Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Edgard Francisco Talave Latino was charged with misdemeanor domestic assault after an incident with M.T.L., with whom he had a prior romantic and sexual relationship. Latino and M.T.L. met in 2020 and had an on-again, off-again relationship that ended in November 2021. Shortly after their breakup, Latino went to M.T.L.'s apartment, where an argument ensued, and he assaulted her.The district court found Latino guilty of misdemeanor domestic assault, determining that he and M.T.L. had been involved in a significant romantic or sexual relationship, thus meeting the statutory definition of "family or household member." Latino waived his right to a jury trial, and the district court made this finding based on the evidence presented.Latino appealed, arguing that the statutory definition of "family or household member" should only apply to current relationships, not former ones. The Minnesota Court of Appeals disagreed, affirming the conviction by referencing its decision in Sperle v. Orth, which held that former relationships could qualify under the statute. The court of appeals concluded that the evidence was sufficient to prove that Latino and M.T.L. had been in a significant romantic or sexual relationship.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether the statutory definition of "family or household member" includes former significant romantic or sexual relationships. The court held that the definition does include former relationships, subject to the statutory factors of length, type, frequency of interaction, and time since termination. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the district court's finding that Latino and M.T.L. had been involved in such a relationship, affirming the decision of the court of appeals. View "State vs. Talave Latino" on Justia Law

Deborah Jane Clapp, a Minneapolis homeowner and taxpayer, filed a declaratory judgment action against the Minneapolis Public Schools and its officials. Clapp challenged the constitutionality of racial and ethnic preference provisions in a collective bargaining agreement between the school district and its teachers' union. She sought to stop the school district from implementing and spending public money on these provisions, alleging they violated the Minnesota Constitution's Equal Protection Guarantee.The district court dismissed Clapp's complaint, ruling that she lacked standing and that her claims were not ripe. Clapp appealed, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision, concluding that Clapp had taxpayer standing and that her claims were ripe for judicial review. The school district then petitioned for review by the Minnesota Supreme Court.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and focused on the issue of taxpayer standing. The court held that taxpayer standing exists only when the central dispute involves alleged unlawful disbursements of public funds. In this case, the court found that the alleged unlawful disbursements were merely incidental to the central dispute, which was the constitutionality of the racial and ethnic preference provisions in the collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, Clapp lacked taxpayer standing to bring her claims. The court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, upholding the district court's dismissal of Clapp's complaint. View "Clapp vs. Sayles-Adams" on Justia Law

Berry Alexander Davis was involved in the kidnapping and murder of Monique Baugh and the attempted murder of her boyfriend, Jon, on New Year’s Eve in 2019. Baugh was abducted, placed in a U-Haul truck, and fatally shot. Davis and a co-defendant, Cedric Lamont Berry, were charged with first-degree premeditated murder, attempted first-degree premeditated murder, and kidnapping. The State's theory was that Davis and Berry attacked Jon on behalf of Lyndon Wiggins, who had a falling out with Jon. Detective Briana Johnson testified about the relationship between Davis, Berry, and Wiggins, indicating they were involved in drug dealing together. Davis waived his right to testify, and the jury found him guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of release.On direct appeal, Davis argued that the district court erred in joining his trial with Berry’s and that Detective Johnson’s testimony was inadmissible and prejudicial. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected these arguments and affirmed his conviction and sentence. Davis also filed a pro se supplemental brief raising several claims, including that his sentence violated his constitutional right to a sentencing jury under Blakely v. Washington. The court found these claims lacked merit.Davis subsequently filed a postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and constitutional violations in his sentencing. The district court summarily denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that even if Davis proved the facts alleged, he would not be entitled to relief as a matter of law.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Davis’s postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing, as his claims failed on their merits as a matter of law. View "Davis vs. State" on Justia Law

In 2018, Ricky Darnell Waiters was convicted of first-degree felony murder, attempted first-degree felony murder, and drive-by shooting for an incident where he shot two people in a bar parking lot, killing one and wounding the other. Waiters admitted to the shooting but claimed self-defense. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Subsequently, Waiters filed multiple motions for postconviction relief, which the district court construed as petitions for postconviction relief and denied each time.Waiters filed a new petition for postconviction relief in November 2023, seeking reversal of his convictions or a new trial based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, erroneous evidentiary rulings, and insufficient evidence. The district court summarily denied the petition without a hearing and without providing reasons for the denial.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the record did not disclose the basis for the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court could not determine whether the district court had considered Waiters’s claims. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings to ensure that the district court properly considers and addresses Waiters’s claims for postconviction relief. View "Waiters vs. State" on Justia Law

Robert Lee Baker, III, was charged with second-degree intentional murder after he shot and killed Maurice Anderson. The incident occurred after Anderson and an accomplice robbed Baker and his girlfriend at gunpoint while they were in a car. As the robbers were leaving with Baker's property, Baker exited the car with a firearm and demanded the return of his belongings. Anderson raised his gun in response, and Baker shot him multiple times, resulting in Anderson's death.At trial, Baker claimed self-defense and defense of others, but the district court refused to instruct the jury on these defenses. The court concluded that Baker was not entitled to the instructions because he failed to establish that he was not the initial aggressor and that he did not have a reasonable means to retreat. The jury found Baker guilty of second-degree intentional murder, and he was sentenced to 438 months in prison. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, but on different grounds, concluding that Baker's use of deadly force was unreasonable as a matter of law.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense and defense of others. The court held that the proper standard for determining whether a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense or defense of others is whether the defendant produced reasonable evidence to support their claim. The court concluded that Baker presented sufficient evidence to support his claims of self-defense and defense of others, and that the district court's failure to give these instructions was not harmless. Therefore, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case for a new trial. View "State of Minnesota vs. Baker" on Justia Law

Almanzo Cotton was found guilty by a jury of second-degree intentional murder and second-degree unintentional murder for beating his girlfriend, Kim Laen Theng, to death. The district court sentenced Cotton to 306 months imprisonment and ordered him to pay $2,362 in restitution to the Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Board (the Board) to cover the cremation expenses paid by Theng’s daughter, S.T. S.T. had paid for the cremation using her personal credit card and later received funds from a GoFundMe campaign. She also submitted a claim to the Board, which awarded her the full amount of $2,362.Cotton challenged the restitution order, arguing that the GoFundMe proceeds should be considered a collateral source that offset the economic loss. The district court, however, concluded that the GoFundMe funds did not constitute recoupment of the cremation expenses from a collateral source and affirmed the restitution order. The court of appeals upheld the district court’s decision but remanded for the inclusion of a payment schedule.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the district court may not consider collateral sources when awarding restitution to the Board under Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a). The court concluded that the exclusive factors for determining restitution are the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim and the income, resources, and obligations of the defendant. The collateral-source provision of the Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Act does not apply in this context. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. View "State of Minnesota vs. Cotton" on Justia Law

Dontae White was convicted of second-degree intentional murder for the shooting death of Kevin Beasley. Beasley's mother, H.T., requested restitution for funeral expenses totaling $15,778.68. White argued that the life-insurance proceeds H.T. received should be subtracted from the restitution amount. The district court disagreed and ordered White to pay the full amount requested, reasoning that life insurance is intended to provide financial security and not just cover funeral expenses.The district court's decision was appealed, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the restitution order. The court of appeals found that life insurance proceeds should not be considered when determining the amount of economic loss sustained by a family member of a deceased person for restitution purposes. The court distinguished life insurance from other types of insurance, noting that life insurance provides financial assistance beyond specific expenses like funeral costs.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether life-insurance proceeds should be considered in calculating economic loss for restitution under Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a)(1). The court held that life-insurance proceeds paid to a family member of the deceased should not be considered in determining the amount of economic loss sustained by the family member as a result of the murder. The court reasoned that life insurance is an investment contract intended to provide financial security, not merely to cover specific expenses. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, upholding the full restitution order. View "State of Minnesota vs. White" on Justia Law

Dakota Drug, Inc., a wholesale drug distributor, was subject to the Wholesale Drug Distributor Tax in Minnesota. The dispute arose over whether rebate amounts paid to Dakota Drug’s customers under rebate agreements should be included in the company’s “gross revenues” for tax purposes. Dakota Drug argued that these rebate amounts should not be included because they were contractually obligated to return the rebates to customers, either through account credits or checks.The Minnesota Tax Court reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of Dakota Drug. The court determined that the rebate amounts did not constitute “gross revenues” as defined by Minn. Stat. § 295.50, subd. 3, which describes gross revenues as “total amounts received in money or otherwise.” The court concluded that Dakota Drug did not “receive” the rebate amounts because they were obligated to pay these amounts to customers once the rebates were earned.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Tax Court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that under Minn. Stat. § 295.52, subd. 3, “gross revenues” do not include rebate amounts paid to a wholesale drug distributor’s customer pursuant to a rebate agreement. The court reasoned that Dakota Drug did not come into possession of the rebate amounts as they were contractually obligated to return these amounts to the customers. Therefore, the rebate amounts were not part of the “total amounts received in money or otherwise” and should not be included in Dakota Drug’s gross revenues for tax purposes. View "Dakota Drug, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

Michael Benson was civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program in 1993. In 2020, he petitioned for a reduction in custody, which the Special Review Board recommended denying. Benson then sought a rehearing and reconsideration from the Commitment Appeal Panel (CAP). He filed a motion to cross-examine witnesses and participate in his defense, expressing a preference to proceed pro se. The CAP allowed limited cross-examination by Benson but required his appointed counsel to be present and conduct initial questioning. Benson refused to participate under these conditions, leading the CAP to dismiss his petition.Benson appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, arguing that the right to counsel under Minnesota Statutes section 253D.20 is waivable. The court of appeals affirmed the CAP's decision, holding that the right to counsel in section 253D.20 is not waivable, based on its precedent. The court also noted that Benson forfeited his constitutional arguments by not raising them at the CAP hearing.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether a civilly committed person can waive the right to counsel under section 253D.20. The court concluded that the right to counsel is waivable, provided the waiver is knowing and intelligent. The court found the statutory language ambiguous but interpreted it in light of legislative intent, common law, and constitutional considerations. The court reversed the court of appeals' decision and remanded the case to the CAP to determine if Benson's waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent. If so, the CAP must allow him to represent himself. View "In re Matter of the Civil Commitment of Benson" on Justia Law

Matthew Eric Zinda filed a petition under Minn. Stat. § 204B.44, requesting that Steve Simon, Minnesota Secretary of State, and Deborah Erickson, Crow Wing County Auditor, exclude Josh Heintzeman from the 2024 primary and general election ballots for State Representative for Legislative District 6B. Heintzeman had filed an affidavit of candidacy listing his party as “Republican.” Zinda argued that Heintzeman did not seek the nomination of a major political party because he did not specify “Republican Party of Minnesota” and thus should not be on the primary ballot.The Minnesota Supreme Court directed the parties to file responses and memoranda. Zinda was the only other candidate who filed an affidavit of candidacy for the Republican primary for the same office, listing his party as “Republican Party of Minnesota.” The court noted that Heintzeman won the Republican primary and would appear on the general election ballot as the Republican candidate.The Minnesota Supreme Court held that Zinda did not prove that the respondents committed an error by placing Heintzeman on the primary ballot. The court found that the term “Republican” is understood to refer to the Republican Party of Minnesota, as Minnesota law precludes other parties from using the word “Republican” on the ballot. The court also concluded that Minn. Stat. § 204B.06, subd. 1, does not require candidates to list the full name of a major political party on their affidavit of candidacy. Therefore, the court denied Zinda’s petition, allowing Heintzeman to remain on the ballot as a Republican candidate. View "Zinda v. Simon" on Justia Law