Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves Angel Ignacio Sardina-Padilla, who was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder for the death of Jose Genis Cuate. Sardina-Padilla appealed the conviction, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrant to search his Facebook accounts. He claimed that the warrant application failed to establish probable cause and did not satisfy minimal constitutional requirements for particularity. He also argued that the district court abused its discretion by summarily denying his petition for postconviction relief, which alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.The district court had denied Sardina-Padilla's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the June warrant, concluding that the totality of the circumstances described in the June warrant application suggested that the accounts likely contained relevant evidence. The court also concluded that the June warrant satisfied minimal constitutional requirements for particularity.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the district court did not err in finding that the warrant application alleged that Sardina-Padilla asked someone to delete his Facebook account during a jail call. The court also concluded that the June warrant was sufficiently particular, considering the circumstances of the case, the nature of the crimes under investigation, and whether the officers could have provided a more precise description of the evidence sought. Finally, the court concluded that there was no reasonable probability that the trial’s outcome would have been different if counsel had successfully challenged the tracking data, and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by summarily denying Sardina-Padilla’s petition for postconviction relief. View "State v. Sardina-Padilla" on Justia Law

The defendant, Sylvester Jones, was charged with third-degree criminal sexual conduct, using force to accomplish sexual penetration. After initially pleading not guilty, Jones later entered a guilty plea to the third-degree criminal sexual conduct charge in return for dismissal of other charges. However, during the plea hearing, Jones made a statement on record denying that he had committed the offense. Despite this, the judge found Jones’s factual basis sufficient to support his guilty plea, accepted it, and adjudged Jones guilty. Jones did not request withdrawal of his guilty plea at the continued sentencing hearing, and the district court sentenced Jones to 153 months in prison.On appeal, Jones argued that his unaddressed assertion of innocence made the factual basis for his guilty plea inaccurate. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, reasoning that Jones’s assertion of innocence during the plea hearing did not invalidate his plea because after he made the assertion, Jones admitted to the factual basis for the guilty plea through affirmative responses to defense counsel’s leading questions.The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts. The court found that Jones’s guilty plea was inaccurate because he made a statement at the plea hearing that negated at least one element of the charged offense, and his guilty plea was not sufficiently rehabilitated because defense counsel subsequently used solely leading questions to elicit the necessary admissions for the factual basis. The court concluded that Jones is entitled to withdraw his plea to correct a manifest injustice under Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. The court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "State of Minnesota vs. Jones" on Justia Law

Michael Joseph Letourneau was charged with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. He was already incarcerated for unrelated reasons, which made him subject to the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA). This act allows incarcerated individuals to demand the speedy disposition of any pending criminal charges. Letourneau signed a formal request for his trial to commence within 6 months, as provided by the Act. However, during pretrial proceedings, Letourneau had multiple changes of counsel and a continuance due to defense counsel’s conflict that delayed resolution of pretrial matters. The district court found good cause to begin his trial in October, past the deadline otherwise required by the Act.The district court's decision to delay the trial was appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding good cause for a continuance because the delay was minimal and because Letourneau did not allege any prejudice caused by the delay.The case was then brought before the Minnesota Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in delaying the trial. The court noted that the district court had found good cause for the delay, citing changes of counsel, administrative delays, and scheduling issues. The court also noted that Letourneau's counsel did not object to the new trial date or the district court's finding of good cause to continue the trial date. The Supreme Court concluded that Letourneau’s right to a speedy disposition under the Act was not violated, and the district court’s reasonable continuance of the trial was not an abuse of its discretion. View "State of Minnesota vs. Letourneau" on Justia Law

The case involves Anthony James Trifiletti, who was convicted of second-degree unintentional felony murder. The conviction followed a second trial after the first ended in a mistrial due to a deadlocked jury. During the second trial, one of the State’s witnesses was exposed to COVID-19 and was deemed unavailable to testify in person. The district court allowed the transcript of her testimony from the first trial to be read into the record instead of live testimony. Trifiletti appealed, arguing that this violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 6, of the Minnesota Constitution.The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the district court erred in determining that the witness was unavailable under the Confrontation Clause. The court found that the State failed to establish that the witness would not have been available to testify in person at some reasonable point in time during the trial. The court also rejected the State's argument that Trifiletti invited the error by choosing to have the witness's prior testimony read aloud for the jury rather than having her testify via video. However, the court concluded that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the jury's determination that Trifiletti did not act in self-defense was surely unattributable to the witness's testimony. Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the court of appeals. View "State of Minnesota vs. Trifiletti" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the 1986 murder of Nancy Daugherty. The defendant, Michael Allan Carbo Jr., was charged with two counts of first-degree murder. The prosecution's case was based on DNA evidence collected from the crime scene and Carbo's garbage, which matched Carbo's DNA. Carbo sought to suppress this evidence, arguing that the collection and analysis of his DNA violated his Fourth Amendment rights. He also sought to introduce evidence suggesting that another individual, B.E., was the actual perpetrator.The district court denied Carbo's motion to suppress the DNA evidence, ruling that Carbo had abandoned his expectation of privacy by leaving his semen at the crime scene and his garbage in a communal bin. The court also denied Carbo's motion to introduce alternative-perpetrator evidence, concluding that the proffered evidence did not have an inherent tendency to connect B.E. to the crime.The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision regarding the DNA evidence. It held that Carbo had indeed abandoned his subjective expectation of privacy in the genetic information gathered from the crime scene and his garbage. However, the court reversed the lower court's decision on the alternative-perpetrator evidence. It found that the district court had abused its discretion by holding Carbo's evidentiary proffer to an unobtainable legal standard, thereby violating his constitutional right to present a complete defense. The court concluded that the error was not harmless and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State of Minnesota vs. Carbo" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the appellant, Said Sharif Maye, who was convicted of second-degree unintentional murder for the death of Idris Yussuf in August 2020. Prior to the trial, the district court denied Maye's motion to exclude testimony that the State's main eyewitness received several threatening phone calls before the trial, instructing him not to testify. The State argued that the evidence was relevant to the witness's credibility, showing that he was willing to testify despite threats. The district court allowed the evidence, reasoning that it was probative of the witness's credibility and that the prejudicial effect of the evidence would be mitigated by the State's suggested clarifying questions.The court of appeals affirmed Maye's conviction, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the threatening phone calls. The court of appeals reasoned that the evidence was relevant to the witness's credibility, the State's use of the evidence was minimal, and the evidence was admitted with sufficient safeguards to protect against unfair prejudice. The court of appeals also held that even if the evidence was erroneously admitted, its admission was harmless.The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the threat evidence on direct examination. The court reasoned that the probative value of the evidence was minimal, and the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant was substantial. However, the court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, agreeing that the admission of the evidence was harmless. The court concluded that there was no reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict, given the strong evidence of Maye's guilt. View "State of Minnesota vs. Mcneilly" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the appellant, Said Sharif Maye, who was convicted of second-degree unintentional murder for the death of Idris Yussuf in August 2020. Before the trial, the district court denied Maye’s motion to exclude testimony that the State’s main eyewitness received several threatening phone calls before trial telling him not to testify. At trial, the State questioned the eyewitness about the threats at the end of direct examination. The court of appeals affirmed Maye’s conviction and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the threatening phone calls.The Minnesota Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence on direct examination that a witness received threatening phone calls from an unknown caller and, if so, whether any such error was harmless. The court found that the district court did abuse its discretion by admitting the threat evidence on direct examination. However, the court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals because it agreed that the admission of the evidence was harmless. The court concluded that there was no reasonable possibility that the erroneously admitted threat evidence significantly affected the verdict. View "State of Minnesota vs. Maye" on Justia Law

The case involves Jerry Arnold Westrom, who was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and second-degree intentional murder. The victim, Jeanie Childs, was found stabbed to death in her apartment in 1993. The case went cold until 2018 when police began working with the FBI to review Childs’ murder. They sent a DNA sample from the crime scene to DNA Solutions, Inc. to create a single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) profile that could be compared with profiles on commercial genealogical databases to identify the source’s relatives. A potential match was located on MyHeritage that appeared to be a first cousin to the source of the crime scene DNA. Law enforcement then used the match to construct a family tree that identified Westrom as the likely source.The district court denied Westrom’s motion to suppress all evidence stemming from the police’s comparison of the SNP profile created from DNA gathered from the crime scene with other profiles on commercial genealogical databases. His motion also contested the admissibility of evidence obtained through the STR analysis of DNA taken from his discarded napkin. The district court concluded that no search had occurred because Westrom held no expectation of privacy in the information contained within his DNA when police only used his DNA for the purpose of identification.The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed Westrom’s conviction of first-degree premeditated murder. The court found that the district court did not err in concluding that the genetic analysis of a napkin discarded by Westrom was not a search under the United States or Minnesota Constitutions. The court also found that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support Westrom’s convictions. However, the court reversed the second-degree murder conviction and remanded to the district court to vacate that conviction, as it was an error to convict Westrom of both first-degree felony murder and the lesser-included offense of second-degree intentional murder. View "State of Minnesota vs. Westrom" on Justia Law

Tyson Joe Hinckley was convicted of first-degree arson, second-degree burglary, and theft of a motor vehicle. Hinckley had stolen a vehicle from a garage and started a fire that damaged the garage and an adjacent home. He sought to assert a mental-illness defense at trial, submitting multiple psychological reports attesting to his mental illness at the time of his offenses. However, the district court rejected the mental-illness defense, concluding that Hinckley had not provided sufficient evidence that he was acting under a defect in reasoning caused by mental illness at the time of the offenses. Hinckley was found guilty at trial, and the court of appeals affirmed the convictions.The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions, holding that the district court had abused its discretion by denying Hinckley the right to assert a mental-illness defense. The Supreme Court found that the psychological reports submitted by Hinckley provided sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of a mental-illness defense. The court concluded that the district court's error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as it could not be certain that the jury's verdict was surely unattributable to the error. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "State of Minnesota vs. Hinckley" on Justia Law

Edbert Neal Williams was convicted of first-degree murder and first-degree attempted murder in the death of Genelda Campeau and the attack on her adult granddaughter, S.C. Williams was sentenced to life in prison for murder and received a 180-month consecutive sentence for attempted murder. He appealed, and his convictions were affirmed. In this postconviction proceeding, Williams seeks a new trial or an evidentiary hearing based on new DNA evidence not available at the time of trial. Williams asserts the DNA evidence exonerates him and implicates an alternative perpetrator.Williams had previously filed multiple postconviction relief petitions, all of which were denied. In 2019, Williams filed a motion seeking forensic testing of evidence from the 1996 crime scene. The district court granted the motion, and the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (“BCA”) analyzed evidence that it had retained from the crime scene. The BCA released three reports in August 2020, September 2020, and November 2022, and a private lab Williams hired released one report in October 2022. Williams asserts that these reports corroborate his claims that he was not at the scene of the crime when it occurred and that an alternative perpetrator killed Genelda.The district court summarily denied his petition. The court concluded that Williams’s petition was barred by the 2-year time limit for postconviction relief petitions set out in Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4(a) (2022), and that neither the newly-discovered-evidence exception nor the interests-of-justice exception to the time bar applied.The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the new DNA evidence did not meet the clear and convincing standard for newly discovered evidence and, in fact, some of the additional testing points towards Williams as the perpetrator rather than excludes him. The court also rejected Williams's claim that he is entitled to relief based on the interests-of-justice exception because his mental illness prevented him from timely filing his petition. The court noted that Williams had been sufficiently competent to file his direct appeal from his conviction, postconviction petitions, and appeals from postconviction petitions. View "Williams vs. State of Minnesota" on Justia Law