Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant, a juvenile, was petitioned for a felony and then adjudicated delinquent of a misdemeanor arising out of the same set of circumstances. The court ordered that Appellant provide a biological speciman to determine her DNA profile for the limited purpose of criminal identification after concluding that Minn. Stat. 609.117, subd. 1(2), which requires a juvenile adjudicated delinquent of a misdemeanor to submit a DNA sample, did not violate constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures and was not a denial of equal protection. The Supreme Court affirmed after applying a totality-of-the-circumstances test, holding (1) the State's legitimate governmental interests in collecting Appellant's DNA outweighed Appellant's reduced expectation of privacy following her misdemeanor adjudication arising out of the same set of circumstances as her felony petition; (2) consequently, as applied to Appellant, section 609.177, sub. 1(2) did not violate the prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures in the state and federal constitutions; and (3) Appellant's equal protection claim failed because Appellant was not similarly situated to misdemeanants without a felony petition, who were not required to provide a DNA sample under the statute. View "In re M.L.M." on Justia Law

Appellant Darryl Colbert was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed Colbert's conviction on direct appeal. Colbert subsequently filed five petitions for postconviction relief, and the postconviction court denied each petition. In this case, Colbert appealed the postconviction court's denial of his fifth petition for postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Colbert's petition was time-barred under Minn. Stat. 590.01, subd. 4, which states that a person seeking relief has two years from the disposition of the person's direct appeal to file a petition for postconviction relief, because it was filed more than two years after it arose. View "Colbert v. State" on Justia Law

Michael Ferguson was convicted of one count of felony drive-by shooting at an occupied building and eight counts of second-degree assault, arising out of an incident in which multiple shots were fired at a duplex occupied by eight people. After Ferguson successfully appealed his original sentence, the district court imposed sentence on the drive-by shooting conviction and all eight assault convictions. On appeal, the court of appeals held that Minn. Stat. 609.035 required the district court to sentence Ferguson only on the drive-by shooting at an occupied building conviction. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and upheld the sentence imposed by the district court, holding that the court of appeals misapplied the rule that a district court may not sentence a defendant to more than one crime for each victim, and that a single sentence for drive-by shooting at an occupied building was not commensurate with Ferguson's culpability for using a dangerous weapon to intentionally cause eight persons to fear immediately bodily harm. View "State v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

Appellant Gary Roby was convicted of aiding and abetting the crimes of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree murder while committing aggravated robbery, and second-degree intentional murder. The Supreme Court affirmed Roby's conviction on appeal. Roby subsequently filed this, his third petition for postconviction relief, arguing that newly discovered evidence should be considered in the interests of justice. The postconviction court denied Roby's petition without an evidentiary hearing, holding (1) Roby's claims that were based on a 1989 police report and a 2002 letter were time-barred, and (2) Roby's remaining claims failed on the merits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) all of Roby's claims were time-barred under the postconviction statute, and (2) Roby was not entitled to relief through application of the doctrine of equitable tolling. View "Roby v. State" on Justia Law

The City of Red Wing enacted an ordinance requiring inspections of rental property before landlords could obtain operating licenses and allowing the City to conduct inspections by application for and judicial approval of an administrative warrant in the absence of landlord or tenant consent. Appellants in this case were nine landlords and two tenants who refused to consent to inspections of their properties and successfully challenged three separate applications for administrative warrants. At the same time Appellants opposed the City's application, they filed a separate declaratory judgment action seeking to have the rental inspection ordinance declared unconstitutional. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the declaratory judgment action for lack of standing, concluding that Appellants had not alleged an injury that was actual or imminent. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the challenge to the constitutionality of the rental inspection ordinance presented a justiciable controversy. Remanded. View "McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing" on Justia Law

Appellant Brent Kuhlmann was convicted after a jury trial of domestic assault and test refusal. On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court committed reversible error when it accepted a stipulation on elements of the charged offenses without advising him of his right to a jury trial on these elements and securing, either in writing or on the record, his personal waiver of the right to a jury trial on the stipulated elements. The court of appeals affirmed Appellant's convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court erred in failing to obtain Appellant's personal waiver of the right to a jury trial on the previous-conviction elements of the charged offenses; (2) the trial court's failure to obtain Appellant's personal waiver of his right to a jury trial did not amount to structural error; and (3) under the plain error standard, the error did not affect Appellant's substantial rights or the outcome of the case. View "State v. Kuhlmann" on Justia Law

Petitioners, including a state senator, filed a petition for writ of quo warranto challenging the authority of the county district court to authorize expenditures by any executive branch agency in the absence of legislative appropriations, the authority of the attorney general to seek authorization for such expenditures, and the authority of the commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Management and Budget to make payments for executive branch agency expenditures as authorized by the district court. The petition sought an order enjoining Respondents, including the attorney general, governor, commissioner, and chief judge of the district court, from seeking court orders that violated the state legislature's prerogatives to appropriate funds. In the meantime, the legislature passed, and the governor signed, appropriations for each state agency retroactive to the start of the biennium, and there were no further district court proceedings seeking funding. The Supreme Court found that the constitutional questions about the relative powers of the three branches of government were moot and would not arise again unless the legislative and executive branches failed to agree on a budget to fund a future biennium, and therefore, dismissed the petition as moot. View "Limmer v. Swanson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Brett Borg was found guilty of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. The court of appeals reversed Borg's conviction, concluding that the district court erred when it allowed a police officer to testify in the State's case in chief that Borg did not respond to a mailed request for an interview by the officer. At issue on appeal was whether the Fifth Amendment prohibits the State from eliciting testimony during its case in chief regarding a criminal defendant's lack of response to a letter mailed to him by the police when the defendant was not under arrest or in custody and had not been informed of his Miranda rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court did not err when it allowed the testimony because the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the State from introducing evidence regarding a defendant's silence unless the government compelled the defendant to speak or to remain silent. View "State v. Borg" on Justia Law

The Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards filed a formal complaint against Judge Patricia Karasov, judge of a district court, alleging violations of the Rules of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Minnesota Constitution. A three-member panel appointed by the Supreme Court (1) found that Judge Karasov failed to reside within her judicial district during her continuance in office and failed to cooperate and be candid and honest with respect to the Board's investigation of her residency status, and (2) recommended that Judge Karasov be censured and suspended from judicial office for ninety days without pay. Both Judge Karasov and the Board appealed. The Supreme Court concluded (1) the Board proved by clear and convincing evidence that Judge Karasov committed judicial misconduct by clear and convincing evidence; (2) Judge Karasov's claim that she was denied due process of law by irregularities in the proceedings lacked merit; and (3) the appropriate judicial discipline was censure and suspension from judicial duties for six months without pay. View "In re Conduct of Judge Karasov" on Justia Law

Appellant Thomas Zais was charged, in part, with disorderly conduct. Before trial, Zais moved to exclude the proposed testimony of his wife on the ground that it was barred by the marital privilege. The district court concluded that the crime exception to the marital privilege did not apply to the charged offense of disorderly conduct, and therefore Zais's wife was barred from testifying against Zais without his consent. The court of appeals reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Zais's wife could testify against Zais on the disorderly conduct charge because (1) the crime exception to the marital privilege applies to the charged offense of disorderly conduct when the alleged conduct is committed by one spouse against the other spouse; and (2) because the conduct underlying Zais's charged offense was directed at his wife, the crime exception to the marital privilege applied in this case. View "State v. Zais" on Justia Law