge's favor. The City sought judicial review by petitioning for and securing the issuance of a writ of certiorari from the district court. The court dismissed the writ after concluding that the City had missed the filing deadline for appeals under the VPA. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding (1) the district court erred when it concluded the writ was untimely, and (2) because the writ was timely, the district court had jurisdiction to consider the City's appeal. Remanded. View "City of Saint Paul v. Eldredge" on Justia Law

After respondent was granted a permit by the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission (âMPUCâ) for routing and construction of a pipeline to deliver natural gas to an energy center within appellantâs city limits, appellant commenced an action for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to require respondent to obtain a franchise from appellant to operate the pipeline. The district court dismissed, concluding that appellant did not have franchise authority over respondentâs pipeline, and the appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) a municipality is authorized by Minn. Stat. 301B.01 to impose a franchise on a public utility that has constructed and operates a gas pipeline located on public property within the municipality, regardless of whether the pipeline itself supplies gas to the public; (2) a municipality is authorized by Minn. Stat. 216B.36 to impose a franchise on a public utility that serves customers within the municipality or that uses public property within the municipality to serve customers elsewhere; and (3) the issuance of a permit by the MPUC for the construction of a gas pipeline does not preempt pursuant to Minn. Stat. 216G.02 a municipal ordinance requiring a franchise for the operation of the pipeline after construction is complete.

Respondents Dr. Rajbir Sarpal and his wife Carol purchased a parcel of property in 2003 on which they built their home. The property was encumbered by two easements reserved by the City of North Oaks for a future trail. The Sarpals wanted a shed on their property, and in 2006, went to the City to obtain the necessary permits. A City employee gave Dr. Sarpal an "as-built" survey in order to obtain the necessary permits, but the survey was dated to a time before the Sarpals' home was built. Dr. Sarpal, acting as his own general contractor, drew up the plans, submitted them to the requisite authorities, and built the shed on his property. He would later find out that the shed encroached on the City's two easements. Dr. Sarpal petitioned the local zoning board for a variance in order to save the shed, but was denied. The City sued to have the shed removed. The court dismissed all of the City's claims, holding that because the Sarpals relied on the survey given to them by the City, the City was equitably estopped from suing for the easements now. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that when a government entity makes a "simple mistake" when providing a document to a party upon which the party relies to obtain building permits and the government approves that permit, the mistake is not wrongful conduct sufficient to support the conclusion that the government is equitably estopped from enforcing its zoning ordinances.

Eden Prairie Mall (EPM) challenged the assessed value determinations of one of its anchor tenants. For the tax years 2005 and 2006, the court concluded that the market values of EPM and the tenant should have been assessed at higher rates than the assessments that were entered into evidence at trial. EPM argued that the tax court's valuations were excessive and not supported by the record. EPM filed for bankruptcy during the tax court proceedings and subsequently argued that the tax court violated the automatic stay provision of the bankruptcy code when the court increased its taxes. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the tax court's reassessment did not violate the automatic stay of the bankruptcy code, but that the record did not support the reassessments. The Court reversed the tax court's holding, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Respondent Ronald Stagg was discharged from employment by Respondent Vintage Place, Inc. for excessive absenteeism and tardiness. Stagg applied for unemployment benefits. An unemployment law judge (ULJ) determined that Stagg was ineligible for benefits because he was discharged for employment misconduct as defined by state law. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the ULJ, holding that Vintage Place failed to follow its own disciplinary policies when it terminated Stagg. Stagg argued that he relied on the employee manual, which defined Vintage Place's formal discipline procedures. Because he had not received a ten-day suspension--the last disciplinary step short of termination under Vintage Place's policy--Stagg did not understand his job was at risk for termination. The appellate court held that Stagg could have reasonably expected Vintage Place to follow its own disciplinary policy, and that Stagg's absenteeism did not amount to denial of unemployment benefits. Given the record presented, the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court's ruling, reversing it and reinstating the ULJ's decision.