Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Family Law
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James Bergstrom and Vanessa Rew dissolved their marriage in 2008. In 2002, 2007, and 2008, Rew obtained a series of one-year orders for protection (OFPs) against Bergstrom. In 2010, before the extended expiration date of the 2008 OFP, Rew filed an application under Minn. Stat. 518B.01(6)(a) to extend the terms of the 2008 OFP. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court extended the OFP for up to fifty years in favor of Rew and the couple’s minor children. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) section 518B.01(6)(a) does not require a finding of domestic abuse before a district court may extend the duration of an OFP; (2) the extension of an OFP under section 518B.01(6)(a) does not facially violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or Minn. Const. art. I, 3; (3) the record was insufficient to conclude that the extended OFP was constitutional with respect to Bergstrom’s children; and (4) the extension of an OFP for up to fifty years does not implicate the prohibition against double jeopardy or the Ex Post Facto Clause of either the United States of Minnesota Constitutions. Remanded. View "In re Rew" on Justia Law

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Appellant was convicted of felony-level failure to provide care and support to his children due to his omission and failure to pay court-ordered child support. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, concluding (1) the phrase “care and support” in Minn. Stat. 609.375(1) refers exclusively to a person’s financial obligations to a spouse or child; and (2) the district court did not err when it excluded Appellant’s evidence that he had provided nonmonetary care to his children. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) to obtain a conviction under section 609.375(1) the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant knowingly omitted and failed to provide both care and support to a spouse or child; and (2) the State did not present any evidence that Appellant knowingly omitted and failed to provide care to his children, and therefore, insufficient evidence supported Appellant’s conviction under the care-and-support statute. View "State v. Nelson" on Justia Law

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The grandparent visitation statute allows a court to award visitation as part of several different kinds of proceedings, including a proceeding for parentage. The district court awarded grandparent visitation to the paternal grandmother (Grandmother) of T.H. after concluding that the recognition of parentage executed by T.H.'s parents pursuant to Minn. Stat. 257.75 was a "proceeding" for parentage under the grandparent visitation statute. The court of appeals affirmed. T.H.'s mother appealed, contending that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to award visitation to Grandmother. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a recognition of parentage executed and filed with the appropriate state agency under section 257.75 is a "proceeding" for purposes of the grandparent visitation statute; and (2) therefore, a "proceeding" occurred in this case, and the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to award visitation to Grandmother. View "Christianson v. Henke" on Justia Law

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Father and Mother were divorced pursuant to a judgment and decree which provided that Father pay child support to Mother. Father later moved to modify his child-support obligation, arguing that certain distributions paid to Mother as a shareholder of a closely-held subchapter S corporation should be included in her gross income, as defined by Minn. Stat. 518A.29(a) and 518A.30 for the purpose of calculating the child-support amount. The district court granted the motion. The court of appeals reversed, determining that because the distributions either were not available to Mother or were designated to pay her income tax obligation, the distributions did not constitute gross income within the meaning of the statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that gross income from a shareholder's interest in a closely-held subchapter S corporation must be calculated using the statutory formula in section 518A.30 and does not depend on the amount actually distributed or available to the parent shareholder. Remanded. View "Haefele v. Haefele" on Justia Law

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At the time of his divorce from Wife, Husband was a participant in a pension fund (Fund). To enforce the interest awarded to her under the decree, Wife needed to serve a domestic relations order (DRO) on the Fund and its administrators (collectively, the Plan) for qualification. Before Wife served any DRO on the Plan, Husband remarried. At the time of Husband's retirement, he made a survivor annuity payable to his current spouse upon his death. Wife eventually served a DRO on the Plan in 2005, but the Plan refused to qualify the DRO. After Husband died, Wife brought a motion to enforce the 2005 DRO. The district court ruled in favor of Wife, concluding (1) surviving spouse benefits do not vest in a plan participant's current spouse at the time of the plan participant's retirement; and (2) therefore, the 2005 DRO served on the Plan was a qualified domestic relations order. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under ERISA, surviving spouse benefits vest in a plan participant's current spouse at the time of the plan participant's retirement; and (2) accordingly, the 2005 DRO in this case could not be qualified. View "Langston v. Wilson McShane Corp." on Justia Law

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Two children's foster parents filed a petition to adopt the children, as did the children's grandparents. The district court concluded that it was in the best interests of the children to be adopted by the foster parents and accordingly granted the foster parents' petition. The court then denied the adoption petition of the grandparents. The court of appeals affirmed. The grandparents appealed, contending that the district court erred in not according them preference and ignoring the plain language of Minn. Stat. 259.57(2)(c) by considering the grandparents' and the foster parents' petitions side-by-side. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly applied section 259.57(2)(c) and did not abuse its discretion in concluding that adoption by the foster parents was in the children's best interests. View "In re Petition to Adopt P.U.K." on Justia Law

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The issue in this case was whether an order for protection (OFP) may be issued under the Domestic Abuse Act on behalf of a minor child in the absence of a finding by the district court that the child was a victim of domestic abuse. The district court issued an OFP to Respondent on behalf of his minor son against Appellant, the child's grandfather and Respondent's father-in-law, when the alleged victim of the domestic abuse did not seek or want protection against Appellant. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred when it issued the OFP without finding that the child was a victim of Appellant's domestic abuse, as, when viewed in its entirety, the Act authorizes a district court to grant an OFP only to a victim of domestic abuse. View "Schmidt v. Coons" on Justia Law

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Respondent Robert Half International (RHI) terminated Appellant Kim Hansen's employment shortly after she returned from maternity leave and failed to reinstate her to the same or similar position. Hansen filed an action against RHI, alleging that it violated the Minnesota Parenting Leave Act (MPLA) and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) by failing to reinstate her to her position or a comparable position after maternity leave, for retaliating against her for taking maternity leave, and for terminating her because of her sex. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of RHI. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that judgment was appropriate as a matter of law. View "Hansen v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

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This case arose out of dispute between two counties over which county was the "county of financial responsibility" for the out-of-home placement costs incurred after October 1, 2008, for a minor child named S.M. The Minnesota Department of Human Services (MDHS) held that Nobles County was responsible for S.M.'s costs. The district court reversed, concluding that the legislative history of Minn. Stat. 256G.10 indicated the legislature intended the county of financial responsibility to be the county where the child last resided with a parent, and therefore, Brown County was the county of financial responsibility. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the language of section 256G.10 was unambiguous and, by its plain language, the county of financial responsibility was the county of the residence of the parent with whom the child last lived, determined at the time the child entered excluded time status; (2) the county of financial responsibility in this case was the county in which S.M.'s mother resided on May 16, 2008, the date S.M. entered excluded time status; and (3) therefore, Nobles County was the county of financial responsibility for S.M.'s out-of-home placement costs for services provided on and after October 1, 2008. View "In re S.M." on Justia Law

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Kelli Rohmiller was the sister of the mother of B.H. After B.H.'s mother died, B.H.'s father, Andrew Hart, was awarded custody of B.H. Rohmiller and her father, Clayton Rohmiller, subsequently petitioned the district court for visitation with B.H. The court jointly granted Rohmiller and Clayton unsupervised visitation with B.H. and provided that Rohmiller could exercise visitation without the presence of Clayton. Hart objected to Rohmiller's independent visitation with B.H. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's grant of visitation to Clayton but reversed the award of visitation to Rohmiller, holding that Minn. Stat. Ann. 257C.08 does not extend visitation rights to aunts generally and that she had no right to visitation under Minnesota law apart from the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an aunt who does not stand in loco parentis with a child has not right under Minn. Stat. Ann. 257C.08 to visitation with the child over the objection's of the child's fit parent; and (2) an award of visitation outside of section 257C.08 and the common law and over the objections of a child's fit parent cannot be based solely on what is in the best interests of the child. View "Rohmiller v. Hart" on Justia Law