Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An airport police narcotics investigator removed a package, which was addressed to Defendant, from a conveyor belt at the UPS mail area at the Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport, and placed the package on the floor. A trained narcotics-detection dog was brought into the area and alerted to the package. Based on the dog’s alert, an airport police narcotics investigator obtained a warrant authorizing him to open and search the package, which contained cocaine and methamphetamine. Appellant was charged with two counts of a first-degree controlled substance crime. Appellant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the movement of the package to the floor constituted a seizure, that the dog sniff constituted a search, and that the package was seized and searched without a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. The district court denied Petitioner’s motion, concluding that the detention and dog sniff did not constitute a search or seizure. The court of appeals affirmed on other grounds, determining that there was both a search and a seizure but that there was reasonable, articulable suspicion for both. The Supreme Court affirmed on the same basis as the district court, holding that there was neither a search nor a seizure under the facts of this case. View "State v. Eichers" on Justia Law

Police officers followed a Chevrolet Monte Carlo that drove away from a house suspected of hosting drug trafficking. The officers subsequently stopped the vehicle after learning that the Monte Carlo’s registration had been revoked and that it was registered to Defendant, whose driver’s license had also been revoked. The driver, who was identified as Defendant, indicated that the car was not insured. The officers decided to tow and impound the vehicle. During an inventory search, the officers found drug and drug paraphernalia in a purse on the passenger seat of the Monte Carlo. Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, aruing that the initial stop was lawful but that the search was unconstitutional because the police were not authorized to impound the vehicle, and the inventory search itself was pretextual. The district court denied the motion. The court subsequently found Defendant guilty on both counts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the impoundment was unreasonable, and therefore, the resulting inventory search was unconstitutional. View "State v. Rohde" on Justia Law

Appellant was stopped by police officers while driving in a 2003 Chevy Tahoe on suspicion that he did not have a valid driver’s license. Appellant was subsequently issued a traffic citation. The officers proceeded to conduct an inventory search of the Tahoe and found 225 grams of methamphetamine. The officers then searched Appellant and found $611 in cash. Appellant was charged with first-degree possession of a controlled substance. The vehicle and cash were seized, and Appellant was served with notice and intent to forfeit the seized property. Appellant filed a civil complaint demanding a judicial determination of forfeiture, arguing that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture actions and that the evidence supporting forfeiture was illegally obtained and must be suppressed. The district court granted summary judgment for the County. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to civil forfeiture actions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the exclusionary rule is applicable to civil forfeiture actions brought under Minn. Stat. 609.531-.5319; and (2) Appellant had standing to challenge the forfeiture of the vehicle and cash. Remanded. View "Garcia-Mendoza v. 2003 Chevy Tahoe" on Justia Law

The State filed a complaint against Defendant charging him with third- and fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial during a pretrial hearing. Thereafter, the State filed an amended complaint adding a charge of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Defendant did not personally waive his right to a jury trial on the amended charge. Defendant was subsequently found guilty of all three counts. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred when it failed to obtain a personal waiver of his right to a jury trial after the State amended the complaint. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant’s first-degree sexual conduct conviction. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, vacated Defendant’s conviction for first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and remanded, holding (1) when the State charges a defendant with an additional offense after the defendant has waived his or her right to a jury trial, the court must obtain a new waiver before dispensing with a jury; and (2) in this case, the district court’s failure to obtain a personal waiver of Defendant’s right to a jury trial on the charge of first-degree criminal sexual conduct constituted a plain error that affected Defendant’s substantial rights. View "State v. Little" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted for the first-degree premeditated murder of Devan Hawkinson. Appellant and Hawkinson were friends before Hawkinson was murdered. On appeal, Appellant argued that the district court erred by admitting evidence of his past conduct and relationship with Hawkinson, contending that the evidence violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause because it included testimonial statements that Hawkinson made to the police before his death and that it was irrelevant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) any error in admitting the evidence was harmless; and (2) none of the claims raised in Appellant’s pro se briefs entitled him to relief. View "State v. Rossberg" on Justia Law

After a jury trial in 1992, Appellant was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted first-degree murder. Appellant was fifteen years old at the time. Under a mandatory sentencing scheme, the district court imposed life sentences with the possibility of release after thirty years for the first-degree murder convictions. After the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama in 2012, Appellant filed a postconviction motion to correct his sentence, arguing that his sentence violated the rule announced in Miller. The postconviction court denied the motion, concluding that Appellant’s sentence was lawful because Miller was not retroactive. The Supreme Court affirmed without reaching the issue of Miller’s retroactivity, holding that Miller did not make the sentencing scheme at issue here unlawful because the mandatory sentencing scheme did not require life imprisonment without the possibility of release. View "Ouk v. State" on Justia Law

The State filed a delinquency petition charging Appellant, who was then fourteen years old, with first-degree felony murder (drive-by shooting), second-degree felony murder (drive-by shooting), and attempted first-degree felony murder (drive-by shooting). Defendant pled guilty to the murder charges, but the Supreme Court vacated the convictions. On remand, the case proceeded to trial, and a jury found Appellant guilty of all three counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over Appellant’s offenses; (2) sufficient evidence supported Appellant’s convictions; (3) assuming that the district court improperly instructed the jury on the elements of drive-by shooting, Appellant did not establish that the error affected his substantial rights; (4) Appellant’s mandatory life sentence with the possibility of release was not unconstitutional under the principles of Miller v. Alabama; (5) the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a longer sentence upon Appellant after his trial and conviction; and (6) the postconviction court did not err when it summarily denied Appellant’s petition for postconviction relief. View "State v. Vang" on Justia Law

James Bergstrom and Vanessa Rew dissolved their marriage in 2008. In 2002, 2007, and 2008, Rew obtained a series of one-year orders for protection (OFPs) against Bergstrom. In 2010, before the extended expiration date of the 2008 OFP, Rew filed an application under Minn. Stat. 518B.01(6)(a) to extend the terms of the 2008 OFP. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court extended the OFP for up to fifty years in favor of Rew and the couple’s minor children. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) section 518B.01(6)(a) does not require a finding of domestic abuse before a district court may extend the duration of an OFP; (2) the extension of an OFP under section 518B.01(6)(a) does not facially violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or Minn. Const. art. I, 3; (3) the record was insufficient to conclude that the extended OFP was constitutional with respect to Bergstrom’s children; and (4) the extension of an OFP for up to fifty years does not implicate the prohibition against double jeopardy or the Ex Post Facto Clause of either the United States of Minnesota Constitutions. Remanded. View "In re Rew" on Justia Law

In 2001, Respondent was found guilty of first-degree murder while committing or attempting to commit criminal sexual conduct and first-degree premeditated murder. Respondent was a juvenile when he committed the crime. The district court sentenced Respondent to life without the possibility of release (LWOR) under the mandatory sentencing scheme in Minn. Stat. 609.106(2)(1). After the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama in 2012, Respondent filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The postconviction court granted Respondent’s petition and resentenced him to life in prison with the possibility of release after thirty years. The Minnesota Supreme Court subsequently issued its decision in Chambers v. State, which held that the Miller rule does not apply retroactively to a juvenile whose sentence of LWOR under section 609.106(2)(1) became final before the Miller rule was announced. Thereafter, in the instant case, the Supreme Court reversed the postconviction court’s order and reinstated the original sentence of LWOR, holding that the postconviction court’s legal conclusion was in direct conflict with Chambers, and the circumstances of this case did not warrant granting relief to Respondent under the Court’s supervisory powers to ensure the fair administration of justice. View "Roman Nose v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder, two counts of first-degree felony murder, and three counts of first-degree aggravated robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions, holding that the district court did not err by (1) overruling Defendant's Batson objection to the State's peremptory challenge of an African-American prospective juror, as Defendant failed to prove that the challenge constituted purposeful racial discrimination; and (2) admitting evidence that Defendant assaulted and threatened a witness two days before trial to prove consciousness of guilt, as the district court correctly weighed the probative value of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice and provided safeguards to ensure the evidence would not unduly influence the jury's verdict.View "State v. Diggins" on Justia Law