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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the district court’s conclusion that Respondent untimely filed his complaint challenging the forfeiture of his vehicle but reversed the district court’s conclusion that the insurance proceeds payable to Respondent under an insurance policy covering property damage to the vehicle were subject to forfeiture under Minn. Stat. 169A.63. The court held (1) Respondent’s complaint was time barred; (2) insurance payments are not subject to forfeiture under section 169A.63; and (3) therefore, the dismissal of Respondent’s complaint to the extent it challenged the forfeiture of the insurance proceeds was proper, but as to insurance payments, the complaint was dismissed for the wrong reasons. View "Briles v. 2013 GMC Terrain" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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At issue on certiorari was what evidence a tax court may rely upon in deciding whether the taxpayer has overcome the presumptive validity of the county’s assessment. Here, Taxpayer contested the County’s assessment of the fair market value of Taxpayer’s parking ramp. The tax court denied the County’s motion to dismiss, basing its decision on evidence presented in the County’s case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the tax court erred in considering the County’s evidence to decide the motion to dismiss because the relevant law permits only the Taxpayer’s evidence to be considered; but (2) the tax court did not abuse its discretion by holding, in the alternative, that Taxpayer’s evidence overcame the presumptive validity of the assessment. View "Court Park Co. v. County of Hennepin" on Justia Law

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A person is “carry[ing] a pistol on or about the person’s clothes or person” for purposes of Minn. Stat. 624.7142(1)(4) when that person is driving a vehicle with a handgun in the center console. During an inventory search of Defendant’s vehicle after his arrest on suspension of driving while under the influence of alcohol, police discovered a loaded handgun in the center console. Defendant was charged with carrying a pistol on or about his clothes or person while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of section 624.7142(1)(4). The district court dismissed the charge for lack of probable cause, concluding that the phrase “carrying on or about the person’s clothes or person” does not extend to a pistol within the closed center console. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a pistol is carried “on or about” one’s person or clothing if there is either a physical nexus between the person and the pistol or if the pistol is carried within arm’s reach of the person. View "State v. Prigge" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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A passenger who grabs the steering wheel of a moving vehicle is “operating” the motor vehicle under the criminal-vehicular-operation statute, Minn. Stat. 609.2113(1). Defendant was charged with criminal vehicular operation after he grabbed the steering wheel of a moving vehicle, causing the vehicle to crash and inflict great bodily harm on the three other occupants of the vehicle. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that he was not “operating” the motor vehicle for purposes of the statute. The district court disagreed, concluding that Defendant had operated the vehicle when he turned the steering wheel. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plain meaning of the term “operating” in section 609.2113(1) unambiguously included Defendant’s conduct. View "State v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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Contrary to the holding of the district court, Appellant filed a timely legal-malpractice claim under Minn. Stat. 541.05(1)(5). Respondent, Appellant’s attorney, prepared an antenuptial agreement for Appellant and his then-fiancee, Cynthia Gatliff, but the agreement did not include statutorily required witness signatures, making it unenforceable. One year after Appellant married Gatliff, Respondent drafted a will for Appellant that incorporated the antenuptial agreement by reference. When Gatliff later filed for divorce, she alleged that the antenuptial agreement was invalid due to its lack of witness signatures. Appellant subsequently sued Respondent for legal malpractice. While the invalid execution of the antenuptial agreement fell outside the six-year limitations period for malpractice claims, Appellant argued that subsequent representations by Respondent that the anteuptial agreement was valid were separate legal-malpractice claims that each triggered their own statute of limitations periods. The district court granted Respondent’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant sufficiently alleged that Respondent’s will drafting formed the basis for a separate malpractice claims within the limitations period. View "Frederick v. Wallerich" on Justia Law

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Contrary to the holding of the district court, Appellant filed a timely legal-malpractice claim under Minn. Stat. 541.05(1)(5). Respondent, Appellant’s attorney, prepared an antenuptial agreement for Appellant and his then-fiancee, Cynthia Gatliff, but the agreement did not include statutorily required witness signatures, making it unenforceable. One year after Appellant married Gatliff, Respondent drafted a will for Appellant that incorporated the antenuptial agreement by reference. When Gatliff later filed for divorce, she alleged that the antenuptial agreement was invalid due to its lack of witness signatures. Appellant subsequently sued Respondent for legal malpractice. While the invalid execution of the antenuptial agreement fell outside the six-year limitations period for malpractice claims, Appellant argued that subsequent representations by Respondent that the anteuptial agreement was valid were separate legal-malpractice claims that each triggered their own statute of limitations periods. The district court granted Respondent’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant sufficiently alleged that Respondent’s will drafting formed the basis for a separate malpractice claims within the limitations period. View "Frederick v. Wallerich" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Appellant’s third petition for postconviction relief, which asserted several claims based on facts alleged in two sworn affidavits, holding that the affidavits were legally insufficient to establish that Appellant was innocent of the offenses of which he was convicted. The postconviction court summarily denied the postconviction petition because it was filed after the statute of limitations in Minn. Stat. 590.01(4)(a) had expired and failed to meet the newly-discovered-evidence exception in Minn. Stat. 590.01(4)(b)(2). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the facts were legally insufficient to show that Appellant met the newly-discovered-evidence exception, and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it summarily denied the petition as untimely filed. View "Henderson v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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Past physical abuse, standing alone, can support the issuance of an order for protection (OFP) under the Domestic Abuse Act, Minn. Stat. 518B.01, because the Act imposes no temporal requirement on when the “domestic abuse” occurred. The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erred when it concluded, as a matter of law, that a finding of past domestic abuse alone is insufficient to support the issuance of an OFP without a showing of a present intent to cause or inflict fear of imminent physical harm. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that, under subdivision 2(a)(1) of the Act, a petition need only show that “physical harm, bodily injury, or assault” has actually occurred, regardless of when it occurred, to satisfy the first definition of “domestic abuse.” View "Thompson v. Schrimsher" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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A facsimile transmission is not a “delivery” under Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.01(c), which requires that a summons be “delivered” to the sheriff before an action is commenced, because Rule 3.01(c) contemplates personal delivery to the office of the sheriff. In this case, Plaintiff faxed a summons and complaint to the sheriffs in two counties. Deputy sheriffs from both counties personally served Defendants. Defendants moved to dismiss the action, arguing that facsimile transmission did not constitute “delivery” of the summons under Rule 3.01(c). The district court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the sheriffs completed service of process on each of the defendants, thus commencing Plaintiff’s action under Rule 3.01(a). View "Cox v. Mid-Minnesota Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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A facsimile transmission is not a “delivery” under Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.01(c), which requires that a summons be “delivered” to the sheriff before an action is commenced, because Rule 3.01(c) contemplates personal delivery to the office of the sheriff. In this case, Plaintiff faxed a summons and complaint to the sheriffs in two counties. Deputy sheriffs from both counties personally served Defendants. Defendants moved to dismiss the action, arguing that facsimile transmission did not constitute “delivery” of the summons under Rule 3.01(c). The district court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the sheriffs completed service of process on each of the defendants, thus commencing Plaintiff’s action under Rule 3.01(a). View "Cox v. Mid-Minnesota Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law