Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging, inter alia, that one of the witnesses who testified at Appellant's trial had given false testimony. The postconviction court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a hearing. After an evidentiary hearing on remand, the postconviction court again denied the petition, concluding that Appellant was not entitled to a new trial under the Larrison v. United States test. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion when (1) it concluded that certain out-of-court statements by the witness were inadmissible hearsay; and (2) it denied Appellant's request for the appointment of advisory counsel to assist him at his postconviction evidentiary hearing. View "Dobbins v. State" on Justia Law

Respondent pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary and was placed on probation for five years. The district court also ordered Respondent to pay restitution in monthly payments. Near the expiration of Respondent's probation term, Respondent still owed $20,894 in restitution even though she had complied with the district court's payment schedule. After a hearing, the district court extended Respondent's probation for five years to facilitate continued payment of restitution. Respondent moved to amend the district court's order by reducing the extension to one year, arguing that the district court lacked the authority to extend her probation for five years because Minn. Stat. 609.135(2)(g) authorizes only two one-year extensions of probation based on the failure to pay restitution. The district court agreed and amended the extension of probation from five years to one year. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Minn. Stat. 609.135(1)(a) and Minn. Stat. 609.14 grant a district court authority to extend a term of probation up to the statutory maximum based on a defendant's failure to pay restitution by the end of the originally imposed probation term. Remanded. View "State v. Barrientos" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of nine counts, including one count of first-degree premeditated murder and two counts of attempted first-degree premeditated murder, stemming from an incident in which Defendant fired a semiautomatic rifle at Joseph Rivera and two of Rivera's friends. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it (1) denied Defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment, as any alleged misconduct by the State did not substantially influence the grand jury's decision to indict; (2) admitted Defendant's taped statement to police, as the statement was voluntary made; (3) admitted a photograph of Rivera as a child, as the photograph was admissible as spark of life evidence; (4) denied Defendant's motion for a mistrial based on a law enforcement officer's testimony that Defendant was truant and once swore at a teacher in high school; and (5) denied Defendant's request for surrebuttal closing argument, because even if the district court erred in denying the request, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Morrow" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder by drive-by shooting and first-degree premeditated murder. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting out-of-court statements made by his wife and cell phone records obtained without a warrant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Defendant's wife's statement under Minn. R. Evid. 807; and (2) the district court did not err in finding Defendant had no subjective expectation of privacy in the cell phone records at issue under the Supreme Court's decision in State v. Gail, and therefore, the admission of the cell phone records did not violate Defendant's constitutional rights. View "State v. Griffin" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct and sentenced to forty-eight months in prison. As part of the sentencing order, the trial court ordered Defendant to pay restitution. More than ninety days after entry of the order imposing Defendant's initial sentence, the court amended the restitution portion of Defendant's initial sentence. The State appealed the amended sentencing order, but the court of appeals dismissed the appeal because it was not filed within ninety days after the initial imposition of Defendant's sentence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the issuance of an order amending the restitution portion of a sentence constitutes a "sentence imposed" within the plain language of the relevant statute, such that the State had ninety days to appeal the amended sentencing order from the date it was entered; and (2) because the State appealed the amended sentencing order within ninety days, the appeal was timely. Remanded. View "State v. Borg" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and second-degree murder. Appellant appealed, asserting, among other issues, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to police because he was in custody when he made the statements and had not received a Miranda warning. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) any error the trial court may have made in denying Appellant's motion to suppress statements he made to police was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant's conviction. View "State v. Sterling" on Justia Law

The district court issued domestic abuse no contact orders pursuant to Minn. Stat. 629.75(1) prohibiting Appellant from contacting his wife. After Appellant allegedly contacted his wife, he was charged with two felony violations. Appellant moved to dismiss the charges, contending that section 629.75(1) violates due process because it fails to provide adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard and encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The district court granted Appellant's motions, concluding that the statute provides defendants with no procedural due process and grants judges unfettered discretion in determining whether to issue a domestic abuse no contact order. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, on its face, the statute (1) ensures that a defendant will receive notice of the conditions to be imposed and an opportunity to challenge those conditions in a constitutionally sufficient proceeding before the court imposes a domestic abuse no contact order; and (2) is not unconstitutionally vague because it does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. View "State v. Ness" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with two counts of second-degree murder for the stabbing death of Tina San Roman and second-degree assault and attempted second-degree murder for the stabbing of a second victim, O.A.R. A jury acquitted Defendant on the murder counts but deadlocked on the two other counts relating to the attack on O.A.R. In preparation for a retrial on the unresolved counts, the district court (1) excluded the State's evidence related to San Roman's death, concluding that the evidence would mislead the jury and substantially prejudice Defendant; then (2) granted Defendant's motion to dismiss the remaining counts, concluding (i) Defendant could not present his alternative-perpetrator defense without using evidence relating to San Roman's death, and (ii) the exclusion of Defendant's alternative-perpetrator evidence would violate Defendant's right to present a complete defense. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the exclusion of the alternative-perpetrator evidence did not violate Defendant's due process right to present a complete defense. View "State v. Pass " on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. After unsuccessfully filing four petitions for postconviction relief, Appellant filed a "Motion for DNA Analysis" under Minn. Stat. 590.01(1)(a) requesting DNA testing of the victim's underwear. The postconviction court construed Appellant's motion as his fifth petition for postconviction relief and found the petition was procedurally barred. The Supreme Court affirmed without addressing the issue of whether the postconviction court erred when it treated Appellant's motion as a petition for postconviction relief, holding (1) Appellant's motion for DNA testing failed to satisfy the requirements of Minn. Stat. 590.01(1)(a) as a matter of law; and (2) even if it was proper to treat Appellant's motion as a petition for postconviction relief, Appellant's claim was time-barred. View "Wayne v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree arson, and theft of a motor vehicle. The district court sentenced Defendant to two consecutive life sentences without the possibility of parole for the two first-degree premeditated murder convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court's removal of two persons from the courtroom during voir dire did not violate Defendant's right to a public trial; (2) the district court erred when it admitted a statement Defendant made to the police during an unlawful search, but the error was harmless; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted into evidence several items that were found when Defendant was arrested; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that, if Defendant chose to testify at trial, the State could attempt to impeach him using three prior felony convictions. View "State v. Zornes" on Justia Law