Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Commissioner of Human Services determining that RS Eden, a supervised living facility where J.W. received treatment before voluntarily leaving and dying of a drug overdose five days later, was responsible for maltreatment of J.W. by neglect, holding that the Commission's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. RS Eden appealed the maltreatment determination to the court of appeals, which affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that that Commissioner's finding of maltreatment for neglect for RS Eden's failure to obtain a waiver or to confer with a prescribing physicians was not supported by substantial evidence because RS Eden complied with the rules regarding the disposition of controlled substances and took reasonable steps to protect its client. View "In re Appeal by RS Eden" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals dismissing the Minnesota Department of Natural Resource's (DNR) appeal of an order of the Chippewa/Swift Joint Board of Commissioners (Board) reestablishing the records for a public drainage system pursuant to Minn. Stat. 103E.101(4)(a), holding that the Board's order was a quasi-judicial decision subject to certiorari review. In dismissing the appeal, the court of appeals held that the order reestablishing records was not a quasi-judicial decision subject to certiorari review because the order was not a binding decision regarding the disputed claim but, rather, a preliminary step in a repair process. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that record-reestablishment orders are final and binding and are therefore quasi-judicial decisions subject to quasi-judicial review. View "Minnesota Department of Natural Resources v. Chippewa/Swift Joint Board of Commissioners" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the tax court upholding the decision of the Commissioner of Revenue to include Pell grants in its calculation of Relators’ household income, holding that “nontaxable scholarship or fellowship grants” as used in Minn. Stat. 290A.03(3)(a)(2)(xiii) is plain and unambiguous and includes Pell grants. Household income is used to determine eligible for, and the amount of, a property tax income and includes “nontaxable scholarship or fellowship grants.” Relators argued that Pell grants are not scholarships or fellowships and therefore cannot be included in the income calculation made to determine the amount of the property tax refund. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Pell grants are nontaxable and therefore includable in calculating household income. View "Waters v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

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The tax court correctly dismissed the appeals brought by several cooperatives (the Cooperatives) challenging the valuation orders of the Commissioner of Revenue for the 2014, 2015, and 2016 tax years because the appeals were not filed within the sixty-day deadline for appeals from orders of the Commissioner. On appeal, the Cooperatives argued that the two appeal paths provided by Minn. Stat. 273.372(2) effectively establish the single deadline of April 30 of the year in which the tax becomes payable. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the Cooperatives’ view that a single filing deadline governs all appeals under section 273.372 fails because the plain language of that statute establishes two different filing deadlines, depending on the appeal path chosen; and (2) the Cooperatives’ notices of appeal were governed only by a sixty-day deadline, and therefore, the tax court properly dismissed the appeals as untimely. View "Lake Country Power Cooperative v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that the forfeiture-of-office provision of the Minnesota Open Meeting Law, under which pubic officials who violate the Open Meeting Law may be removed from office, requires three separate, serial adjudications, other than three concurrently filed actions alleging separate, intentional Open Meeting Law violations. Under Minn. Stat. 13D.06(3), the forfeiture-of-office provision of the Open Meeting Law, Minn. Stat. 13D.01-.07, if public officials are found to have intentionally violated the statute “in three or more actions” they may be removed from office. Residents of the City of Victoria successfully proved that certain officials, collectively, committed thirty-eight Open Meeting Law provisions. These violations were found after a single trial resulting from consolidation of five separate lawsuits filed by the residents. The district court declined to remove the officials from office, concluding that three separate adjudications were required. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the forfeiture-of-office provision is not triggered unless three separate, sequential adjudications result in findings of three separate, unrelated Open Meeting Law violations. View "Funk v. O’Connor" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) that the compensation judge failed fully to consider the extent to which each of Respondent’s employers sought to shift liability to the other employer and that it was error to deny Respondent’s motion for fees under Minn. Stat. 176.191(1). In 2015, Respondent filed a workers’ compensation claim for work-related aggravations to a low-back condition resulting from a work-related injury in 2009. Between the 2009 injury and later aggravations sustained in 2014 and 2015, Respondent’s employer and its insurer changed. When Respondent sought benefits for later aggravations sustained in 2014 and 2015, her 2009-employer and her new employer disputed whether the aggravations were a continuation of the 2009 injury or subsequent injuries for which the new employer and its insurer were liable. The compensation judge held the new employer liable for reasonable benefits for the later injuries but denied Respondent’s claim for fees under section 176.191(1). The WCCA reversed the denial of the motion for fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the efforts by each employer to shift responsibility to the other employer greatly increased the burden on Respondent’s counsel to provide effective representation, and therefore, Respondent was entitled to receive reasonable attorney fees under the statute. View "Hufnagel v. Deer River Health Care Center" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Minnesota Tax Court affirming the order of the Commissioner of Revenue that assessed Terrance Sargent’s income tax liability for tax years 2010-2014, holding that Sargent’s arguments on appeal were without merit. On appeal, Sargent argued that Minnesota’s income tax violates the Minnesota Constitution and the United States Constitution on several grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed the Minnesota Tax Court's decision after considering all of Sargent’s arguments, holding that they each were without merit. View "Sargent v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

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The Commissioner of Revenue properly invoked her alternative-apportionment authority under Minn. Stat. 290.20(1) and applied an alternative apportionment method that fairly reflected the income of Associated Bank, N.A. and its affiliates (the Bank) allocable to Minnesota. The Bank, which included two LLC partnerships under Wisconsin law, objected to the Commissioner’s assessment of additional state corporate franchise tax liability for tax years 2007 and 2008. The Bank had calculated the tax owed based on the relevant statutes for apportioning income to Minnesota. The Commissioner found that applying the general apportionment formula to the LLCs did not “fairly reflect” the Bank’s “taxable net income allocable” to Minnesota. Accordingly, the Commissioner invoked her authority under section 290.20(1) and applied an alternative apportionment method to correct a distortion of reported income. After exhausting its administrative remedies, the Bank appealed to the tax court. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in HMN Financial, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 782 N.W.2d 558 (Minn. 2010), the tax court agreed and reversed the Commissioner’s order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) HMN Financial is not dispositive; and (2) the Legislature plainly gave the Commissioner the authority to use an alternative apportionment method under the circumstances presented here. View "Associated Bank, N.A. v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the court of appeals and district court that Respondent’s due process rights were violated when he was read an inaccurate implied consent advisory after his arrest on suspicion of driving while impaired. Respondent refused to submit to either a urine or a blood test. Thereafter, the Commissioner of Public Safety revoked Respondent’s driver’s license for refusing to submit to a test. Relying on McDonnell v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 473 N.W.2d 848 (Minn. 1991), the district court rescinded the revocation after finding that the implied consent advisory violated Respondent’s due process rights because it incorrectly stated that refusal to submit to a urine test was a crime. The court of appeals affirmed on the basis that the threat of legally impossible criminal charges for refusal to submit to a urine test violated due process. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Respondent did not rely on the implied consent advisory to his detriment, and instead refused to submit to testing, no due process violation occurred under McDonnell. View "Johnson v. Commissioner of Public Safety" on Justia Law

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Appellant failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the implied consent advisory read to him after he was arrested on suspicion of driving while impaired, and therefore, Appellant was not entitled to a rescission of his license revocation under McDonnell v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 473 N.W.2d 848 (Minn. 1991). Appellant submitted to a blood test, and the test results showed an alcohol concentration above the legal limit. Appellant’s driver’s license was subsequently revoked. The district court sustained the revocation on the basis that Appellant voluntarily consented to the blood test. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant was not entitled to a rescission of his license revocation under McDonnell because he did not even claim, much less establish, that he prejudicially relied on the implied consent advisory. View "Morehouse v. Commissioner of Public Safety" on Justia Law