Justia Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Clifford Robert Letourneau, III, was charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota Statutes section 609.342, subdivision 1(d), which criminalizes nonconsensual sexual penetration when the actor uses force, defined as the infliction of bodily harm. The complaint alleged that Letourneau arrived at K.L.'s home, and without consent, inserted his penis into her vagina, causing her to cry and bleed due to vaginal tearing.The district court dismissed the charge for lack of probable cause, concluding that the complaint did not allege facts showing that Letourneau used force to accomplish the act of sexual penetration. The court interpreted the statute to require the use of force to accomplish the act of penetration, not merely in conjunction with it.The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision, interpreting the statute to require the use of force either before or during the act of sexual penetration, not necessarily to accomplish it. The court of appeals determined that the plain language of the statute criminalizes nonconsensual sexual penetration when the actor uses force either before or during the act.The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision, concluding that the plain language of section 609.342, subdivision 1(d) criminalizes nonconsensual sexual penetration when the actor uses force either before or during the act. The court held that the statute does not require the force to be used to accomplish the act of penetration. The court found that the facts alleged in the complaint, including K.L.'s statements about the bleeding and vaginal tearing caused by Letourneau's actions, established probable cause that Letourneau used force before or during the act of sexual penetration. View "State of Minnesota vs. Letourneau" on Justia Law

In early 2021, Jason Turner Johnson was charged with first-degree burglary and fifth-degree assault in Minnesota. Later, an additional charge of second-degree burglary was added. Johnson pleaded guilty to the second-degree burglary charge, and the other charges were dismissed. He was sentenced to 28 months in prison, but the sentence was stayed, and he was placed on probation for five years. In August 2023, Johnson's probation officer reported multiple probation violations, including new criminal charges and failure to contact his probation officer. Johnson requested jail credit for time spent in custody in North Dakota, which the district court partially granted.The district court revoked Johnson's probation, executed his stayed sentence, and awarded him partial jail credit for time spent in custody in North Dakota. The State of Minnesota appealed the jail credit determination. Johnson moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the State had no right to appeal the jail credit determination. The Minnesota Court of Appeals denied Johnson's motion, holding that the State's right to appeal a jail credit determination arises by necessary implication from its right to appeal any sentence imposed or stayed by the district court in a felony case.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether the State could appeal the district court's jail credit determination following a probation revocation. The court concluded that the State's right to appeal a jail credit determination arises by necessary implication from its express right to appeal a probation revocation decision under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.04, subdivision 3(4)(a). Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, allowing the State's appeal to proceed. View "State of Minnesota vs. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 1997, Milton K. Sanders was found guilty by a jury of one count of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted first-degree murder. The district court sentenced him to life in prison for the first-degree murder conviction and to consecutive 180-month prison sentences for the attempted first-degree murder convictions. Sanders's convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal in 1999.In May 2024, Sanders filed a motion to correct his sentence, arguing that his consecutive sentences were unauthorized by law because they exaggerated the criminality of his conduct and were based on an incorrect criminal history score. The district court denied his motion, concluding that the sentences were authorized by law and that any error related to the criminal history score was harmless.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that Sanders's argument regarding the exaggeration of his criminality was barred by the law of the case doctrine, as it had been previously addressed and denied in his direct appeal. Additionally, the court found that the consecutive sentences did not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of Sanders's conduct, as each offense involved a different victim, consistent with past sentences for similar offenses.Regarding the criminal history score, the court determined that any error in the district court's failure to pronounce Sanders's criminal history score at sentencing was harmless. The life sentence for first-degree murder was mandatory and unaffected by the criminal history score. The consecutive 180-month sentences for attempted first-degree murder were consistent with the presumptive sentence for a criminal history score of zero, as required by the sentencing guidelines.The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the sentences were authorized by law and that any error related to the criminal history score was harmless. View "Sanders vs. State of Minnesota" on Justia Law

Ryan Charles Rooney was found guilty of first-degree domestic abuse murder after a jury trial and was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. Rooney appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by precluding his alternative-perpetrator evidence and erred in denying his motion to suppress statements made to police officers. The case involves the murder of Rooney’s wife, Samantha Columbus-Boshey, whose body was found in a hotel room they had been staying in with her two young children.The district court precluded Rooney's alternative-perpetrator evidence, finding that he did not meet the foundational requirement to introduce such evidence. Additionally, the court denied Rooney's motion to suppress his statements to police officers, concluding that the statements were made voluntarily despite Rooney's head injury and hospitalization.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in precluding the alternative-perpetrator evidence, as Rooney failed to provide evidence with an inherent tendency to connect the third person, D.G., to the actual commission of the crime. The court also found that the district court correctly determined that Rooney's statements to police were voluntary, considering the totality of the circumstances, including his ability to comprehend and the nature of the interrogation.The Supreme Court concluded that the district court's rulings were based on a correct application of the law and were supported by the evidence. Therefore, the judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State of Minnesota vs. Rooney" on Justia Law

James Jurgensen sustained a work injury on July 29, 2021, while employed by Dave Perkins Contracting, Inc. He hired attorney Joshua E. Borken, who agreed to a contingent fee of 20% of the first $130,000 of compensation and 20% of any excess amount, subject to approval. Minnesota Statutes § 176.081, subd. 1(a) (2022), caps attorney fees in workers’ compensation cases at $26,000. The parties settled for $150,000, and Borken sought $30,000 in fees, including $4,000 in excess fees. The compensation judge approved $26,000 but denied the excess fees after applying the Irwin factors.The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirmed the compensation judge’s decision, finding no abuse of discretion in denying the excess fees. The WCCA also concluded that automatic approval of unobjected-to excess fees is inconsistent with section 176.081, which provides a presumptive cap on attorney fees. The WCCA did not address the constitutional issue due to a lack of jurisdiction.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the 2024 amendment to Minn. Stat. § 176.081, which increases the cap on attorney fees, does not apply retroactively. The court also held that the WCCA did not err by declining to automatically approve the requested excess fee. Additionally, the court found that Minn. Stat. § 176.081, subd. 1(a) (2022), does not violate the Contracts Clause of the Minnesota Constitution. Finally, the court concluded that the WCCA did not err by affirming the compensation judge’s denial of excess attorney fees under the Irwin factors.The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the WCCA, upholding the denial of the $4,000 in excess attorney fees. View "Jurgensen vs. Dave Perkins Contracting, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011, Carlos Heard was convicted of third-degree depraved-mind murder and second-degree intentional murder for shooting and killing his brother and another person during a struggle over a gun. The district court sentenced him to 313 months for second-degree intentional murder and 180 months for third-degree depraved-mind murder. Heard appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, challenging the district court's decision to allow impeachment evidence at his trial. The court of appeals affirmed his convictions, and the Minnesota Supreme Court denied review. Heard subsequently filed four postconviction petitions, all of which were denied.In 2023, Heard filed a fifth postconviction petition, arguing that the Minnesota Supreme Court's decisions in State v. Coleman and State v. Noor announced new substantive rules regarding the mental-state element of third-degree depraved-mind murder, which should apply retroactively to his case. The district court denied his petition, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that Coleman and Noor did not announce new rules but rather clarified existing law.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that Coleman and Noor did announce new rules of substantive law that apply retroactively. Coleman clarified that the mental-state element for third-degree depraved-mind murder requires a showing of reckless disregard for human life, while Noor held that this mental state cannot exist when the defendant's actions are directed at a particular person. The court also held that a postconviction petitioner is not required to independently satisfy the requirements of State v. Knaffla if the petitioner establishes that a new interpretation of state law is retroactively applicable in the first postconviction petition filed after the new interpretation is announced.The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision and remanded the case to the district court to consider the effect of Coleman and Noor on Heard's third-degree depraved-mind murder conviction. View "Heard v. State" on Justia Law

A 15-year-old girl, S.W., left her home in Anoka County, Minnesota, without permission to stay with her mother’s cousin, A.G., in Wisconsin, where A.G. lived with the defendant, Paulson. After using methamphetamine together, Paulson assaulted A.G., took S.W. to his family’s property in Stacy, Minnesota, and kept her there for two days, during which he threatened her, provided her with drugs, and sexually assaulted her. S.W. was eventually recovered in Anoka County, where she reported the kidnapping and assaults to police.Paulson was initially charged in Anoka County District Court with first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct. He moved to dismiss, arguing the offenses occurred in Isanti County, not Anoka County. The district court denied the motion, finding venue proper in Anoka County under Minnesota Statutes section 627.15, since S.W. was found there. The State later amended the complaint to add a kidnapping charge, to which Paulson entered an Alford plea. He did not challenge venue for the new charge. The district court accepted the plea and imposed sentence. On appeal, Paulson argued that his plea was invalid because the factual basis did not establish that venue was proper in Anoka County as required by Minnesota Statutes section 627.01. The Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected this argument, holding that venue is not an element of the offense.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed whether the statutory venue requirement is an element of the offense for purposes of the accuracy requirement of a guilty plea. The court held that the venue requirement in section 627.01 is not an element of the offense, and therefore, the factual basis for Paulson’s guilty plea was sufficient even though it did not establish venue. The decision of the court of appeals was affirmed. View "State of Minnesota vs. Paulson" on Justia Law

Samuel Alejondro Torrez was arrested for driving while impaired and driving after license cancellation. Law enforcement obtained a search warrant to test Torrez’s blood or urine, which he refused. Torrez was charged with first-degree test refusal and driving after license cancellation. Before trial, Torrez requested the district court to instruct the jury that the State must prove the arresting officer had probable cause to believe he was driving while impaired. The district court denied this request, and the jury found Torrez guilty on both counts.The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed Torrez’s conviction, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not including a probable cause element in the jury instructions. The court reasoned that the issuance of the search warrant already established probable cause.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed whether Minnesota Statutes section 169A.20, subdivision 2(2), requires the State to prove that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe the defendant was driving while impaired. The court held that the plain language of the statute does not require the State to prove probable cause for the refusal of a blood or urine test when a search warrant is involved. The court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, concluding that the district court did not err in its jury instructions. View "State v. Torrez" on Justia Law

In September 2015, Bobby Lykins suffered severe physical and cognitive injuries from a work-related explosion. In 2017, Lykins, his employer Anderson Contracting, Inc., and its insurer SFM Mutual Insurance Co. agreed to a workers’ compensation settlement. An addendum to the settlement was agreed upon in 2018. Both agreements were approved by a compensation judge. In 2022, a conservator was appointed for Lykins, who then petitioned the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) to set aside the settlements, alleging they were invalid due to Lykins’ incapacity at the time of signing and fraud by omission.The WCCA found that the evidence raised significant questions about Lykins’ capacity when he signed the settlements and referred the matter to a compensation judge for further fact-finding. The WCCA instructed that if the compensation judge found Lykins appeared to be incapacitated at the time of the settlements, the matter should be referred to district court for a determination of incapacity.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and clarified that the WCCA has the authority under Minnesota Statutes section 176.521, subdivision 3, to set aside an award if the settlement is invalid under section 176.521, subdivision 1(a). The Court affirmed the WCCA’s decision to refer the matter for fact-finding but vacated the part of the WCCA’s decision that required referral to district court. The Supreme Court held that the workers’ compensation courts have the authority to determine whether Lykins was incapacitated when he signed the settlements. The case was affirmed in part and vacated in part. View "Lykins vs. Anderson Contracting, Inc." on Justia Law

Fred Karasov joined a fitness center operated by Calhoun Orange in 2017 and signed a "Client Intake Form" containing liability-shifting provisions. In 2019, Karasov suffered cardiac arrest during a workout at the center, resulting in significant brain injuries. Tina Lund, Karasov's conservator, sued Calhoun Orange, alleging negligence. The district court granted summary judgment to Calhoun Orange on Lund's claims of negligence, negligent undertaking, and medical negligence, citing the exculpatory language in the Client Intake Form. A jury found in favor of Calhoun Orange on Lund's claim of willful and wanton negligence.Lund appealed the district court's summary judgment decision. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that the Client Intake Form's indemnification clause was enforceable and barred Lund's claims of ordinary negligence. Lund then sought review from the Minnesota Supreme Court.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed whether the Client Intake Form was enforceable to shield Calhoun Orange from liability for its own negligence. The court held that the indemnification clause in the form, which explicitly stated that the client agreed to indemnify the fitness center for "all acts of active or passive negligence," was a clear and unequivocal expression of the parties' intent to shift liability for negligence. Therefore, the clause was enforceable under the strict construction standard, and Lund's claims of ordinary negligence were barred. The court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, upholding the district court's grant of summary judgment to Calhoun Orange. View "Lund vs. Calhoun Orange, Inc." on Justia Law